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

Resourcing Stability Operations and Reconstruction

PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

March 23, 2006
Washington. D.C.

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RESOURCING STABILITY OPERATIONS AND RECONSTRUCTION: *PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE*



Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series Symposium
March 23, 2006

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Shannon A. Brown
General Editor

First printing, August 2006

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FOREWORD

In the American experience, stability operations and reconstruction, undertaken with the broad goal of "nation building" in mind, have emerged as key strategic issues in the 21st century. Nation building activities are closely related—both in theory and in fact—to our efforts to understand, contain, and preempt the spread of global terrorism, and stability operations are a function that both military and non-military actors are now grappling with to this end in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the world. Reconstruction efforts, especially programs aimed at reestablishing or augmenting neglected and war-damaged public works, infrastructure, and institutions—the foundation for nation-building—are proving difficult and costly.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, East Timor, and other places where U.S. and coalition forces continue to struggle on a daily basis with the problems of security. Bringing stability to these states is an important short-term goal for our forces, for only with some semblance of rule of law can we promote long-term peace, prosperity, and economic growth. Both history and recent experience suggest that stability and reconstruction cannot be achieved by military force alone. Thus a wide range of actors, government and non-government, must be engaged.

As the Department of Defense formally embraces stability operations and reconstruction as a core military competency (a position articulated in the recently-issued DoD Directive 3000.05), important questions loom: How will the U.S. Government pay for these operations, which are both costly and lengthy? Where will the resources come from to meet the challenges of stability and reconstruction? What forms of collaboration—government to government, government to private, government to non-government organization—will promote successful stability operations and reconstruction programs in the future? These are some of the broad questions at the heart of this symposium.

Future leaders will have to find satisfactory answers to these questions. The presentations and panel discussions captured in this symposium proceedings provide insightful contributions to policy discussions that are just now beginning in earnest.

Major General F. C. Wilson, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant
Industrial College of the Armed Forces

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TIMELY AND IMPORTANT, this symposium was the culmination of months of hard work by many people. As this year's symposium coordinator for the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, I would like to express thanks to the men and women who helped to make this event an engaging and thought-provoking success.

The symposium planning committee, consisting of Ambassador Cliff Bond, Dr. Frank Cooling, Dr. Alan Gropman, Captain John Yeager, USN (Ret.), Captain Ken Ryan, USN, and Dr. Shannon Brown, devised the program, selected insightful and experienced panel members, and attended to the many details of the event. Additional invaluable assistance was provided by members of the National Defense University staff, Mr. Brad Simmons and Ms. Holly Gannoe. Special thanks is due to Mr. Sean Connor, who provided critical assistance in a myriad of functions in the execution of the event.

Key oversight and administrative support of this symposium was provided by Mr. Bill Angerman, Mr. Billy Wilson, and Ms. Sharon Baker.

We are also grateful to our corporate co-sponsors, all of whom were essential to making this event successful: the National Defense University Foundation, the Military Officers Association of America, and the National Defense Industrial Association, all had an important role in supporting this endeavor. Finally, the staff of the National Defense University Foundation, especially Mr. Bob O'Such and Ms. Alice Bernardi, lent critical support to the planning and execution of this event, and they have our thanks.

Captain Brian Scott, USN
Symposium Coordinator
Department of National Security Studies
Industrial College of the Armed Forces

INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Eisenhower National Security Series event examined issues related to a subject of almost daily reporting in newspapers and on television programs throughout the world today: stability operations and reconstruction. The object of this symposium was to encourage discussion on questions related to how stability operations and reconstruction efforts are resourced. In light of the fact that these kinds of activities—sometimes described as elements of "nation building"—are now being recognized as key missions of the Department of Defense and other non-military U.S. government agencies, the symposium provided participants with a rare opportunity to hear a variety of perspectives from highly distinguished participants. As the nation's premier national security resource management educational institution, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces welcomed the opportunity to host this event.

The symposium consisted of three sessions. The first session was a lecture on the history of U.S. involvement in stability operations and reconstruction. The second and third sessions were panel discussions. Key takeaways from each are noted below. The reader is encouraged to read the prepared remarks and discussion summaries of each panel for additional detail on the broad themes identified below. The discussions were rich and thoughtful, and although the panel members reached some consensus, there were moments of disagreement that deserve attention.

Section I: Resourcing Stability Operations and Reconstruction: A Historical Perspective

- Stability operations and reconstruction are an important part of the military heritage of the United States.
- Historically, "success" in stability operations and reconstruction has been difficult to define.
- In the American South, post-Civil War reconstruction failed because resourcing faltered; in addition to other key resources, national will was lacking.
- In Haiti, Cuba, and in other cases, stability operations and reconstruction failed because of the prejudices and expectations of U.S. policy-makers.
- Post-World War II Germany and Japan were successful nation building efforts because both states were totally defeated; existing institutions were leveraged by the occupying power(s) when appropriate; and resource commitments were high, thanks in part

to careful pre-occupation planning.

Section II: Issues and Challenges in Stability Operations and Reconstruction

- The record for nation building is encouraging. According to Ambassador James Dobbins, the U.S. success rate stands at about fifty percent.
- There is a growing body of professional expertise in stability operations and reconstruction as the U.S., UN, and other organizations participate in humanitarian and nation building activities.
- In connection with Iraq, this expertise was available but largely ignored by the Bush administration; according to the panelists, the wrong case studies were cited to explain the occupation of Iraq.
- If stability operations and reconstruction efforts are to become a routine part of U.S. foreign policy (as suggested by Department of Defense Directive 3000.05), new strategies are going to have to be adopted to cultivate and retain the institutional expertise required to sustain future nation building programs.
- The decision to intervene in another country's affairs—with the intent of nation building—must not be made lightly, and must not be made without detailed plans that draw on all resources, military and non-military alike.

Section III: Resourcing Stability Operations and Reconstruction: Challenges for the Future

- Developing a strong interagency process for stability operations and reconstruction is vital if the U.S. government is to embark on nation building in the future.
- From a resource management standpoint, military institutions can serve as an enabling force for non-military actors involved in nation building. This can be extended to include training and doctrine development.
- Allies—both government and non-government—are vital to nation building efforts. For a variety of reasons, stability operations and reconstruction efforts should not be undertaken unilaterally.
- The private sector can have a valuable role in stability operations and reconstruction, not only by providing materiel support to the effort, but also by serving as a bridge to local or indigenous partners and assisting with institution-building.

SECTION I

Resourcing Stability Operations and Reconstruction: A Historical Perspective

B.F. Cooling and Alan Gropman

Precedents from the distant past (the post-Civil War occupation of the American South, early 20th century Caribbean and Philippine interventionism, efforts to promote liberalism and self-determination in Europe after World War I), as well as the more recent past (Haiti between World Wars, post- World War II Germany and Japan) suggest that best intentions of U.S. policymakers can be understood with the old adage about the interwar French Army General Staff: that they remembered nothing and forgot nothing from the experience of World War I. Historically, traditional resource areas like manpower, material and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, health care support, communications, host-nation support, environment, law, and funding cut across time and experience. Military institutions are very adept at capturing lessons learned for war fighting. Indeed, the study of military history is dedicated to the premise that one can learn from both success and failure. Today, however, men, material and finances may be most important for stability and reconstruction operations.

For American armed forces, military victory against conventional fighting foes now seems relatively easy. But, stabilization and reconstruction operations (nation building) remain difficult. The plethora of proscriptive counterinsurgency books from the 1960s, published during the first decade of the American intervention in the Vietnam War hardly produced victory. Similarly, today's work on stabilization and reconstruction often oversimplify the complexities and underestimate the difficulties associated with rebuilding both public works and the societies that subscribe to them. Conventional wisdom today suggests that successful reconstruction takes five to seven years. The lessons of history suggest otherwise. The United States remained involved intimately with the ex-Confederacy for nearly thirteen years after the surrender at Appomattox and the effort ultimately failed. U.S. forces occupied Haiti for a period of nineteen years and failed; in the Philippines, the U.S. maintained both a military and non-military presence in the archipelago for nearly a half-century and failed. The models of post World War II Germany and Japan seem more successful. Yet, both countries still host American troops, enjoy the American nuclear umbrella, and consequently have the luxury of

devoting much less of their gross domestic product than the United States to defense thanks to American military protection.

Korea, of course, can be counted a success—but this success story took more than three decades. Coalition partners from NATO and Europe have been in Bosnia for eleven years and Kosovo for seven years. Both efforts remain wobbly. Certainly, the American experience is hardly unique. Papua New Guinea is a failed state, the Solomon Islands no better, East Timor is failing, and Fiji has experienced a series of military coups. All over post-colonial Africa, new nation-states teeter on the brink of collapse: the Congo suffers a kind of identity crisis with unstable leadership that renames the country with some frequency; Nigeria, after decades of independence, remains problematic; Uganda is in trouble; Rwanda and Burundi are trembling; and Zimbabwe is close to hopeless, from a political and economic standpoint. So, it would be wise to broaden and carefully study all nation-building generalizations even though the American experience seems the most informative for today's situation. Above all, it is important to define what stability operations and reconstruction mean if we are to understand the purpose of these efforts, assess the effectiveness of resourcing to these ends, and set realistic expectations about the future.

Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 provides a good definition for stabilization and reconstruction operations: military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict for establishing or maintaining order in states and regions. From thence, the literature flows in many directions. One of most useful progenitors of useful wisdom, Robert Orr, *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington: CSIS Press, 2005), highlights "four pillars of reconstruction: security, governance and participation, economic and social well-being, justice and reconciliation." Those pillars seem as relevant to the experiences of the 1860s as they do to the world of 2006. These pillars seem as mystifying to policymakers today as they apparently did a century and one-half ago.

The essential question remains, "why so?" Part of the problem may be reflected in two opinions from respected serving officers. The words of Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower at the opening of the North African campaign in 1942 concerning his immersion, not just with combat but also civil affairs matters suggested the impact and interplay. "The sooner I can get rid of these questions that are outside the military in scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week," he wrote Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall in Washington, "of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters." Later, another officer reported conditions upon first entering a Sicilian town: "…and what a lot of headaches I found. Water supply damaged. No

power. No food. No fuel, and corpses all over town to bury."

Should the military assume such uncongenial tasks; should soldiers become governors? The question has been answered by history—not only they should, but also they will, despite generations of warriors skirting the issue and politicians wishing away the inevitable. Colonel Irwin L. Hunt, Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany penned his report on American Military Government of Occupied Germany from 1918 to 1920 with the blunt conclusion: *It is extremely unfortunate that the qualifications necessary for a civil administration are not developed among officers in time of peace. The history of the United States offers an uninterrupted series of wars, which demanded as their aftermath, the exercise by its officers of civil governmental functions. Despite the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the southern states, Cuba, Porto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines and elsewhere, the lesson has seemingly not been learned. In none of the service schools devoted to the higher training of officers, has a single course on the nature and scope of military government been established. The majority of the regular officers were, as a consequence, ill equipped to perform tasks differing so widely from their accustomed duties.*

What might a study of history have taught generations repeatedly faced with requirements for security, stabilization and reconstruction? Moreover, what resourcing lessons might they then have learned? We can begin with reconstructing the American Union (1860-1878).

The American Civil War and Reconstruction

Viewed traditionally, the American Civil War began at Fort Sumter (1861) and ended at Appomattox (1865). Confederate defeat was followed by a formal Reconstruction period that lasted until the disputed presidential election solution of 1876/1877. More rationally, in terms of stabilization and reconstruction, the period must be expanded to 1860 (the date of first state secession) until 1878 (passage of a Posse Comitatus provision to a War Department appropriations act prohibiting use of the Federal military domestically except under special circumstances). Such an expansion of reality permits recognition of a full spectrum integration of crisis, war, stabilization and reconstruction which reflected employment of main force combat, counter-insurgency, restoration of civil authority, institutions and governance at one and the same time in different places and circumstances in the American South. This paradigm further underscores the *duration* and crucial resourcing issues for reconstructing the American nation.

History professor and Arts and Sciences Dean Edward L. Ayers of the University of Virginia has suggested how America's experience with post-Civil War Reconstruction may be useful "as a guide to what to expect

elsewhere in the world.'' Ayers contends that most of the societies that the United States has tried to reconstruct ''have been like the South in 1865,'' rather than post-World War II Germany and Japan. That is to say, they have a strong indigenous resistance to the occupying force, a residue from the prewar regime neither destroyed nor discredited, forces of change and reaction vying for domination, strong ethnic or racial components, and a lack of overwhelming U.S. military presence on the ground. He concludes that by understanding our own Reconstruction, we can better understand those reconstructions currently in progress in the twenty-first century.

Indigenous resistance came from southerners as soon as United States troops invaded the South and continued their occupation throughout the war and reconstruction. It was always a question of winning hearts and minds— well recognized but not always well practiced by politicians and soldiers during the presidential administrations of Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson. Harsh war and soft peace policies alternated in blinding confusion of practice by soldiers on the ground so that southerner (unionist and confederate alike) resistance developed early and lasted long. Moreover, the *prewar regime residue* (a residue of oligarchy, party and social class) complicated attainment of stability and security so that to avoid complete revolution, buy-ins from the defeated soon overturned many of the political and socio-economic goals of the victorious United States government (and the northern political factions that supported the war). The *forces of change or reaction* for governance soon engaged in a footrace that tested the staying power of the victorious parties. Superimposed upon what opposing sides styled either a war of rebellion or a war for independence was the ethnic and racial dimension—first of slave emancipation, subsequently the award of civil rights to freed people. Matters of legal equality and racial discrimination became intertwined during and after the war underpinnings of the larger problem.

In retrospect, two preeminent factors emerge that can help us understand the failure of reconstruction in the American South—the huge expenditure of national treasure (wealth and humanity) during wartime and lack of continued overwhelming military presence for enforcing the peace. The cost of the carnage—more than 625,000 Americans killed (nine per cent of the US male population, aged 15 –39, according to the 1860 census) with at least another quarter-million maimed—can be understood as a $1.6 billion loss for the Union and another $1.8 billion loss—in human capital—for the Confederate side alone. Physical property destruction in the South added another $1.5 billion; economic historians have concluded that the cost of merely the war alone (not counting formal reconstruction) approximated $6.7 billion. The war's cost could have purchased all slaves at 1860 prices, given each freed family forty acres and a mule and still had $3.5 billion left for ''reparations'' of back wages. Such was the cost of

changing American history to expunge human chattel! The cost produced so severe a shock to the American psyche that further commitments to potentially damaging stabilization and reconstruction past 1876 proved most unappealing to the citizenry.

Number counts and statistics of force ratios for Civil War occupation further underscore belie the problem. From approximately 140,000 Federal troops present for duty in the occupied South at the end of 1861, this number crested at 463,000 in March 1865. Even by June and September 1865, 202,277 and 186,788 officers and men respectively remained in the states of the former Confederacy from a total army strength of about 1,000, 000; these forces absorbed a budget of $1,031,323. Even then, the core ''deep South'' of Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and the Carolinas remained relatively clear of field and garrison forces. Soon, however, cessation of overt hostilities brought postwar demobilization demanded by the American public. By 1866, War Department expenditures of only $284,850 funded an army of 57,072, and there was a steady diminution of strength for the occupation army from 87,550 in January to 17,679 by October. This pattern remained the norm for the rest of the ''formal,'' or traditionally defined ''Reconstruction'' period. By October 1876, barely 6,011 regulars could be found distributed across the eleven former Confederate states. The whole army only numbered 28,565 during the same year as Custer's Last Stand and the ground forces of the United States subsisted on a budget of $38,071. Reinstitution of state militias in the South hardly provided suitable offsets, nor did the prevalence of black U.S. troops imposed on predominantly white population win hearts and minds. Restoration of state law, politics and social mores provided a distinct feeling of *déjà vu* to the southern states basically unreconstructed!

Lack of overwhelming military presence was exacerbated by absence of (much less merely weak or ill-defined) an interagency process. The United States Government of the nineteenth century was simply not configured either structurally or philosophically for the social, political, and economic actions demanded by civil war and reconstruction. Aside from the United States army, the War Department's Freedmen's Bureau and the Department of the Treasury's collection officers constituted the Federal response to integrated war, stabilization and reconstruction efforts (supplemented by ill-defined, coordinated or understood private sector charitable gestures). Above all, personnel of those agencies required military protection. Little wonder that Secretary of War William W. Belknap's 1871 annual report noted that ''it has been absolutely necessary to retain about one-sixth of the Army in those states of the South, east of the Mississippi, which were engaged in the war of the rebellion.''

For instance, ''numerous applications for troops'' to aid in the enforcement of provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution

came from officers of internal revenue, members of the U.S. Marshal Service, state officials, and private citizens. Reiterating the meaning of these requests, Belknap noted "that the security of the people demanded the continued presence of the regular forces." "Indisputable evidence establishes the fact," he commented, which was also proven "by the experience of numerous sufferers, 'that an armed rebellion of regular organization and great strength now exists in parts of those States.'" He was referring to the Ku Klux Klan and other such radical groups that constituted a reconstruction-period guerrilla-terrorist movement bent on continuing the war by other means. In fact, the war secretary had but 8,038 available troops from an army strength of 29,115 to handle the tasks enumerated by Belknap.

Thus, ironies that surface by re-thinking the American Civil War and Reconstruction period transcend purely combat questions. The forces of nationalism rearranged power and focus at the national governmental level, with wartime presidential supremacy buckling under pressure to a Congressional vying for control of the post-war situation. Northerners collectively turned their backs on the section of their country that had, in their minds, caused the conflagration. The national will that so dutifully fought the war proved unsustainable to formal reconstruction. The forces of nationalism prevailed over sectionalism during armed conflict, but nationalist sentiments did not capture the hearts and minds of those under reconstruction, and states' rights and home rule were rigorously pressed in the South. The economics of the southern plantation system, disrupted for a brief moment in the endgame of the war and during the first optimistic months of the post-Appomattox occupation, reemerged with a white oligarchic power. Under these conditions, economic reality distorted the dreams of freedmen into a new kind of peonage, despite the theoretical granting of theoretical civil rights via constitutional amendment. The government and the army—traditionally expansible for war—predictably contracted in peace with efficiency, managerial prowess, and the attendant organizational decay that seems to result from peace.

In the end, economics and racial politics dictated the frictional response of government and the people. A nation was reunited, but there was no national settlement. War accomplished constitutional achievement—no right to secession and no right to enslave man. But the Civil War's "greatest generation" proved the adage that it was easier to win a war than to impose a just and abiding peace. The Confederacy lost its war of independence but the American South won the peace only to continue as the economic and social "sick-man" of America well into the second half of the next century.

Constructing an Empire 1898-1934

The United States thrust itself into the community of imperial nations at the turn of the nineteenth century after flirtations with intervention in the Pacific (Samoa and the Hawaiian Islands) and the Caribbean (providing moral support to Cuban revolutionaries fighting their Spanish masters). Driven by economic and political ambitions that reached beyond the borders of North America, the McKinley administration became engaged in a war with Spain in 1898. In the aftermath of this brief conflict, U.S. forces once again were committed to promoting security and stability, this time in overseas territories that were ceded by Spain to the United States as part of the 1898 Treaty of Paris peace settlement. For the United States, the reconstruction—indeed, the rehabilitation—of the Philippine Islands, Cuba, and Puerto Rico became the great politico-military challenge of the first decade of the twentieth century. These efforts were not without controversy, however, as anti-imperialist voices called on the president and Congress to disengage from these conquered lands, recall the armed forces, and renounce the imperial urge, even in instances when intervention was contemplated to bring liberty and democracy to benighted peoples.

These demands fell on deaf ears in Washington, however, and the American people accepted—even embraced—the idea of an overseas empire guided by the principles of the founding fathers. Even with the best of intentions, however, once the United States decided to assume responsibility for Cuba, Haiti, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Samoa, and (eventually) undertake the paternalistic domination of most of Central America, visions of democratic and economically productive subjects were replaced by the realities of nation building. Repeated naval/marine expeditionary interventions, justified at home and abroad under the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and the "Open Door" Policy in China vied for resources with tempestuous counter-insurgency/guerrilla operations in the Philippines, as well as road, water system, sewage disposal, schools and establishment of the instruments of government whether by diplomats, colonial administrators or the military.

From all of this emerged a sort of proto-colonial office in the War Department's Bureau of Insular Affairs, an ever-present record of insurgent and U.S. military atrocities and massacres against native populations (paralleled by U.S. sponsorship and training of indigenous native legions like the Philippine Constabulary, Guardia National de Nicaragua, Guardia Nacional Dominicana, Guardia Rural in Cuba as well as the U.S. Army's own Philippine Scouts also composed of native Filipinos) the more admirable civic action record of building infrastructure, health and educational systems, and indigenous governance attached to nation-building that vaulted military names such as Leonard Wood, Walter Reed and John J. Pershing

together with colonial administrators like Taft to the forefront of recognition at home and abroad. The army's Quartermaster's Department (whose historic mission was the transportation of troops and supplies) had to respond to service colonial missions by developing an efficient Army Transport Service with home ports, ocean transport service, harbor boat service and an inter-island service in the Philippines prior to World War I.

There were never enough military forces to aid civilians (native and colonial office) in pacification and democratization. Military officers consistently underestimated resource needs during the Philippine insurrection and a succession of presidents soon came to understand that intervention bore more fruit than occupation—although no official ever recanted from such dogma to the point of eschewing Big Brotherism entirely. Morality and ethics trumped reality in the rationales for imperialism and American Christianity and racism ran up against Moro Islam and in the southern Philippines that siphoned resources for a nasty fourteen-year campaign to civilize that region with Krag-Jorgenson rifles!

Notwithstanding introduction of civic action and civil government to core military combat missions with attendant acquisition of skills and leadership/followership education for all—the impact of empire resourcing can be suggested simply by statistics. War Department expenditures that exceeded $50,000,000 per annum only in 1894 before the Spanish war never again receded under $125,000,000 with figures close to or exceeding $200,000,000 for the duration of the period 1899-1915. Similarly, the regular army of about 28,000 officers and men pre-Spanish war never went below easily double that figure in the same years according to *Historical Statistics of the United States*. Clearly, even the "Army of Empire," as it has been styled by one military historian, swelled with volunteers from the states to 209,714 during that war itself required manpower from 70,000 - 106,000 as the United States took on new roles and missions. Eventually, and the predictable American cycle of major war and peace witnessed by participation in World War I had much to cause the result, public and politicians alike, internationalism and empire. By the 1920s and 1930s, the tide of interventionism and paternalism quieted to some extent so that while the Caribbean and Central America as well as influence in China continued to demand resourcing, the Philippines were pointed toward eventual independence. Even then, however, World War II intervened to delay protectorate transition to full nationhood promulgated with a cost by 1946 of perhaps incalculable American blood and treasure recapturing the possession before finally cutting it loose. But, that is another story.

Stabilizing Europe for Democracy—1919-1922

By 1903-1904, the United States had intervened briefly in Morocco

and Abyssinia, and continued to deploy forces to Latin American countries when political and commercial interests within the United States saw fit. But a new global challenge—Bolshevism—and the collapse of former European empires during the Great War (1914-1918) brought a new kind of urgency—fueled by ideological considerations—to America's foreign affairs. President Woodrow Wilson to send the military not only to France and Italy for combat, but also to post-czarist Russia and the Balkans to contain Bolshevism and spread democracy—as well as reconstruct and nation-build. Bolshevism vied with democracy and capitalism, especially in a post-Versailles Germany. As part of the four partite occupation of the Rhineland (as an associated power with Great Britain, France and Belgium), the United States provided military forces (originally intended as a 7,000-man reinforced brigade but ultimately varying even over 10,000 in number), but only informally participated in the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission for civil governance because of the United States Senate's refusal to ratify the Versailles treaty—an instance where domestic politics trumped the high-minded international goals of Wilson and his like-minded associates. The High Commission met in Coblenz, where the American Forces in Germany under Major General Harvey Allen was also headquartered. U.S. participation continued from 1919 to 1923; formal allied occupation of the Rhineland (designed to ensure the good behavior and stability of the fledgling Weimar Republic, and payment of war reparations) ended only in 1930. When Germany and the United States signed a separate peace treaty in 1921, the Army of Occupation became a political football.

Western senators like William E. Borah, Hiram Johnson and Robert La Follette—even powerful Massachusetts senator Henry Cabot Lodge—demanded the removal of U.S. forces because of the expense. The Rhine army cost millions of dollars per month to keep in the field. This cost was supposed to be borne by Germany (which owed the United States alone almost $240,000,000 for upkeep of the forces on its soil). The possibility of a U.S. withdrawal did not go unnoticed. The French offered to subsidize the American presence, and even the defeated Germans quietly asked for U.S. forces to remain, noting that spending by soldiers supported the economy and helped to offset the suffering of the poor. Frankly, many of the "Doughboys" preferred to remain on German soil, recognizing that their alternative postings might be unpopular duty on the Mexican border or a return to poorly built World War I cantonments. Moreover, American entrepreneurs had ventured to the Rhine in support of the military—bankers, merchants, taxi drivers, photographers and restaurant owners who had no alternative either but to return to postwar uncertainty in America from such lucrative opportunities. The Yanks eventually went home in 1923, convinced that their security, stabilization, and reconstruction

service on the Rhine had made a lasting impact for democratizing Germany.

The customary issues that had confronted Maj. Gen. Harvey Allen and his army involved military tribunals, establishing ordinances on civilian identification, possession of alcohol, arms and ammunition, assembly, communications infrastructure and public health—activities that were not dissimilar from what roles the army had performed in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico nearly two decades earlier. Sanitation, civilian food supply distribution, industry and labor relations, were among the issues and problems addressed by U.S. forces, as well as the administration or governance of finance, supply, billets, banking institutions, taxation, and armistice interpretations on matters including prisoners of war, abandoned war material, and property restitution. American supervision of local German civil government, the thorny questions of Rhenish separatism and the Bolshevik movement, inter-allied relations, and the most prosaic of all problems—keeping the occupation troops trained, entertained, informed, drilled and disciplined—also clogged dockets. Only slowly would the corporate experience with civil affairs and military government studied and institutionalized for administration of occupied territory—which, of course, the American government and its military discounted as ever happening again.

Haiti—1915-1934

The Rhine occupation was something of an aberration in the minds of soldiers and politicians—the necessary conclusion to a painful chapter in the history of western civilization. Let us focus now on an abject nation-building failure that is distinctive in American history as an on-again, off-again intervention: Haiti. The first extended United States attempt to stabilize and reconstruct Haiti began in 1915 and lasted 19 years, but the American government had occupied Haiti—or at least its most important commercial parts eight times in the 19th century to protect American lives and property. Between the turn of the 20th century and 1915, American gunboats were deployed to the Caribbean to ensure that Haiti's governments (and there were many) did not confiscate property owned by United States citizens because American bankers and entrepreneurs were heavily engaged in the Haitian economy. By 1910, the United States was the dominant international power in Haitians affairs. By 1915, it can be said that the U.S. and Haiti enjoyed a "close," if not equal or especially harmonious, relationship.

Soon after Woodrow Wilson was inaugurated in 1914, he indicated his desire to take control of Haiti to reform it. There were certainly a number of motivations behind taking Haiti at that time, and no single decision maker necessarily possessed all of them. Wilson was probably

motivated by idealism, and he truly thought the United States could bring democracy and capitalism to what was most surely the poorest state in the Western Hemisphere. But the President was also a racist, and a kind of racial paternalism no doubt informed his thinking. One of the many reasons that interventions of this kind usually fail is because of the unwillingness of the occupiers to allow the local population to manage—or even inform—the nation-building efforts of the occupiers. T. E. Lawrence of Arabia asserted that it was better for inhabitants to make errors that could be later corrected than for the foreigners to do everything, even if everything was done right. Even if guided by the best intentions, the racial paternalism that was the *Zeitgeist* in the United States during the first half of the 20th century was practiced in Haiti by excluding key indigenous political players from active participation in the execution of stability operations. Wilson set the tone for the operation, and policies in Haiti reflected the preferences of the commander in chief.

Within the United States, other actors took an interest in Haiti for different—and much more realist—reasons. American military officers, especially men of the United States Navy, were very concerned about the security of the recently opened Panama Canal. Germany, eyeing Great Britain's domination of the world's oceans with imperial envy, had constructed a blue-water navy in the preceding 25 years; American navalists, imperialists, and capitalists shared concerns about the safety of the world's sea lanes as this new imperial navy took to the water. In the minds of those who sought to protect the Panama Canal, Haiti was a logical staging base for naval operations in the Caribbean.

Understanding the rationale for the Haiti intervention is important to a key point in the stabilization and reconstruction discourse: motivations matter. If revenge, for example, is an objective (whether formally articulated or not) as it was in the period after World War I and also World War II—especially in the case of Japan—policies that pertain to feeding the people and resurrecting the economy will be different from policies undertaken with the intention to build a true partner. Creating an independent state in Haiti that might threaten American imperial and economic interests was definitely not in the cards when, in July 1915, the United States landed marines to occupy Haiti.

Haiti was in turmoil when U.S. forces arrived, and the Caco rebels that were fighting Haiti's failing government turned on the invaders. U.S. forces' first security task was to disarm insurgents in the Port-au-Prince area, take control of all government functions (especially customs collections), seize control of the Gendarmerie, declared martial law in the capital (later applied to the entire country, an act which ignited a nation-wide insurgency), and install a compliant president. The new president, according to the American admiral in charge of the operation, was given little

latitude in dealing with the occupying forces: "Haiti must agree to terms laid down by the United States," were the terms provided to the new leadership. No elected or appointed native governing officials from 1915 to 1934 had any real freedom of action. The new Haitian president soon signed a treaty with the United States that virtually gave up all control of the government and finances. The new president also saw to it that the Haitian parliament ratified a new constitution that overturned the Haitian prohibition on foreign ownership of land. After the insurgents were pacified, the United States military officials in charge turned to forced labor to build roads and other infrastructure projects, practices that re-ignited an armed insurgency that lasted for four years.

U.S. actions were widely criticized in the American and overseas press for the occupation, with stories circulating about atrocities committed against the local population, to include the use of torture to gain intelligence. There was relative tranquility from 1922 until the dark days of the Great Depression, beginning in 1929, when Haiti suffered protests, student strikes, and finally a general strike that led to general press censorship on the island and the jailing of those who expressed opposition to American control. President Herbert Hoover appointed a commission to study the issues in Haiti that reported, "unless measures are taken to meet," the public's "demands for a legislature that can elect a president in the near future…grave public disorder will arise." Franklin Roosevelt ended the occupation in 1934, although direct supervision of Haiti's economy continued until 1942. The U.S. withdrawal did not bring peace and stability to the country, however, and coups, revolts, crime, and other forms of disorder have been de rigueur ever since. Periods of relative peace—usually accompanied by a harsh dictatorship—have been punctuated by savage coups and the occasional U.S. intervention.

Germany and Japan

Yet pundits who claim to have some understanding of events in Haiti during the first half of the 20th century have proposed that a *state* can be stabilized and reconstructed in five to seven years, using Germany and Japan after World War II as the shining examples of success. But it can be argued that there were special circumstances governing the successful reconstruction of both defeated Axis powers that are not found in any other nation-building situation.

First of all, it is important to recall that Germany was utterly defeated by the Allies and occupied by millions of battle-hardened troops—more than 1.6 million American troops in the American sector of the western part of Germany. Initially, there was one solider for every ten German civilians, and even towards the end of the occupation the ratio had fallen to one American per every hundred Germans—a much higher ratio that ever

existed in Haiti. The first aim of the occupation was security (a constant in successful nation-building scenarios), and that was all but ensured by the overwhelming presence of well-armed, equipped, and trained soldiers.

The Allied nation building effort in Germany, moreover, was gigantic by comparison to Haiti, even if look only at the material contribution of the United States. The financing of the reconstruction by American must be understood in the context of the emerging Cold War, a conflict the roots of which were apparent well before the German surrender in May 1945. The United States needed Germany as a bulwark against possible Soviet expansion and, just as importantly, western Germany needed the United States to defend it against the threat of Soviet domination. Germans adopted American democratic principles for many reasons, not least of which was to gain United States support in the face of a dire threat to the east. There were other reasons for success in rebuilding Germany: countries to the north, south, and west of what became the Federal Republic of Germany all favored Germany's rebirth as a democracy, and the United States had two (generally) cooperative allies in its reconstruction efforts: France and the United Kingdom, states that had suffered mightily during the war but were willing to make contributions to the reconstruction effort.

Probably the most significant difference between Germany and Haiti (or, for that matter, numerous other attempts to reconstruct nations) is that fact that a plan existed to shape the reconstruction of defeated Germany. Well before the surrender, George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff during World War II, had directed that a plan be written, and the result, over a three-year period, was a 400-page document that helped guide those responsible for reconstructing Germany. General Lucius Clay, the officer chosen to command the effort, was well steeped in the plan and was carefully chosen to succeed. He demobilized the German Army—having more than 1.6 million American troops to provide security and stability was definitely ample. Clay also immediately worked to solve the humanitarian crisis and in the process earned the respect and often the affection of the German population. In time he created a constabulary force of 30,000 to provide for routine policing, but its main task was to train Germans to police their own country and, by 1949, this mission was complete.

Clay also recognized total de-Nazification was impractical if the Germans were to run their own country in the foreseeable future. The Nazi party had been in totalitarian control of the state for more than 12 years, and even routine civil service positions—from postmen to firefighters to schoolteachers—went to party members. To get a job in government, in other words, one had to join the party and there were, therefore, millions of nominal party members. In any case, the Allied administrators of Germany needed to rely on the expertise of experienced people, so they

were compelled to turn to nominal party members. At war's end, there were more than 3.6 million civilian Nazi party members left in the American sector of Germany (a significant percentage of the population), and Clay let the Germans decide who among these numbers was an ideological Nazi who committed crimes. German—not American—special courts tried 900,000 of these, and 120,000 were ultimately convicted. The others were cleared. What is not generally realized about former "Nazis," even at the top of the government, is this: the first Chancellor, Conrad Adenauer, was an anti-Nazi; the second Chancellor was a non-Nazi (he never joined the party) named Ludwig Ehrhard; and the third Chancellor, Kurt Kiessenger, was a former Nazi.

Sovereignty was gradually returned to the three western occupied parts of Germany, and the reunified polity became known as the Federal Republic of Germany in 1947. National elections were held in 1949. By then, the education system had been completely reformed and vestiges of anti-Semitism, nationalism, fascism, and Nazism had been removed from texts. Freedom of the press, assembly, and discussion were guaranteed by public laws and, perhaps most importantly, the economy was recreated.

In the United States and among the peoples of the Allied states, anti-German sentiments were so strong that some suggested stripping the defeated power of its industrial base and reducing it to agricultural peonage in the community of nations—with the objective of forever preventing the Germans from attacking their neighbors. There was no widely expressed view towards rebuilding Germany as an industrialized state with a vibrant economy, but that is what Clay did, and in doing so, he might have exceeded his authority. For the Germany economy under Clay's stewardship, the improvement was spectacular. Output in the American sector in the fourth quarter of 1946 was 250 percent greater than the same quarter of the preceding year, and the German economy grew rapidly—with double-digit increases—from 1947 to 1952. A major factor during this period was Marshall Plan assistance that began to affect Germany starting in mid-1948. All pundits writing on the subject of nation building agree that security or stability *and* a robust economy are essentials for successfully reconstructing a state and General Clay's policies made both possible.

Ambassador James Dobbins of the Rand Corporation believes there are important lessons to be learned from the allied experience in post-war Germany, and many of these apply to our next case: Japan. These include the following:

1. Careful planning is essential.

2. Democracy can be transferred, as it certainly was in what became the Federal Republic of Germany, but to transform a totalitarian society with little experience in democratic processes, enforced accountability for crimes is essential.

3. Having to divide occupational authority and nation building planning and operations can make reconstruction more difficult than were one state in charge (as the United States was in the occupation of Japan).

4. The path to success is paved with money; a robust economy is necessary, and money must come from everywhere to fertilize economic growth. Sources include the occupation governments, foreign direct investment, World Bank, etc., and demanding immediate payment of reparations is not useful when one is trying to rebuild infrastructure and build a workable economy.

Dobbins argues that "[M]ilitary force and political capital can…successfully…underpin…[enduring] societal transformation…." Both force and capital had a vital role to play in Germany as well as Japan, and because of the effective application of both ingredients, both states were thoroughly transformed.

As case studies in stabilization and reconstruction, there are great similarities and dissimilarities between the German and Japanese occupations. In both instances, the Allies agreed on unconditional surrender as a precondition to ending the war, but in the case of Japan the allies accepted the continued existence of the Emperor as at least titular head of state. There were no accepted preconditions for Germany other than unconditional surrender. Given the U.S. materiel presence in the Pacific theater, and the fact that the British, Dutch, Australians, and other allies in the Pacific were taxed to the breaking point in defending their remaining territories, the Americans could essentially dictate the conditions of the surrender and subsequent occupation of Japan.

As in Germany, the wartime leadership was to be purged, war criminals were to be prosecuted, and the country's war making capabilities were to be eliminated; this including the total disbandment of the military. Like the German post-war situation, there was to be an allied occupation until a new order was established; an important difference was the fact that there were no occupiers other than Americans (Germany was a temporary home to millions of troops from Russia, France and the United Kingdom). Japan, like Germany, lost an empire that it forged in the 1930s and 1940s. Like Germany, a constitution was written for the Japanese that established basic freedoms of speech, religion, and thought, and that also

encoded a respect for human rights. A novelty in Japan's case was the introduction of universal suffrage for women. Like Germany, the Allies called for a reduction in Japanese economic/industrial capacity to prevent rearmament (and like Germany, given the demands of the Cold War, this notion did not last long when the value of having an industrial partner with a large consumer population in the Pacific became apparent). Emperor Hirohito's public role in Japanese society was preserved, although he officially repudiated his divine status, and Douglas MacArthur, the theater commander and also chief of the occupation whitewashed the emperor's role in the recent war and used his influence to help the American administration rule Japan without violence. The whitewashing of the Emperor was necessary to make his continued existence as head of state palatable to Americans who remembered the "sneak" attack on Pearl Harbor and also the Bataan Death march among other atrocities. The German occupation had nothing comparable. The Emperor ordered his troops to disarm and surrender and they did, and no Americans were killed during the occupation by Japanese troops—there was no insurgency (the same can be said of Germany, although there was one well-publicized incident near Aachen that was swiftly and harshly addressed by the U.S. authorities; there were no follow-on or copycat attacks). Also, unlike Germany, when MacArthur arrived there was a sitting cabinet of civilians and a parliament (Diet) and MacArthur ruled through both organizations. Working through established institutions helped the occupation powers greatly, as first of all there were no other occupation authorities to deal with, and second it looked like the orders were coming to the Japanese from Japanese government officials that were not, in the minds of the general population, discredited by the defeat.

As in Germany, the humanitarian problems facing the occupation were daunting. Much of the infrastructure was damaged or destroyed, many homes burned to the ground by a sustained bombing campaign (there were 9,000,000 homeless Japanese), and there were 3,000,000 Japanese civilians in the former Japanese colonies and occupied countries who had to be repatriated quickly, and these numbers only added to the crushing housing problem. There were, moreover, 3,500,000 Japanese military in various countries from China and Korea to Indonesia and the islands of the South Pacific who were also quickly returned to the home islands, and all of these demobilized troops had to be integrated into society and the economy. MacArthur worked hard to see that this mass was adequately fed, clothed and housed, and because the emperor and the Japanese government were outwardly docile and appeared to be cooperating (Japanese armed forces were demobilized within a month of the formal surrender), humanitarian aid flowed. MacArthur had more than 350,000 troops for occupation duty, a number sufficient to provide security (these numbers were augmented by Japanese police who were quickly retrained for work under the occupation government; this is another instance of the American authorities employing respected and legitimate government institutions to manage the population).

As in Germany, war crime tribunals were held, some officials were hanged, and militaristic politicians and bureaucrats were purged, but not a significant fraction of either category. MacArthur caused a new constitution to be written quickly by his staff, and although the Japanese Cabinet and Diet argued with him, they were forced to accept. Interestingly, the long—more than 225 articles—document has never been amended. Probably the most famous provision in the constitution is Article 9, a formal rejection of war as a sovereign right of the nation. Based on the new constitution, MacArthur directed an election be held in April 1946, seven months after the formal surrender. There were nearly 3000 candidates and more than 360 parties competing for 466 seats, and of that total more than 75 percent of the members elected were new to the Diet. Almost 80 percent of Japanese registered males voted in this election, and more than two-thirds of the eligible females voted. The conservative party won that election and has won all of the elections since except for one.

MacArthur understood the way to the Japanese hearts was through their stomachs and worked hard, against some policy makers in Washington D.C., to demand enough food to prevent mass malnutrition, and with his characteristic force of personality, he got his way and won the admiration and affection of the Japanese people for himself and the United States.

Geopolitics rapidly changed the American perspective on Japan, and as Cold War tensions emerged, attitudes in Washington changed from occupying a former enemy to building an ally, and by, 1947, the United States was talking about re-arming Japan. The impetus for rearmament came in 1950; the Korean War demonstrated to the Japanese government the dangers of the three communist states across the Sea of Japan: the Soviet Union, The People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the United States began to seriously consider the strategic position of Japan as part of a larger global strategy of Communist containment. The war had an unexpected but advantageous effect on Japan, leading to an enormous economic boom.

A sound economy is definitely a prerequisite to a successful nation-building effort, and like General Clay in Germany, MacArthur fully understood the nexus between economic security, prosperity, and democracy, and although pulled in many directions about democratizing the economy, he worked to begin what became the Japanese economic miracle. Probably the most significant reform he pushed through the Diet was a land reform program that gave ownership of land to the tenant

farmers who worked it. This development broke the back of perhaps the most conservative and nationalistic class in Japan—the agrarian landowners. This group was instrumental in supporting the militarists who came to power in the first half of the 20th century.

MacArthur was also charged to eliminate the Zaibatsu—the capitalist manufacturing conglomerates who had considerable influence over the economy. Like the large land-holders, the industrialist class had an important role in encouraging and supporting politicians with imperialist and militarist impulses. But like in Germany, the industrialists knew how to manufacture everything from automobiles to the tools of war, and if restoring the civilian economy was an objective of the American occupation government, retaining most Zaibatsu was necessary. MacArthur guardedly did so, but he created a kind of check-and-balance system by sanctioning labor unions, groups that were seen as having a democratizing influence, to be sure, but the union gambit carried some risk, as labor organizations were readily infiltrated by communists. In any case, MacArthur's efforts led to a defense alliance in 1952 that lasted through the Cold War and continues to bind the two countries. Beginning with the so-called Yoshida Doctrine in the early 1950s, America guaranteed the security of Japan vis a vis the communist threat to the west in exchange for military bases, and Japan provided a strong industrial base for exports and a ready (if not always open) market for U.S. imports.

Conclusions

What can be learned from the cases cited in this brief chapter? There is no substitute for planning even though reality intrudes on the plan as soon as it is executed. The Germany and Japanese examples discussed herein were planned well in advance of the occupations that followed World War II. The first element to plan for is security, without which there will never be successful nation building. Obviously, it is easier to make security the prime prerequisite than to effect it, and many paths can get one there, but to undersize the occupation force or to plan on occupying according to a rigid timetable that does not reflect conditions in the subject country can destroy the effort because one cannot build a nation while fighting an insurgency. Antagonizing the people with brutality in counterinsurgency operations is self-defeating, as was the case in the Philippines, where extreme measures were used to combat the Moro insurgency; and in Haiti, where brutality was often used to keep the peace and defeat insurgent fighters.

Employing local institutions with legitimacy among the local population can facilitate the nation building process, as both security and stability are a cause and effect when this is done; more challenging are situations where there are no accepted or legitimate institutions for the

occupation force to use, or when only a percentage of the population is willing to accept the authority of an existing institution. But relying on local institutions in all circumstances can be a mistake, as in the post-civil War American south, where former Confederates were "reconstructed" and then returned to power in their states, only to find ways to impose a new kind of peonage on the black population.

Physical security, moreover, is not enough because economic security is also essential, but a robust economy won't exist in an insecure environment. No nation can be built unless people are employed constructively, and a democracy cannot be created where people feel they have no stake in the process. And establishing a vigorous economy is a multilateral effort. People in other nations, in other words, must be willing to buy products made or grown in the state being reconstructed.

This chapter has made the point that stabilization and reconstruction is a difficult operation that has usually been unsuccessful. When it succeeded, as in the cases of Germany and Japan, there were external influences—for example the global conflict we call the Cold War—that ensured success.

SECTION II

Issues and Challenges In Stability Operations and Reconstruction

Ambassador Cliff Bond–Panel moderator
Right Honorable Lord Paddy Ashdown
Ambassador James Dobbins
Anthony Cordesman
Lieutenant General Paul G. Cerjan, USA (Ret.)

Opening remarks by Ambassador Cliff Bond, ICAF Faculty

Ladies and Gentlemen, welcome to the first panel discussion of this symposium. My name is Cliff Bond and I will be moderating this session. Let me say a few words on organization.

Our panel will begin with a keynote speech by the Honorable Lord Paddy Ashdown. A copy of Lord Ashdown's biography and that of other panelists has been circulated. Lord Ashdown recently returned to England from almost four years serving as the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina for implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. It was my pleasure and a personal and professional honor to work with Lord Ashdown in Bosnia. I can tell you his mandate involved much more than Dayton implementation. He led Bosnia well beyond Dayton to the threshold of Bosnia's entry into the European Union and NATO's Partnership for Peace.

After Lord Ashdown's speech we will turn to our other panelists for remarks. This is a very distinguished group with a wealth of experience in dealing with and researching stabilization operations, or nation-building in contemporary parlance. Again, you have their full biographies. They are Ambassador Dobbins, currently directing RAND's International Security and Defense Policy Center, Lieutenant General Cerjan, Vice Chairman of the National Defense University Foundation, and Professor Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

After the panelists remarks we will open the floor for questions from the audience.

The subject of our morning panel is *Issues and Challenges in Stability Operations and Reconstruction*. Our objective is to review past and ongoing stability and reconstruction interventions to determine if there are some basic principles or "lessons learned" that can be applied in future failed state or post conflict situations. Our morning discussion will set the

stage for the afternoon panel on recommendations for the future.

Of course, every conflict has its specific historical and cultural circumstances. Certainly that was the case in Bosnia. We are assuming, however, that some common questions need to be addressed in stabilization and reconstruction operations, even if the answers to those questions or tasks are somewhat different in different situations. While in Bosnia, I was detailed to Baghdad for two and half months. What struck me there immediately was the similarity of many of issues that needed to be addressed: reconstruction of infrastructure, humanitarian relief, managing sectarian political movements, establishing the rule of law and dealing with crimes against humanity. The environment, however, was radically different. The lack of security made it immeasurably more complicated to carry out those the tasks in Iraq.

Through the course of this academic year at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces questions and analysis of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations have been a regular feature of the remarks of our quest speakers and our student seminar discussions. Here are some of the themes that have come up and that I hope we can touch on today:

1. What questions should be asked and what are the optimal pre-conditions for a successful stability and reconstruction operation: an international mandate, addressing the root causes of the conflict, long term political will and a commitment of resources?

2. We understand the importance of creating a secure environment for stability and reconstruction activities, but how do we move beyond essential physical security to creating the institutions and processes for rule of law? Who should do this?

3. How should military and civilian responsibilities be coordinated in these situations? Is there a right model for civilian/military interaction or should there be a transition from military to international civilian leadership? When should the transition to local leadership take place?

4. What are the core set of actions that need to be taken to restore or build a society?

5. What is the right division of labor in stability and reconstruction activities between military and civilian agencies, between nation states and international agencies, and among U.S. Government agencies?

6. Which U.S. Government agencies should take the lead on civilian stability and reconstruction activities? What capabilities are needed by U.S. Government civilian agencies and military and which are lacking?

7. What should be the role of non-government organizations (NGOs) and the private sector?

8. Is there a preferred sequence of stabilization activities (i.e., security, humanitarian aid, infrastructure, institution building, economic development, etc.) or should all be pursued simultaneously? Where has a lack of progress in one or more areas proved a drag on the overall stability and reconstruction effort?

9. Finally, how can we measure success? Is it more than ending the conflict?

This is a broad, and probably incomplete, list of the issues we should consider. While I am sure that the "right" answer to these questions will depend on the specific circumstances of each stability and reconstruction operation, discussing them in the light of historical experience can help us prepare for what most analysts agree will be a principal security challenge in this century. That is the point of this panel and the wider Symposium.

Now let me invite Lord Ashdown to make his opening remarks.

Introductory remarks by Lord Paddy Ashdown

Ladies and Gentlemen, the post-Cold War world doesn't look at all as most of us once expected it to look. The bright vistas conjured up in 1989 and 1990—with democracy and prosperity breaking out everywhere—now seem more like the product of over-exuberant imagination, than of clear-headed political or historical analysis.

Far from being the End of History as described in that comforting idyll by Francis Fukuyama, history is alive and kicking—and kicking rather hard at the moment.

Far from being more tranquil, our global village is looking increasingly more troubled.

Among the issues that have come to haunt us—or come *back* to haunt us—are some very old geo-strategic cultural antagonisms, such as the struggle between Christendom and Islam, and some very new challenges such as globalization and resource competition.

These were either completely invisible or on the very margins of debate a decade ago.

Today they are full-blooded, front and center and demand our

attention.

Yet—I think most of us will agree—our post-Cold War world remains, overall, a better world than the one in which most of us grew up, where the two superpowers were locked in a chronic conflict that placed the whole of humanity just one push of a button away from nuclear annihilation.

That, however, does not diminish our need, at the beginning of the 21st century, to come to grips with a different range of challenges.

The problems of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction stand among the top rank of this list of modern challenges.

From Iraq to East Timor, from Afghanistan to Sierra Leone, in Central and South America, in the Caucuses and the Middle East, in Africa and in South and East Asia, countries are struggling to recover from conflicts, many of which erupted as a result of the collapse of the Cold War system and the power vacuums which followed.

Each of these conflicts has thrown down new challenges to the International Community, and in each case new, and often very distinct, solutions have had to be developed. We have had to learn on the job.

None of us should forget that this learning process—proceeding by trial and error—has exacted a substantial price from the civilians caught in these conflicts, and they number in the tens of millions.

Until the beginning of this year, I served as the International Community's High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here I gained some perspectives that may illuminate this important debate, from the viewpoint, not of the theoretician, but of the practitioner in the field.

These perspectives, at least in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, are predominantly positive.

Here is what we have learned, in a nutshell:

If you have a clear vision, the right resources, a firm destination to head for, a good plan and the will to carry it through, you can successfully build a secure peace after even the most devastating war.

In my opening remarks I will deal with each of these elements of successful peace stabilization, in turn.

First, resources.

These are time, money, troops on the ground and a united International Community.

It helps to have the troops—and, by the way, lots of them—at the beginning, and the money in the middle and at the end.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, no less than ten divisions of NATO-led troops were deployed along the front lines in the space of just three weeks in the winter of 1995. Their authority was never challenged after that. And not one of them has ever been killed in anger. Successive reductions in the size of the peacekeeping force—from 60,000 in the initial deployment to around 6,000 today—reflect a process of steady consolidation.

Was this a lucky break?

No.

One thing we have learned in Bosnia is that troops plus a workable political settlement will succeed—but one without the other won't.

And the Dayton Agreement, for all its shortcomings—has proved to be a workable settlement.

At least, it proved so when the International Community resolutely set about *making* it work.

In the early stages of peace implementation the domestic signatories to the agreement appeared determined to honor its provisions to the letter, while undermining its very clear intentions whenever the opportunity to do so arose.

They did so while channeling the influx of international aid money away from strategic projects into their own projects, often ones that allowed them to deliver benefits to their constituents, while cutting out potential beneficiaries from other groups. Their aim was to use the Dayton process, not to build peace, but as a framework within which to continue the pursuit of their aims by other means.

If not actually going backward—since any possibility of a return to violence was quashed by the overwhelming presence of international peacekeepers—Bosnia-Herzegovina appeared at best to be standing still.

During this period the International Community concentrated much of its effort on holding free and fair elections. On the face of it, this made sense.

But it didn't take into account the hard fact that democratic norms are attained and sustained by more than elections—they depend on recovery across a broad front that includes—crucially and early—the rule of law and a viable economy.

Corrupt and politicized judges and police, mass unemployment, endemic poverty and clientelist politics will all confound the democratic process, even if elections are technically free and fair.

Democratic elections without the rule of law, simply allow the criminals to be elected to political office, the better to undermine the rule of law. What this leads to is not democracy but the criminally captured state.

Now, this may appear to be obvious, with the benefit of hindsight. But it was by no means obvious in the first months and years of peace implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Intervention is at best messy, at worst bloody. It is invariably attended by pressure for quick results. In situations where peacekeepers are engaged in full-scale military operations against opponents of a political settlement—not, happily, the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1995 but

all too blatantly the case in certain intervention exercises today—it may be hard to understand and focus on the need, for example, to upgrade the judiciary and de-politicize the police.

In situations where a massive segment of the country's housing stock has been destroyed or badly damaged, where GDP has collapsed and economic life is controlled by black marketeers, it may seem fanciful to start talking about improving the business environment, let alone the need to introduce an efficient Value Added Tax.

But what we learned, too slowly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina is that these things really are on a par with emergency relief and a robust security posture. They are indispensable elements in making a political settlement work. You can't have constructive politics if you don't have a growing economy; you can't face down obstructionists if parliamentary and judicial institutions are weak and infected with corruption.

Reconstruction—like politics as a whole—is complex. It can't be accomplished piecemeal.

This initial and nearly mortal dysfunction in Bosnia-Herzegovina's recovery arc was, at last, addressed at the end of 1997 with the introduction of the Bonn Powers, enabling the High Representative to cut through the thickets of obstruction by removing recalcitrant officials and where necessary enacting reform legislation. This was combined with a new focus on making the political and economic institutions *work* as opposed to propping them up with international largesse.

It would have been better to have taken these tough measures from day one, rather than two years after the peace had been signed; another lesson for peacekeeping here, incidentally. It is better to be tough at the start and relax later, than to be weak at the start and pay for it later.

The result of this new tough approach by the International Community was almost immediately felt.

From then on Bosnia-Herzegovina has made remarkable progress.

Here is what has been achieved in the intervening years:

- More than a million of those who were displaced from their homes during the war have since returned;
- The armed forces, which for years continued to maintain organizational and ideological divisions created by the war, have been unified and brought under the exclusive command and control of the state;
- A program of reform that will in the coming years provide Bosnia-Herzegovina with a democratically supervised and rationally organized police service has been agreed;
- The two customs services have been unified;
- The three intelligence services have been welded into one and brought under democratic control;
- The judiciary has been cleaned up, de-politicized and placed within a single countrywide framework;
- A single criminal code, written by the Bosnians themselves, has been established;
- The ruling Council of Ministers has been expanded and made more efficient;
- After years of frustratingly slow progress, the city of Mostar has at last been unified;
- A single, countrywide system of Value Added Tax (VAT) has been introduced;
- GDP growth has been maintained in recent years at 5 percent or above, the fastest growth rate in the Western Balkans;
- The inflation rate stands at 0.5 percent, one of the lowest in Southeast Europe;
- Foreign direct investment is now five times higher than it was in the late nineties;
- Exports and industrial production are up;
- Interest rates have halved since 2000;
- The real unemployment is about half the official rate of 40 percent.

I haven't recited this litany as an exercise in puffing up the achievements of the International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That would be simplistic and rather pointless. I've drawn attention to these facts because they show in a very tangible way that postwar reconstruction has to be *holistic*.

One step forward facilitates another step forward. You can't have economic progress unless you clean up the legal environment; you can't have democratic progress unless you tackle corruption. You can't have social progress unless you deliver tangible improvements in living standards, and so on.

And the second reason is to demonstrate that with a range of activities this broad and this complex, you simply cannot have progress by fiat. A small band of foreigners, empowered by military force and limitless funds cannot *make* a country recover.

The only people who can do this successfully are the people of that country.

This too may appear rather obvious—yet it has not been heeded in the case of several notable and still problematic international postwar reconstruction exercises in various parts of the globe.

The International Community may have everything it needs to fix a failed state—but this is essentially beside the point. The failed state won't

stop failing until *the people* of that state have a clear idea of where they are going, are prepared to take the necessary steps to reach that destination and have what they need to fix problems along the way.

I cannot overstress the issue of a common destination, shared by the domestic authorities and the International Community. This is something we have had in Bosnia and Herzegovina but which has been, up to now, lacking in Kosovo and, after that, in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the International Community and domestic opinion have worked together to reach the same agreed destination. This has provided a common project around which both the International Community and constructive domestic forces could gather. The absence of such a commonly agreed project can seriously debilitate or even, in the worst case, destroy stabilization efforts—a fact to which the events in Kosovo and Iraq bear testimony.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina we were lucky. Membership of the European Union and NATO provided the obvious destination, and getting there has been an undertaking supported by all, or nearly all, across the whole political and ethnic spectrum. This made our job much easier.

And agreeing objectives—and setting clear benchmarks on the road to reaching these objectives—has been applied to good effect inside the Office of the High Representative. The Mission Implementation Plan (MIP), which we introduced in January 2003, sets out the core tasks remaining for Office of the High Representative (OHR), and provides us with a means of evaluating our progress. The priorities in the MIP reflect the fact that, against a backdrop of declining donor resources and with new and pressing priorities vying for the International Community's attention, we need to distinguish rigorously between what is essential and what is merely desirable if we are to make peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina self-sustaining.

Administratively, this has meant increasing efficiency against a backdrop of systematic staff reductions. In 2003 OHR had more than 800 staff. By the end of 2005 the number had dropped to just over 300.

But the Mission Implementation Plan was not just an internal management tool.

It was also the compass that kept OHR on course, by keeping us targeted on the issues that mattered and preventing mission creep.

The closing down of OHR departments and the phasing out of OHR tasks was not haphazard or arbitrary; it was executed in lockstep with a rigorous program aimed at completing short and medium-term tasks, and handing over the long-term ones to the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities, whose proper role it is to oversee and execute such tasks. In this way real Bosnia and Herzegovina ownership of its own recovery was systematically increased as the international presence was systematically

decreased.

The framework within which this took place was our joint overarching plan, achieving membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions

Now, there are plans and there are plans. We are all familiar with the danger of confusing plans with policy, a danger pointed up in the sort of annual address to parliament that reads like a wish-list, topped by calls for economic growth and strengthening of the education and health sector, without containing realistic steps that must be taken in order to turn wish into reality.

In recent years, Bosnia-Herzegovina has benefited hugely from the fact that its aspiration to integrate in Euro-Atlantic structures, most notably the European Union and NATO—an objective that has the support of the vast majority of citizens—comes with very clear policy benchmarks. Making this dream a reality has involved the implementation of a long and coherent list of economic, social and political reforms—essentially *a practical blueprint* for taking Bosnia-Herzegovina into the modern democratic world.

Throughout this process we have had to contend with the fact that the state bequeathed by Dayton is a bureaucratic monstrosity. Bosnia-Herzegovina has no fewer then thirteen prime ministers, and that is the tip of a vast administrative apparatus set in place in 1995 when the demands of *representative* government—and by representative we are talking about representation of groups rather than individuals—outweighed the requirements of *efficient and effective* government.

Substantial progress has been made in tackling this issue. No state can prosper which spends 70 percent of its hard-pressed citizens' taxes on salaries for government employees and only 30 percent on services. Bosnia-Herzegovina politicians have at last come to accept the rather obvious truth of this.

Our experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been that, in the first phase, the agreement hammered out at Dayton proved to be an indispensable and durable mechanism for preventing a return to violence. But now we are in the second phase—building a viable state. And here we discover that Dayton is not so much a help as a hindrance. We had to move *beyond* Dayton—and Europe provides the means to do so. We have to find a new framework within which Bosnia-Herzegovina can complete the second phase of its journey, to create a modern market economy—and the European Union provides just the framework we need.

I have sketched some of the salient aspects of postwar reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I believe we have only to compare what we know now to what we clearly and painfully *didn't* know in 1992 to see how far we have come.

I mentioned earlier that this learning process has not been carried out

without cost—to the people in the states that the International Community has sought to help. The people of Bosnia and Herzegovina endured three and a half years of slaughter and hardship because the International Community dithered, and then several more years in which the least constructive political forces were allowed to rule the roost, because the International Community was learning on the job.

Our priority now must surely be to make sure that the lessons that *have* been learned in the last decade are applied, where appropriate (because each country in recovery has its own distinct requirements) in a disciplined and effective way.

What we *do* know is that peace implementation and nation building *can* work. Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrates that (although, in the beginning, few thought that it would work).

We must learn from the successes; we should not give up in those cases where success has not yet been achieved. If there is one final lesson for peace stabilization it is this. Fighting a modern, high-tech war can take days or weeks—but building the peace that follows such a war must be measured in decades.

That time frame—not months but decades—represents a sound investment.

If we reduce the proposition to one of material expense, we find that a week of war routinely costs more than a year of peace stabilization, so, clearly, avoiding a recurrence of war is better value for public money than letting failed states keep on failing.

But this is not just about economics.

As the United States knows, perhaps better than any other nation on earth, the cost of allowing states to fail, in our increasingly interdependent world, is more often than not paid in blood and horror well beyond that states borders—that a failure to finish the job in Afghanistan, can result in unimaginable terror and destruction a decade later, in New York.

And nor is it just about prevention.

Recovering states make sound allies, promising trading partners, useful allies in peace stabilization elsewhere—Bosnia has recently sent forces to Iraq to help the coalition effort there.

In short—though there are moral reasons for intervention and peace stabilization, there are powerful reasons of self-interest in getting it right as well.

Getting it right takes time and it takes resources but it can work - as Bosnia and Herzegovina, arguably the world most successful large-scale peace stabilization exercise in recent times, shows.

We owe it to ourselves and perhaps above all to the citizens of failed states—our fellow citizens in the global village—to make sure that where possible that example is followed, intelligently and effectively, in other

parts of the world.

Panel discussion summary

Following Lord Ashdown's opening remarks was a presentation by Ambassador James Dobbins, who noted that the ongoing situation in Iraq—a liberation followed by an attempt to stabilize and reconstruct a state—was in fact the seventh such instance in the past twelve years. Kuwait (1991), Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan were among the cases he identified in raising a leadoff question:

"How can we do this so often and yet still do it so badly?"

The answer he offered was "calculated ignorance." In defining this turn of phrase, he noted that in recent nation-building efforts, it was his experience that there exist three categories of people who become involved in the planning and decision-making processes that precede an intervention. The first, the regional experts, were very knowledgeable about the country in question, but were so immersed in the political and economic minutiae of the country that they had only the most pessimistic expectations about changing or improving conditions in that country. The second category, the pragmatists, might not have detailed knowledge about the country in question, but they had experience with nation-building and understood the manpower and monetary requirements. The last category were the idealists, who knew little about the state and little about stability operations and reconstruction, but made the assumption that both activities—indeed, nation building—would be inexpensive and quick. "Unfortunately, it's the third group of people that are in charge…"

Dobbins notes that this is both expected and desirable to have the third category in control of the decision-making process (it is unrealistic to expect senior political leaders who have a public role to be masters of every subject), but the advice and guidance of the regional experts and the nation-builders—the first and second categories of expert—must be accepted and understood. In the recent Iraq case, according to Dobbins, the third group ignored these two groups.

Does this group of "nation builders" really have the knowledge and experience to make useful contributions to stabilization and reconstruction planning (and execution)? "I think there's some skepticism as to whether we really do have a body of expertise on the project of nation-building, and I would say in the early '90s, it was probably fair to say that there was very little expertise available, but that's no longer the case today." Citing statistics on both United States and United Nations involvement in peacekeeping and other stabilization activities, Dobbins noted that during the Cold War, the U.N. deployed peacekeepers on average about once every four years, and, "for the last 15 years, they've been initiating a new

peacekeeping mission every six months, a new mission every six months. At the moment, they've got 27 missions going. They've got 90,000 men deployed," making the U.N. the world's largest expeditionary force.

Based on research supervised by the ambassador, the track record for nation-building (to include stability operations and reconstruction) is encouraging: "looking first at the U.S. experience in this field over the last 60 years and then at the UN experience and the results were on balance fairly encouraging. The U.S. success rate was about 50/50; that is, half of the operations involved did produce a peaceful democratic state at the end and others either didn't or haven't yet. The UN experience in the cases we studied was actually somewhat better. Now, [the U.N results were] somewhat better than the American [results] in part because the missions that the [U.N.] tackled were easier, but also in part because the [U.N. was] more methodical in building a body of expertise, in creating a doctrine, in creating a cadre of people who could go from one mission to the next and apply the lessons and techniques that they had learned in easier and earlier missions which we had not until recently begun to do."

Well-known successes that can be attributed to either U.S. or U.N intervention include Bosnia, Kosovo, Namibia, Mozambique, Cambodia, El Salvador, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Liberia—cases where "American or NATO or UN troops went in and separated the combatants, disarmed the adversaries, demobilized the armed forces, oversaw a process of elections and stayed around long enough to allow the elected government to consolidate its capabilities and to begin to govern."

There has been a kind of nostalgia, according to Ambassador Dobbins, for the Cold War, when the international community seemed more structured and peaceful, and the need for stabilization and reconstruction interventions seemed less pressing. In fact, proxy wars in which many thousands lost their lives in places like Indochina, Angola, El Salvador, and Mozambique (among others) characterized the Cold War, and only in the past 15 years have these conflicts been resolved, thanks in part to nation-building and peacekeeping activities. Despite the appearance of insecurity and instability in the world today, Dobbins suggests, "there were 60 wars going on in the early '90s. That's down to about 30 today. The number of casualties as the result of those conflicts, including in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, has been cut by even more than 50 percent over that period. The number of refugees and displaced persons has been cut as well." Thanks to interventions undertaken by the U.N. and U.S. (and others) there is a growing body of professional nation-builders with hard-won experience and expertise.

"So what went wrong in Iraq?"

The current situation in Iraq can be partially attributed to the conscious decisions made by the political leadership to ignore or otherwise

exclude a body of knowledge and expertise from the planning and conduct of the operation—knowledge and expertise that was relevant and available.

Ambassador Dobbins provided two points to illustrate this claim. First, American political and military planners expected to model the occupation of Iraq on the post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan rather than on the international efforts (U.N.- and NATO-led) in the Balkans. These older case studies were appealing to the administration for two reasons: the size seemed more appropriate (Iraq is a larger country than Bosnia or Kosovo, and the comparison to German and/or Japan seemed logical); and the German and Japanese cases were clear successes, while recent Balkan successes have been qualified rather than resounding. "The problem, of course, is that Iraq in 2003 looked a lot more like Yugoslavia in 1995 than it did Germany and Japan in 1945. Germany and Japan were very homogeneous countries without any significant ethnic, linguistic or other differences in their population. They were first world economies. They'd been thoroughly defeated through nearly a decade of brutal conflict. The populations were totally demoralized and they had surrendered."

"None of that was true with either Yugoslavia or with Iraq, both of which had been carved out of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the Second World War, both of which brought together a number of different ethnicities and religious groups that really didn't want to live in the same state if they could avoid it, both of which were not first world economies and neither of which had surrendered, and so you had very different situations and all in all it would have made more sense to base the Iraq operation on the more recent, the more relevant experience, but that was politically inopportune and it wasn't done."

Ambassador Dobbins' second point about the administration's disregard for the expertise of "nation-builders" focused on the decision to make the military responsible for non-military "elements of nation-building," placing the Department of Defense in charge of "things like building parties, creating a free press, building a civil society, holding elections, bringing in police, creating a rule of law and a court structure." The result was an "immense start-up cost" that included placing dedicated Americans into positions of authority for which they had no preparation, experience, qualifications, and (perhaps more importantly) no qualified support from a home office that could provide directly relevant expertise for accomplishing the mission at hand: "it was amateur hour that created a good deal of the early confusion and setbacks which have made it so difficult to make meaningful progress."

Ambassador Dobbins noted that some of these early errors have been recognized—if not publicly acknowledged—and addressed. Important

changes both within the administration and inside Iraq have taken place in recent months. The State Department, for instance, has created an office to plan for these kinds of operations and train a cadre of people to meet the requirement for manning. Similarly, "the Defense Department has issued a directive making stability operations a core function of the U.S. military and the White House has issued a presidential directive establishing an interagency framework for managing these and these are all the kinds of steps which, had they been in effect three-three and a half years ago, would have produced, in my judgment, very different results."

Mr. Anthony Cordesman followed the ambassador's comments with several points about stabilization and reconstruction (intervention) decision-making and consequences:

"The most important decision to be made is whether to engage in operations which require you to have large-scale stability and reconstruction in the middle of war."

Mr. Cordesman elaborated by noting that policy-makers must determine if intervention is the correct course of action. There are, of course, other options: containment, for instance, might be a more pragmatic option. Sometimes intervention is the best choice to be made, but the decision to intervene must never be made carelessly. Hasty or ill-informed decision can be costly.

Policy-makers must consider the following when contemplating an intervention: is this the correct method? What are the limits? Is the strategic goal that underpins the decision to intervene really worth it?

Mr. Cordesman's second point put the question of risk on the table—and in more meaningful context. "When you go into these operations…Our reputation, our status, our role in the world, to some extent, all becomes hostage to success. That's not a reason to avoid [the commitment]. It is a reason to deeply consider [possible outcomes and the consequences]." These operations are neither swift nor decisive, and the decision to intervene will carry over for many years, long after the troops have departed.

"Stability and reconstruction are an oxymoron"

Mr. Cordesman suggests that when we discuss failed states and the difficult problems associated with intervention for stabilization and reconstruction purposes, "in most cases, it is *construction*. You are not reconstructing. You are trying to fundamentally change, build, and create something very different, and, by and large, stability will always be very relative." On the matter of control, the interventionist can only control the future so long as he is willing to commit forces to carry out his will. Without that kind of long-term commitment, there is no guarantee of stability. In the short term, "you can offer hope, progress, and, as [Ambassador Dobbins pointed out], you can stop some of the killing." Long-term

goals must be realistic and not guided by high-minded rhetoric: "one of the things I dearly wish that we could stop…is the mindless obsession with the word 'democracy.'"

"If you do not have stable political parties, if you do not have the conditions where elections will make things better, if you do not have the rule of law or effective governance, constant stress on the word "democracy" is simply stupid, and I invite you to take a look at our national strategy document that has just been issued. Count the number of times the word 'democracy' is used and then look in vain for any explanation of what it means or how [one] gets there."

"Governance is critical… much more critical on a day-to-day basis than politics."

Outside the realm of politics, several factors weigh heavily in the stability and reconstruction questions that were raised by Ambassador Bond and Ambassador Dobbins. Governance is one of these key factors. People's lives are shaped by governance and security, and undermined by religious and sectarian fault lines. Newspapers regularly report on the ongoing religious and sectarian crises in Iraq: "If any of you have been to Vietnam recently, you will find in Buddhist temple after Buddhist temple a celebration of our defeat in Vietnam because we had a sectarian war there, too, where we were seen as backing a semi-Catholic Mandarin class separated from the Buddhist issue. This is not something new."

Economics is also critical, and according to Mr. Cordesman, the emphasis on free markets and capitalism in recently failed states—in reconstruction and nation-building projects—is part of the overall problem. In many failed—or failing—states, command kleptocracies are the dominant form of economic organization. "How many people do we have anywhere in the United States Government with any experience with command economies?" Without an understanding of this kind of economics, is it realistic to expect to change a political and social system in the middle of a war?

Local allies—both individuals and institutions—are another factor that must be considered when intervening: "Are there local forces and local allies we can trust and work with? That isn't just military. It's security, it's police, it's courts, and it's the rule of law. You have to bring them all into balance if you want stability." Legitimacy—a related factor—is just as important to the enemy: "Do we have a commanding ideological position or does the group we are trying to help have a position that can win the support of the people? Sometimes we do and sometimes we can't."

"Small boys and frogs…"

"The absolute essence of success is a grim and demanding realism. One of the problems that are typical of government is cheerleading…into

disaster. You lose objectivity. Rather than plan to succeed, you exaggerate to fail. One of the things I have seen all of my adult life in the U.S. military is the tendency to show caution until you have the mission and once you get the mission, lose objectivity and realism in ways which defeat the mission.''

Mr. Cordesman identified two other related points that have troubled him in recent years as more attention is paid to the issues of insurgency and nation-building. The first is the growing literature on counter-insurgency operations that focuses on warfare, reduces complicated problems to simple buzzwords (''win, hold, evacuate,'' or some variation on the same themes), and ignores stability and reconstruction. The analysts and policymakers who read these articles and books are being led to believe that the problems of nation building are easy to solve using a formula or some kind of systematic approach. This prospect is especially troubling for Mr. Cordesman: ''we cannot afford to have a counterinsurgency doctrine which essentially has a bunch of buzzwords about stability and reconstruction based again on slogans about democracy and free enterprise.''

His second point was on the matter of victory: ''You can't exaggerate what you can do. We should not have illusions about competence and control in really complex stability and reconstruction operations.'' Being realistic about victory means being modest; Mr. Cordesman cited Pliny the Elder—''Small boys throw stones at frogs in jest, but the frogs do not die in jest. The frogs die in earnest''—to highlight the importance of heeding warnings from coalition allies, not rejecting the participation of international organizations, and not being arrogant about prospects for the future: in those circumstances, ''there isn't that much difference between the small boys and the strategists. There is very little difference… between the Iraqi in the street and…the frogs.''

Lt. Gen. Paul Cerjan, USA (Ret.), followed Mr. Cordesman's comments with his own perspective on the situation in Iraq by first reflecting on a discussion that he had years ago about the Somalia intervention in 1992-1993. Shortly after the announcement was made that the United States was going to deploy forces to that country on a humanitarian mission, Gen. Cerjan encountered the Chief of Staff of the Army, an old friend, at a reception: ''I pull[ed] him aside and I said, 'I think you guys are smoking something in the Tank.' He said, 'What are you talking about?' I said, 'I don't understand how we're going to intervene in Somalia and be out by the inauguration.'" After a short debate, the chief of staff directed Gen. Cerjan to draft a report on the forthcoming intervention.

Gen. Cerjan recalled that the result was a paper entitled ''Painful Dilemma'' that captured many of the same points made by Lord Ashdown, Ambassador Dobbins, and Mr. Cordesman above. The paper identified

four issues that required close attention in order for the proposed intervention to succeed. These included a police/security force, political infrastructure, a judicial system that can be used to define the rule of law, and a viable economy. These four ''pillars'' are the foundation of any nation-state.

''[Y]ou have got to understand that nation-building is soft science as opposed to the hard science many of us have been exposed to. So you'd better start understanding how the interaction between the military and the other 'sides of the house,' i.e., the diplomatic side of the house, the State side of the house…law, government, leadership, business, and economics, how all of these things…have to be taken into account.''

According to Gen. Cerjan, part of the problem faced by any policymaker contemplating an intervention operation is that ''that we have grown the American public to believe that instant gratification and heightened expectations are the way to go. You know, we came out of the first Gulf War with 147 KIA. Everybody started thinking that war is not going to hurt people. So, look where we are after three years in an insurgency in Iraq.'' Self-assessment is not something that Americans are good at, and decisions are often made based on unrealistic expectations.

''What went wrong?''

The absence of a serious long-term plan is where the U.S. went wrong in Iraq: ''I want to tell you I sat in Jay Garner's headquarters for thirty days before he went into Baghdad, as he was going into Baghdad, and today, I'm still trying to figure out what the plan was. The decision was made the end of January to switch the oversight from the State Department to the Department of Defense which was mentioned here previously. The plan was not good and the staff was a pick-up staff. That's the bottom line.''

Priorities and personnel were also an issue in Iraq during the early days of the occupation: ''When the G-4 of an operation that's going to go in and take over a company is more worried about cell phones so people can talk to each other than what it's going to take to resource the operation, there's something wrong with the whole issue, and it was thrust upon Garner and I don't think you can blame him because I think he tried very hard, but it was thrust upon him at the last minute, and he didn't have the people to do it.''

In addition to staffing, organization matters in stability operations and reconstruction. Deciding who is in charge, who has authority, is one of the most important considerations when a government attempts on embark on a joint operation that draws on the resources of both military and non-military agencies. This is a source of tension, however, in a bureaucratic environment where different participants attempt to build consensus rather than taking direction from a single authority. Gen. Cerjan noted

that this thinking was informed by his own military experience—where an estimate of the situation and an operations order are fundamental: "When you get to the strategic level, you do an estimate, you bet your boots. That's what should have been done going into Iraq and the plan should have been developed off of it."

Gen. Cerjan explained why he had been in Iraq during the days before the war: "I got called…and asked if I would go with [Jay] Garner's operation and a small team to put the Iraqi Army back to work. I want you to think about that. You get a call on a Thursday that says, 'Hey, I've got a little mission for you. We're going to put together a little team. You're going to go over there and we want you to put the Iraqi Army back to work.' I said, 'Well, how many is that?' They said, 'I don't know. Figure it out.' It turned out to be…450,000 people." After ruling out the post-war employment of the Republican Guard, other troops expected to be strongly loyal, and everybody above the rank of colonel, the target was 200,000. "So, we put together a plan to put 200,000 people to work. Never touched, dismissed out of hand, but that was the reason we were sent over there."

Gen. Cerjan concluded his remarks with an emphasis on economics—and jobs—in a post-war setting. Expressing agreement with Mr. Cordesman, he decried people associated with the Iraq operation who were convinced that new and innovative approaches to the problems of stability and reconstruction were the best way forward; instead, according to Gen. Cerjan, people with experience on the ground must be consulted—and if the response from policymakers is indifference, that indifference must be met with vocal objections: "You've got to make sure you stand up and you put across the points that are going to make the operation work and anything you see that doesn't make sense, you've got to stand up and talk about it, just like Eric Shinseki, former Chief of Staff of the Army, did when he said, 'we don't have enough people.'"

Gen. Cerjan's remarks were followed by a group discussion and question-and-answer session. The central points raised in the group discussion, and the highlights of the follow-on questions, are captured below:

Mr. Cordesman: Planning is important, but there are other factors to consider before any plans are drafted: "you really had to know whether you were adapting your capabilities to the circumstances rather than sort of having some kind of ideological or political approach.

Before you have a plan, you have to have a risk assessment and a cost-benefit assessment. There are an awful lot of ways to do this. There are some ways you could avoid. I think in retrospect, we didn't need to

go into Vietnam and we certainly didn't need to escalate our commitment. In retrospect, if we look at the objectives for going to war in Iraq, we may or may not produce something approaching a liberated country, but all of the other objectives, securing energy, an example to the region, getting rid of the weapons of mass destruction, the objectives were wrong."

Lord Ashdown: "I agree with Tony Cordesman about [making] the case [for intervention]. Where I don't agree with him is that somehow or another if it's a command economy, you can't deal with economic reform… Bosnia and Herzegovina was a command economy as an ex-communist economy, and we had to convert that over time through economic reform into something approaching a modern market-based economy. Until you did that, you could not create an economy which now is growing at five percent per year, fastest in the Balkans, cutting inflation down to the lowest level in the Balkans, beginning to create jobs, and giving people a stake in their own society and the improvements of it."

Lord Ashdown: "I agree with Tony Cordesman completely about realism. There was a tendency certainly in Bosnia, and I suspect it exists in Iraq as well, that you're not over until you've made Baghdad like Washington, all its institutions working to the same sense of sophistication and smoothness and so on. Nonsense. That's not what you're about."

Lord Ashdown: "modern wars, whether we like it or not, and especially modern peace stabilization missions, are fought in the theater of public opinion, and you have to win there quite as much as you have to win on the theater of the battle and the operational theater that you're referring to."

Ambassador Dobbins: "When nation-building missions flounder, they flounder most often on a mismatch between mission and capability. You can accomplish a little bit with a small amount of manpower, money and time. You can accomplish a lot with a lot of manpower, money and time, but you can't accomplish a lot with a small amount of manpower, money and time, and if you try, what you'll accomplish is a disaster."

Ambassador Dobbins: "You can't put a broken country together if its neighbors don't want you to. You simply can't go in and assume that even the world's only super power can pull a broken divided country together if its neighbors are operating against you."

QUESTIONS FROM THE AUDIENCE:

Given that perhaps our leadership is where the weak point is [in both planning and executing stability operations and reconstruction], how do we get past that, or can we get past that? What is the path ahead?

PANEL MEMBER: "[The Bush] administration has now put in a series of measures in the State Department, in the Defense Department, and in the White House which are at least as good as what the Clinton Administration had when it went out of office in 2001. Unfortunately, this is five years too late and if these kinds of steps had been taken in 2001, we would be a lot further along.

"So, I think we need on the civil side of the nation-building, on this activity, the equivalent of what the Goldwater-Nichols Act did for the military when that was instituted 10 or 15 years ago which is to build a sense of jointness, to mandate a greater interchange between agencies and, most of all, to create assured procedures in the case of Goldwater-Nichols for going to war, in the case of a new piece of legislation for going to peace, if you will, in which everybody knows what they do, in terms of going to war, you know what the theater commander does, what the service chief does, what the Secretary of Defense does, what the president does. Those roles and missions are defined. They're not subject to renegotiation every time you face a new crisis.

"We need that kind of continuity built in and so I would take the presidential directive that we've currently got and essentially put it into legislation, so the next administration doesn't have to reinvent it."

What is the challenge ahead for the United States? How much of a revolution are we trying to achieve [through stability operations and reconstruction efforts]?

LORD ASHDOWN: "This is what I think Tony Cordesman was referring to when he talked about the case, and I think this is an extremely important point. I'm going to repeat what I said before.

"If you cannot articulate the case as to why you are there in terms which make sense to your domestic population, who are committing troops and resources to it, and to your international coalition, but above all, has popular support in the country that you are trying to stabilize, you have placed an immense impediment in the way of your success."

AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: "In our studies, we established two criteria for success. One was peace and the other was democracy. Pretty simple, pretty binary. Either they are still fighting or they're not. Either they are living

under a representative government that gets elected and changes every few years or they're not. The success rate was, as I've suggested, rather better than one might have expected…So, these are not impossible objectives, as long as you define, you know, democracy with some degree of modesty, and I agree with Tony, which we're not doing adequately these days. I mean, essentially, your objective, what you want to do is channel the competition for wealth and power in that society, away from violent channels into essentially transparent, peaceful and ultimately democratic channels."

Gen. Cerjan wound up his remarks talking about the fact that perhaps having someone in charge was a criterion for success in Germany and Japan. There were comments about the need for integration and coordination, the need for unity of vision and unity of voice, the need for accountability…if you were tasked with designing the next large multilateral intervention, what mechanisms would you put in place for leadership of this herd of cats that you'll wind up being responsible for?

LORD ASHDOWN: "if I was redesigning this, I would to stick with a coalition of the willing and to have as the managing group or the chief international coordinator a board made up of the nations who have contributed in one way or another, either to fighting the war in the first place or to stabilizing the peace after war…I actually believe that the UN, despite what Jim says, is not a good organization for doing things. I don't think it's good at running wars, and I don't think it's good at running peace stabilization."

MR. CORDESMAN: "I think, first of all, there are two principles in constructing these operations which are somewhat in conflict with each other. One is the desirability for unity of command which is pretty clearcut, and the second is the desirability for broad participation and burden-sharing…The issue of whether a coalition of the willing or a UN operation, it's rather situationally-dependent. The UN doesn't do invasions. So, if a forced entry is going to be a requirement, you're going to have to go to either NATO or a coalition of the willing. So, you know, in East Timor, it was the Australians that led. In the Solomons, it was the Australians that led, but then they quickly turned it over to the UN."

CLOSING REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR CLIFF BOND, ICAF FACULTY

Let me thank our panelists for a rich discussion. What we've been trying to do this morning is identify the issues and the questions that must be raised before a state undertakes a stabilization and reconstruction opera-

tion and in the post-conflict environment. I think Ambassador Dobbins made the very good point that all of these issues and questions have to be informed by the specific circumstances on the ground, from experts—both regional experts and specialists in reconstruction and stabilization.

I think Professor Cordesman gave us a very good sense of the sort of considerations and the cost-benefit analysis you have to make before you intervene. Paddy Ashdown spoke, I think very correctly, on the need to be able to make a strong and continuing case to your own public and to the society that you're intervening in.

We certainly have to do a better job of integrating military and the civilian activities to create the sort of jointness that Goldwater-Nichols provided the military. This can help overcome the stove piping to which our speakers referred to and which is a legacy of the Cold War.

Commitment is also key. Ambassador Dobbins' recent book on nation building shows that the strongest correlation of success is linked to a commitment of resources, troops, and time. These are very expensive operations, and you cannot succeed in them on the cheap.

We touched a bit on the right division of labor between the military and the civilian agencies. We might pose the question, and perhaps they'll address it this afternoon during the second panel, in terms of how much the military should be expected to do beyond providing a safe and secure environment? I agree that as the security environment improves, civilian agencies should take on more and more responsibility. It is also true, as several of our speakers noted this morning, that some things are best done and should only be done by the civilians. In that list, I would include policing training and the reform of the broader chain of institutions you need for the rule of law.

We discussed the issue of military versus civilian leadership. There are different models that you can apply in these situations, but I think the important thing is an integrated decision-making approach. This was not the case early in Bosnia and it complicated our stabilization and reconstruction activities there.

Finally, what constitutes success? The formal end to the conflict and casualties can serve as one metric, but is not a sufficient one. Our discussion today touched on the need for other standards, including correcting the root causes of the conflict and the creation of a more integrated society that can function in the world community. But we also need to be realistic in our expectations of the kinds of things that the international community can accomplish.

Clearly, as everyone has said, there are certain capabilities the U.S. Government does not have and we are going to have to develop them to deal with these problems in future. That topic is going to be the subject of our panel this afternoon.

SECTION III

Resourcing Stability Operations and Reconstruction: Recommendations for the Future

Dr. Hans Binnendijk—Panel Moderator
Ambassador Carlos Pascual
Lieutenant General David Barno, USA
Ambassador William Taylor
General Carl E. Vuono, USA (Ret.)

Opening remarks by Dr. Hans Binnendijk, National Defense University

In this session, we're going to look forward and we're going to discuss how to build a better stabilization and reconstruction capacity and how to resource it.

This morning we took a look back at history, going back even to the Civil War, and we discovered that the U.S. military and, in fact, the U.S. Government, has done these operations in the past. It wasn't just post-Civil War Reconstruction, either. The government had a role in the Philippines, in Germany and Japan, and even in Vietnam. After Vietnam, the attention of the nation shifted away from these kinds of operations, and the military's avoidance of stability operations and reconstruction was enshrined in many ways with the Weinberger Doctrine and the Powell Doctrine, which focused on decisive force to the exclusion of these kinds of activities.

In the 1990s, we saw once again a growing requirement for the armed forces to engage in these kinds of operations again. As Ambassador Dobbins noted earlier today, the pace has been about one operation every two years. The post-Vietnam decline in capabilities is being reexamined as the Department of Defense attempts to address what the National Defense University publication has described as a "stabilization and reconstruction gap." This panel is focused on how we can fill that gap.

In many ways, this "gap" is being been complicated by military transformation. The focus on military transformation at the beginning of this century has emphasized high-end military change—and we have learned to do that very well. The quick victories in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early days of those wars demonstrate the value of transformation, but there have been unintended consequences of that military transformation.

If you think about the way that we won those two wars, it was almost

like a military coup with effects-based operations targeting specific areas that would collapse a regime. It was not a war of attrition and, as a result, in many ways quick success—regime change—has made the post-conflict mission more difficult.

So what we need—and what this panel is about—is a second military transformation that focuses on stabilization and reconstruction operations. The building blocks for the second transformation are in place and they've been discussed throughout the day, but let me just very quickly go down through them.

The building blocks include the DoD Directive 3000.05, which essentially equates stabilization and reconstruction missions to war-fighting missions. The directive says stabilization and reconstruction are core missions of the military, and the implementation of that directive is currently underway.

We had the Quadrennial Defense Review, which focused on partnerships, both interagency and international. The National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) that was briefly discussed this morning—which Ambassador Pascual had a large role in drafting which created a framework for interagency action in this area—is another important building block.

In the international area, we have NATO beginning to look at stabilization and reconstruction capacity, and NATO militaries are considering what they should be doing to enhance their capabilities.

So the building blocks are in place and what this panel is going to try to do is to think about those building blocks and figure out what needs to be done next. This is indeed a star-studded panel.

We'll start with Carlos Pascual, who is currently the Vice President of the Brookings Institute. He also runs the Foreign Policy Division. In his last assignment at the State Department, he was the coordinator for CRS Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations.

I've asked Carlos to focus primarily on the interagency part of this problem.

We'll next hear from Lt. General David Barno, who is currently the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army for Installations. He is here because of his deep experience, both in Iraq and Afghanistan. He helped train Iraqi forces prior to the movement into Iraq, and then he became the commander of coalition and U.S. forces in Afghanistan. He has directly-relevant experience in both of those operations. I have asked him to draw on those experiences, and also address how the military is changing itself for the second transformation I just mentioned.

The third speaker will be Bill Taylor, Foreign Service Officer. He is currently the Senior Advisor to the Office Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department. He is here with a great deal of

experience. He served in Baghdad as the Director of the Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office and he served in Kabul as Coordinator for U.S. and International Assistance to Afghanistan.

Our final speaker will be General Carl Vuono. He was the 31st Chief of Staff of the Army. He served in that position at the end of the Cold War and initiated some of the dramatic changes—transformations—within the Army to deal with these post-Cold War missions. He is currently the Director of Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), and he will be focusing on non-governmental actors and the contributions that they make to stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Introductory Remarks by Ambassador Carlos Pascual

I think it's extremely important to remember that this whole process—creating a stabilization and reconstruction capability—is going to be evolutionary. When I was in my previous job, I once had a discussion with Secretary Colin Powell, and one of the things that we noted was that when the Goldwater-Nichols legislation was passed (which, by law, promoted joint operations in the military) it took fifteen years before the military became good at joint operations, this despite the fact that the military had a strong hierarchical culture that should have facilitated the move to joint operations. Indeed, at the outset, there are many within the defense establishment who really opposed joint operations and thought it was the wrong way to go, and they used the hierarchy to resist change.

To make changes in the civilian world—to create a joint operations capability and a joint capability between civilians and the military—is going to take time. We should all recognize that. I think we've got the rhetoric right. We've got a lot about the vision right, but actually making it happen is going to be another challenge.

I think it is important to recognize that a great deal to this end has been done to date. Hans Binnendijk laid out some of the key points on the military side of the nation-building equation, but on the civilian side, Presidential Directive 44 (PD44) makes it very clear that the Secretary of State is responsible for stabilization and reconstruction functions. President Bush's decision to sign PD44 was a very important act for this administration.

PD44 defines very clearly the role of the Secretary of State in facilitating the interagency process. Within that, Directive 3000 is, in a sense, a subset. There are parts of Directive 3000 that have to do with military operations, but for stabilization and reconstruction, there is a planning framework that has been developed and circulated to the combatant command to be tested. The framework is actually being put to use in planning activities for Cuba, Sudan and Haiti—it is being used to help define how stabilization and reconstruction missions should actually be constructed,

something that we did not have in the past.

We've developed models for how civilians and the military can work together at combatant commands. These models have been put to the test in work that has been done in Southern Command.

There are models that have been developed for civilian-military interaction, what we call "advanced civilian teams" that build on models for interagency coordination in Washington, and there are mechanisms and models that have been developed for how to fund stabilization and reconstruction, as well as what some of the skill areas are.

So we are no longer in the position of having to reinvent this out of whole cloth. There is a very solid foundation for stability operations and reconstruction, but what's going to be critical now is whether there exists the political will and the resources—and there exists the ability to adapt from experience to transcend bureaucratic boxes.

I want to touch on four sets of issues. The first is prevention. The second is planning and exercises. The third is the response capability of the U.S. Government. Finally, I want to look at programmatic responses and consider related critical issues and resource implications.

All right. Let me start with prevention. I think that there has been a convergence in the literature and in the Executive Branch that dealing with the threats of failed and weak states is absolutely one of the critical things that we have to do as part of our national security.

The 2002 National Security Strategy says that we are threatened more by failed states or weak states than we are by concurring states. In December of last year, Secretary Rice published an op-ed that said that the dynamic within weak states is a much greater issue that affects the security of our country than what happens in the dynamics in the borders across strong states.

There's been a convergence, I think, that this is a reality that we have to deal with, but if you were to ask the next question, what are the greatest threats because if these are indeed some of the critical things that we have to face today, the answer would be that we have no mechanism in the U.S. Government to determine what those principal threats are, and as a result of not being able to determine those principal threats how to necessarily plan for them and gain for them in a concerted interagency basis and then provide some specific response.

In my previous job, we began a process of working with the intelligence community in developing a watch list and using that watch list as a management tool to get Interagency input, but it was absolutely impossible to achieve a consensus on which key countries were some of the ones we should be looking at that could have a major impact on our national security. Frankly, it's not that hard to do.

If we were simply to ask the question have we read the newspapers in

the last few months and what countries were greatly affected by internal instability as a result of the Danish cartoons, perhaps maybe had nuclear weapons, some of which might have a major impact on oil supplies or regional stability, and we'd probably come to a consensus that at a minimum, we should be focusing some attention on what happens in Pakistan, on Saudi Arabia, on Egypt, on Nigeria, perhaps maybe even Turkey as a major transit route, but we cannot reach consensus on that within the U.S. Government, and the irony of it is that the more sensitive a country that we're dealing with in the civilian world as opposed to the military, in the civilian world, it becomes almost impossible to deal with it because we begin to think that it might leak, that we're actually gaming out what could happen in Pakistan if there were democracy here in a year, like my God, maybe as happened in Lebanon or what happened in the Palestinian territories, and how would we deal with rising Islamism in those countries, and how can we plan for it right now in order to prepare for that kind of transition?

We have not been able to do that as part of the civilian world. So, one critical lesson is going to be to be able to create a consensus to move this process forward. The NSPD gives the Secretary of State the leadership role. I think we have to think more creatively about how to use the National Security Council and build a consensus, and we have to have the resources to be able to gain these situations and prepare for them in advance. This isn't that expensive. The kind of work that needs to be done here could probably be done for $2 to $5 million.

Second area that I want to raise is planning. I think that there's been a consensus that we have to have in any kind of stabilization and reconstruction operation a plan which is based on goals. A major step forward that was taken, I think, over the past six months was the development of a framework for stabilization and reconstruction planning that can apply to civilians and to the military.

With the help of Joint Forces Command that is in fact being circulated to all the combatant commands, it's being tested and reviewed. We've used it in Cuba and Sudan and Haiti. In Cuba, it's actually been taken to further levels of examining the intricacies of how it might actually play itself out in different kinds of circumstances.

There are still major issues here. On Sudan and Haiti, it took at least six months to be able to get the Interagency to come to some common perspective on what kinds of goals to establish, how to break down those goals into key major mission elements, to break them down further into essential tasks, and then to look at who had the institutional responsibility and what the resources were that are required for them.

If we had to do this quickly overnight in a real-live situation, it would be extraordinarily difficult to do, and, you know, one of the things that

the U.S. Government is really good at doing is to get groups of people together and tell you what the goals are for their individual accounts, so you can get people to respond what is the right goal for their economic support funds or their development assistance or the child survival account or the peacekeeping account or the foreign military financing account, but ask the question, what should the U.S. Government's goals be in a country and how to achieve those goals, and our Interagency competitions virtually preclude us from doing that because everybody's looking after their own budget and trying to figure out how to make sure that the other guy doesn't steal a part of it.

So, one of the key lessons that we've learned is if we want to do this successfully in the future, we've got to get rid of the account structures. We have to find a way to create incentives for the Interagency to come together to look at how they can achieve U.S. Government resources, and then we need the planners.

If we counted the number of planners within that and we assume that everybody in my former office, the Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization, was a planner, well, we've got in the State Department maybe about 65 planners. We add on top of that the Policy Planning staff which actually doesn't do this kind of planning; maybe we could get up to a hundred. The personnel just are not there if we're going to proactively be planning for future contingencies and, just as importantly, if we want to exercise this.

Planning has been antithetical to the civilian world culture for the most part and in particular to the State Department culture. I say this all the time and I said it all the time when I was in the State Department, and taking it a step further of exercising those plans and testing them is just simply something which the civilian world and the Foreign Service world has not done and has not had the resources to do and, quite frankly, if you don't put the personnel in place to make it possible, it almost is asking an impossible task because you're telling people who are working ten to thirteen hours per day, depending on the circumstance, that you have to add on another responsibility to what you're trying to do.

So, fundamentally, I think that on the planning side, it's going to take at a minimum staffing up the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction in the State Department to the eighty personnel that have been requested, but staffing it in a way that is funded in advance in the budget in a transparent way so that the individuals can be hired who have the skills and the capabilities that are necessary for those functions.

If we look at the resources that are officially on the State Department budget, it looks like about $10.4 million are being allocated to personnel for this purpose right now. If you look at how much has actually been planned for, I would guess we'd be pushing—and some of my former

colleagues are here. If I said the figure $3 million, my guess is that we'd probably be pushing it.

What is necessary for that? If you really need eighty people, that—even using conservative estimates for the cost of an individual—is about $16 million right there. If you take ten percent as an additional cost for training, there's another $1.6 million. Again, they're not huge figures, but if you don't actually get those resources available and make them available up front, you can't succeed.

All right. Next issue I want to say a few words about is U.S. Government response capability. One of the critical requirements in any kind of response on the ground is for the U.S. Government to be able to deploy people who can play a leadership role in negotiating peace agreements, developing strategic plans, developing the strategy for stabilization and reconstruction, developing specific programs, managing those programs.

These are not the implementers, these are the people who are in the embassies and USAID who provide the diplomatic base for our operations, and right now, in order to put those people on the ground in any given country on an emergency basis, we essentially tear apart our diplomatic operations in other parts of the world.

So, what has been proposed is that the State Department create an active response corps of individuals who can have these responsibilities of being designated and trained in a whole range of skills where they can be made available on an emergency basis and a fast response basis and be put into the field, and in fact, originally when the proposal was conceived, we would have an active response corps of a hundred people in the State Department and another hundred people with technical backgrounds because you need those key individuals who have an understanding of law programs or infrastructure programs, civil society development programs or economic kinds of activities.

The cost of that kind of a personnel base is probably around $20 million, if we look at a hundred for the State Department, and another $20 million for a technical corps, and if we take 10 percent for training them, there's about $44-45 million. Again, not huge figures but simply not reflected in the budgets that are being put forward right now.

Finally, let me just say a few words about programmatic response. The skills that I talked about right now are really, you know, if you think about it, prevention side, specific kinds of strategic gaming capabilities, planning and development of a strategy for how one can respond, skills that you generally have in Washington and look at how you can deploy them effectively, an active response team that you put into the field to serve as the base for diplomatic operations, and then you need those who can come in and actually implement the programs.

The civilian police, the police trainers, the rule of law experts, the

economists, the civil society experts, and how are you going to obtain them? There's a three-part strategy that in effect has been proposed, and I think it's a sound strategy. The question is getting the resources to put in place.

One piece of this is the development of a civilian response corps. The Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization is in the process now of developing that model for what that civilian response corps would look like, but in the first phase, it would be police, police trainers, and rule of law experts because what we've learned over time is this is the long pole in the tent and creating stability on the ground and if we can get that going faster, the faster that we can in fact allow our troops to be able to move out or peacekeepers to be able to move out.

The request that's been made has been for $25 million in fiscal year '07 to get this response corps going. The cost of sustaining it at a level of about 3,000 people in a reserve would be about $50 million a year.

That's a huge number in the civilian budget. It's a tiny number when you think about the broad issues that are at stake.

The second piece of doing this are the contractual capabilities, those skills that can be brought in through the private sector, through NGOs, through universities, through think tanks, and how you can mobilize those quickly, and one of the things that's being done is to put together an operational database with all of the contracts that are available within the U.S. Government, but to increasingly turn more and more of those contracts into indefinite quantity mechanisms that allow you to respond much more quickly and flexibly on the resources that you put into the field.

To do something like that, you just have to have seed money to put the indefinite quantity contracts in place and the amount to even just get that started would probably be about $10 to $15 million.

Finally, there is a conflict response fund, and the reason that you need a conflict response fund is not to have a slush fund, but when you have an emergency and you've done your planning and that is key, when you have done your planning and you need a specific response and you need to move people out quickly, you have to have resources that you can tap immediately to be able to put those skill teams on the ground.

The U.S. Congress appropriates money for specific purposes. So, oftentimes the answer that's been put by the appropriators on the Hill has been that you can simply reallocate budgets, but we all know that any time that you reopen that envelope and say that we want to take the money from where it was originally appropriated and put it anywhere else, you're in the middle of a political fight.

So, if there's any way that we're going to avoid this, there need to be resources that will allow us to fund at least the first three to four months

of any given mission so that there's time to either reallocate resources from other accounts or to be able to seek a supplemental appropriation.

What I would propose is that this be funded both out of the Defense budget and the Foreign Affairs budget, a $100 million from each. We have the example this year of the 100 million transfer authority. On the civilian side, we have not been able to get a single appropriation, a single dollar for this purpose up to now.

I think it's important to allocate money from both because this is actually fundamental to the military mission, totally complementary to the military mission, and hence would be logical to bring resources from both accounts for this purpose.

So, if we add up these totals, what it means is somewhere around $63-65 million between prevention, the stabilization and reconstruction staff, the active response corps on the personnel side, and another $260 million, say, $200 million for the conflict response fund, another $10 million for operational contracts, another $50 million to create the civilian reserve corps.

It's not a huge amount of money, $320 million, but I think what we've gotten into right now is a negative cycle where the administration started out with very broad and strong ideas of where it wanted to go. It had a response from those in the Congress who were not always sure of what the purpose was or how strongly the administration backed it, and so they have not put forward money.

The administration in turn has responded by saying, you know, we're not sure if we're going to ask this because resources are tight and we're going to get a negative response from the Congress, and so you get this negative cycle that starts in fact actually descending downward and what you start getting is great rhetoric on what we want to achieve, great ideas on how it should be done, but the resources and the people that are necessary to make it happen aren't being allocated.

So now, I think, is the absolute crucial time when we need to try to turn this around.

Remarks by Lt. Gen. David Barno

Lieutenant General Barno followed Ambassador Pascual's introduction to the subject of the future of stability operations and reconstruction. The general began his comments with a series of observations about the military aspects of security, stability, transition, and reconstruction. Perhaps most importantly, according to Gen. Barno, is the fact that it will take many years to get the military to embrace the stability operations and reconstruction "construct." To illustrate how the armed forces of the United States will have to make significant cultural changes, he read from the Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for

Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction":

"Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission. Priority is comparable to combat operations. The U.S. military shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so," and, "Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operations." Both of these statements, taken verbatim from DoD 3000.05, are fundamental departures from the way U.S. military institutions have traditionally conducted business; the latter statement reinforces points made by Ambassador Pascual's in his opening remarks.

Gen. Barno used his recent experience in Afghanistan, where he served for nineteen months, to explore the difficulties of stability operations and reconstruction, especially in light of the new DoD directive noted above. "Clearly, one of the things that was apparent when I arrived was that this unity of effort between the civilian components of our operation and the military components needed some degree of strengthening." To this end, he was directed to establish a new headquarters in Kabul that was co-located with the U.S. embassy, "adjacent to the International Security Assistance Force, the NATO Compound, with easy access to the Afghan government, to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and obviously to the Afghan government ministries."

Gen. Barno made a distinction between post-conflict stability operations and reconstruction and the work that was being done during his tenure in Afghanistan. Paraphrasing a senior United National official who served in the country with Gen. Barno at the time of the 2004 elections, "what we're doing is really in-conflict nation-building and in-conflict reconstruction." This, to the general, is an important distinction, because the labels we use to describe the nature of operations can influence thinking on the military's role in the process of nation building.

Gen. Barno noted that in late 2003, U.S. forces adopted a broad-based counterinsurgency strategy that was organized around five pillars. The first of these was counter-terrorism, and this effort included sanctuary denial. The second pillar was the active promotion and support of the Afghan security forces, work that was done in collaboration with the U.S. Department of State. The third pillar was "area ownership", a term used for the concept of placing forces in a defined area and keeping them there so that they could learn the terrain and come to know the local population. The fourth pillar was a proper nation-building program that involved the promotion of good governance by using provincial reconstruction teams. Finally, the fifth pillar was external engagement with neighboring states.

The thread that connected all of these pillars together was the informational strategy. This part of the overall plan of attack proved to be the most difficult. Despite the difficulties, the pillar approach, in Gen. Barno's view, helped to bring military and civilian resources to bear on the situation. "In fact, we sat down with the embassy staff and began to work and then ultimately with the international community and with the Afghan government developing a very broad based campaign."

The campaign plan was all encompassing, and was organized around economic, military, justice, governance, and diplomatic categories. The plan, developed jointly by military and civilian personnel (with the military planners in the lead role), called on a variety of stakeholders to identify issues that deserved close attention. Within the broad campaign plan framework, other categories were recognized and addressed. These included social development, economic development, strategic infrastructure, counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency, the Afghan National Army, counter-narcotics, the Afghan Police, judicial reform, counter-warlord efforts, and political, regional, and international engagement. Over time, the stakeholder list grew to include international organizations and Afghan stakeholders, all of whom brought expertise and perspective to the discussion table.

This experience, according to the general, suggests an important role for the military in future operations: "As you heard earlier today, there is a dearth of planners in other parts of the U.S. Government. Planning is not part of the culture of many other agencies. It's simply a fact of life. The military has the capability, I think, to help provide thinkers and planners who can leverage the experience and the knowledge of these other organizations to help develop in-country solutions to some of these problems."

Returning to his earlier remarks about the cultural and institutional changes that will follow DoD Directive 3000.05, the general described some of the initiatives that the army has embarked upon to take on the challenges of nation building, stability operations, and reconstruction. These include work being done at training centers around the country that reflects the operational realities of ongoing deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq. In California, for instance, training exercises used to focus on "tank on tank" combat. Now, exercises are focused on villages that are manned by actors playing the roles of civilians and irregular forces. Of course, these kinds of changes to training were well underway before DoD Directive 3000.05 was signed, but the Army is taking steps to "absorb" the stability operations and reconstruction requirement.

There are other signs that the Army is poised to embrace these new missions and facilitate the resource management aspects of these operations. Returning to one of his earlier points, Gen. Barno noted, "I found in my time in Afghanistan that regardless of what the U.S. military was directed to do as a primary mission…in the first place, with 20,000 troops on the ground, scores of helicopters, all kinds of tactical vehicles, an immense communications network, and aircraft of all type, we were the

'800-pound gorilla,' and we had the ability to get things done…when that capacity simply wasn't there in other parts of the U.S. interagency and the international community…Our [dual] challenges will be [to figure out] how we can best partner with the other parts of the government, [while] institutionalizing the changes we're making in the military today."

Ambassador Taylor's Remarks

Folllowing Gen. Barno's comments, Dr. Binnendijk invited Ambassador Taylor to discuss the role of coalition partners and allies in stability operations and reconstruction efforts. The ambassador began his remarks by referring back to Gen. Barno's initial comments about the decision to relocate his headquarters to be closer to other U.S. Government and coalition activities in Kabul. This, according to the ambassador, was in important decision, from a resourcing standpoint, because the move put his staff in closer proximity to the United Nations, coalition allies, and non-government organizations that were moving resources into the country. A similar move, according to the ambassador, was made in Baghdad: "Ambassador Negroponte and General Casey's office were set up exactly the way that General Barno's office was with Ambassador Khalilzad and that was right across the hall. The [offices] were side by side and they would stick their heads into each other's offices during discussions."

Ambassador Taylor made some very succinct comments about allies: "Number one: seek them. Number two: support the host governments as they try to organize the donors, the allies." To illustrate these points, the ambassador gave several examples drawn from his extensive professional experience.

Ambassador Taylor noted that his most recent experience was in Jerusalem, rather than Iraq. In Jerusalem, a quartet of powers—the U.S., Russians, Europeans, and United Nations—were all trying to improve conditions in the region. "last summer, the Israelis were pulling out of Gaza and last summer, there was hope that there could be some real reconstruction, some real development, some real stability in the Palestinian territories, and so for the past eight or nine months, I've been over there with this quartet organization…The Americans worked closely with the Israelis. The Europeans had a history of working very closely with the Palestinians. The Russians, of course, supported the Palestinian authority in previous times. The UN could work with anybody." This arrangement led to a kind of burden sharing that was complicated, but it could also have important benefits.

Ambassador Taylor provided an example of a border crossing between Gaza and Egypt. The Europeans were instrumental in putting people on the ground quickly to handle the border crossing issue. But the Europeans were not alone in this instance. "USAID played a major role in

that crossing as well. Within two weeks, they put in all the equipment, all of the hardware, all of the cameras and the computers to make it possible for the Palestinians to take over."

"It goes without saying as well, that allies bring resources. They bring men, they bring soldiers, they bring dollars, Euros…So, I would say seek allies in terms of going forward in terms of resources, and then the second thing I would say is try to support the local government as the local government organizes these allies, as the local government organizes the donors, and again we've got different examples."

For example, in Afghanistan, there was a very driven and effective economics minister who pulled together the international community. He was able to pull together a wide range of international actors to support projects across the Afghan government. He chaired the overall organization, and relied on Afghan ministers in charge of transportation, education, and other areas who in turn called on international donors for assistance. According to the ambassador, this kind of arrangement was foreign in Iraq, where there was no strong personality bringing disparate groups together. There was also considerably less international aid available to the Iraqi government. Complicating matters was the geographic division of labor: the British were in the south, the South Koreans were in the north, and the Americans had a presence in the Kurdish parts of the country.

Palestine, another case that seems like a logical choice for lessons, is not a good example to follow. "In the Palestinian authority, their people have been working on Palestine for ten years…You think they might have gotten it right over a period of time, but they haven't. It's been layer after layer after layer after layer of coordination mechanisms." Part of the trouble is the fact that the Palestinian Authority is not a state, and the leadership is unable to assert the kind of authority that is required for effective resource management.

Ambassador Taylor concluded his comments with a reiteration of the importance of allies to stability operations and reconstruction, especially as costs mounts and non-military resources become crucial to long term goals.

Dr. Binnendijk next called on Gen. Vuono of MPRI, representing a private sector view, to comment on the role of commercial firms in stability operations and reconstruction efforts.

Prepared Remarks by Gen. Carl Vuono, USA (Ret.)

Ambassador Pascual, Ambassador Taylor, General Barno, Dr. Binnendijk and symposium participants. It is a pleasure to join you here today to discuss the role of the private sector in reconstruction and stabilization.

I'll address my remarks on this topic not from the perspective of a former Chief of Staff of the Army but rather as the president a private company that is deeply involved in reconstruction and stabilization. Nonetheless, my remarks—and my recommendations—are shaped not solely by the market forces of the private sector, but also by my 34 years of military experience.

Let me begin with what I believe is an important point. The use of the private sector in war is not synonymous with the privatization of war. Contractors—no matter how much they may contribute—are not in the business of making war or peace or national security policy. Those functions must always be the sole purview of legitimate governments. Companies like mine are, quite simply, an instrument of policy execution that the government has at its disposal.

Let me now outline three points, highlighting several areas in which the private sector can make contributions to reconstruction and stabilization that are both effective in terms of outcome and efficient in terms of resources.

My first point: the private sector provides the U.S. with both unique staying power and long-term continuity. As we all know, official governmental organizations, such as the armed forces, must rotate personnel on a frequent basis. The private sector, on the other hand, can employ men and women who are committed for the long haul. For example, we have certain members of our team in Afghanistan who are now in their third year in-country, while their active duty counterparts have changed repeatedly.

This sort of durability facilitates the growth of close inter-personal relationships between the U.S. and the host nation in ways that are nearly impossible to achieve without the private sector. These relationships then translate into opportunities for institutional progress. In my experience, ministers of defense take risks with change because they trust the individual recommending such changes. By way of illustration, the personal trust that developed between Minister of Defense Sviranov of Bulgaria and the MPRI program manager in Sofia proved to be instrumental in jump-starting some of the most basic institutional reforms within the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense.

In the same vein, the staying power of private companies can become the glue that gives multi-year U.S. programs continuity over time. We all know from practical experience that even the most detailed post-conflict plan will not survive first contact with reality. Changes will—and must—occur as conditions themselves dictate. However, if we are to alleviate possible uncertainties among friends and allies that are generated by changes in the execution of our policy and plans, we must maintain continuity, particularly in interpersonal relations. This is an invaluable

role that the private sector can play—a byproduct of the longevity of individuals within the teams.

Consider the continuity that our teams have provided to the Bosnian mod in the decade-long program that we have maintained in Sarajevo. Changes in U.S. and NATO commanders, in OSCE leadership, in the U.N. and E.U. presence, in U.S. ambassadors and country teams have been offset by the long-term presence of MPRI.

There is an important caveat, however, in the durability that the private sector brings to the equation. Organizations in the private sector must ensure that their long-term personnel remain energetic, imaginative and current in their areas of expertise—always remaining within the left and right limits of their assigned responsibilities.

My second point: the private sector can make an enormous contribution in the most crucial of all post-conflict functions: institution-building. By "institution building," I mean the creation of capacity within indigenous structures—in and out of government.

Institution building is a difficult challenge, as we are seeing in both OIF and OEF. But it is by no means an impossible task, if approached with vision, resources, tenacity and plain hard work. And it requires a methodology that lends discipline and structure to specific program elements. Across the private sector, we have developed such a methodology and an experienced-based skill set that can be of singular value in building the institutions of post-conflict governments.

My third point: the private sector can play a vital role as a bridge in an overall U.S. post-conflict transition strategy. In an ideal world, highly visible U.S. forces should be reduced in direct proportion to increasing capability of indigenous forces. Ideal conditions, as we all know, rarely exist in reality.

Under non-ideal conditions, the private sector can become an important bridge between large-scale U.S. military presence and complete host-nation responsibility for security. The private sector, in selected functional areas such as institution building, can provide high quality, experienced expertise with a far less visible profile. The use of the private sector can thus help ensure that post-conflict governments will achieve requisite capacities while allowing for a timely and disciplined withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Those three points—the continuity of the private sector, the private sector's vital role in institution building and the role of the private sector as a bridge in successful transition strategies—highlight several of the key contributions that contractors can make to overall U.S. objectives.

Let me close with a final thought. Regardless of the nature and expertise of contractors and companies in the private sector, they must all be governed by an uncompromising commitment to the highest standards of

ethics in everything they do. In support of national security, there can be no room for dishonesty, immorality or shady business practices.

So, let me suggest by way of conclusion that the private sector has an invaluable role to play in the business of reconstruction and stabilization. In the years ahead, the private sector should be considered not as an anomaly or a competitor but as a full partner in establishing and enhancing U.S. capabilities to fulfill the reconstruction and stabilization mission worldwide.

Following General Vuono's comments, Dr. Binnendijk summarized the observations and recommendations made by the panelists. Ambassador Pascual suggested that, with $3 to $350 million additional a year, a significant interagency stabilization and reconstruction capability could be developed that could be used effectively in cases of intervention. One of Gen. Barno's major points was that the military can—and should—be an enabler for the other agencies. Barno discussed planning and training as two of the key areas where that this "enabling" capability should be grown. Ambassador Taylor took the position that the United States needs to seek out allies if it is going to embark on stabilization and reconstruction or "nation-building" operations in the future. Carl Vuono noted that the private sector—with its expertise and diverse resources—will be involved in stability and reconstruction operations for many years to come, and that the private sector can serve an important institution building function by serving as a "bridge" to local partners. These follow-up remarks were concluded when Dr. Binnendijk opened the session up to the audience for questions.

QUESTIONS FROM THE AUDIENCE:

Q: *I know some people have made some other recommendations for how to reorganize our diplomatic efforts. Some have even suggested creating a diplomatic capability that almost mirrors our combatant commands. Would the panel like to comment on whether something that extreme would help in our stabilization and reconstruction efforts or is?*

A: "I think that it's particularly important to understand that there is a reason for the division between civilian structures and military structures, and that there is civilian control of the military. I think that for us to have our diplomatic missions co-located with the combatant commands, frankly, would create a real difficulty for how the United States projects itself abroad, and this kind of organization would not necessarily solve some of the problems that we need to address in our diplomatic service.

Q: *Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, training for the conventional mission had pretty much achieved zero sum status, at least in the Marine Corps. Now we've added an additional core competency requirement for stabilization and reconstruction. Do you think this new requirement is going to take away from our capability to accomplish the kinetic combat mission and, perhaps instead of building new core competencies in stabilization and reconstruction, should we more aggressively pursue a private sector solution right up front instead of insisting that we can do more with less or more with the same?*

A: GENERAL VUONO: "First of all, we're a world power and we have got to have a balance in our forces, in the training and in development of our leaders, and we don't want that pendulum to swing too far either side, and I think what you're saying, as Dave said in Afghanistan and in Iraq, we have developed through our system, our school system, our training system, a pretty dog-gone high caliber group of adaptive leaders who can pretty much do a lot of things and we talked about some of those today.

"But I'm in awe of battalion commanders that I talked to who have come back from Afghanistan and Iraq and sort of just by second nature describe what they do in a day. I can tell you, I commanded a couple of battalions in combat in the previous wars here, Vietnam, and I couldn't hold a candle to what these guys do today.

"So, I think that pendulum, you have to be careful how far you go to the counterterrorism side, how far you go to the conventional side, because the next war may not be as much a counterterrorism war as we might think today or it might be a little more on the conventional side.

"I think the key is ensuring that you got a very, very rigorous training program against the potential threats you might face, but I really believe the key is developing the kind of leaders, both officers, NCOs, and civilians, who can adapt to whatever it is we're going to face and that's not a pie in the sky answer. I really feel that's what we have to do."

Q: DR. BINNENDIJK: *"Let me ask a question as you're thinking of other things to ask the panel, and what I'd like to try to do is ask a question which might connect this morning's panel to this panel.*

"This morning's panel was, as you recall, very critical of the stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq, although Jim Dobbins did note that the Rand Study that he directed gave the U.S. about a .500 batting average over the series of cases that he looked at, but the question for this panel is this, and I'd like each just to comment on it.

"If you look at the Iraq operation, Iraq with a population of 27 million, you might recall Tony Cordesman's comments this morning, if the United States had what you are recommending for new capabilities in the future, would it have made a difference in the Iraqi case?

"So, Carlos, if, for example, you had the $350 million that you're asking for on an annual basis, you had the capability that that buys, would it make a difference? General Barno, if the directive was already in place and implemented, would it have made a difference? If we had better connected with our allies and local partners, as you're advocating, would it have made a big difference? If the private sector had been perhaps deployed earlier or connected better, whatever, you know, the bridging function, would it have made a difference?

A: So, let's take the Iraqi case and try to connect these two panels. Carlos, you want to start?"

AMBASSADOR PASCUAL: "Sure. [If an institutionalized nation-building capability had been in place before the Iraq invasion], some basic things would have been different. One is that there would have been a comprehensive political-military plan on how to address one's objectives. It would have identified what needed to be done, who would do it, and with what resources, and that would have asked questions across the security sector, who's going to maintain stability and order, who's going to protect key sites, who's going to protect key individuals, who's going to provide the policing function, what resources are going to be available, how quickly are they going to be able to come in?

"It would have asked questions about the political process. What kind of political transition is going to take place, who's going to lead it, what are local groups going to do, what kinds of different local groups are going to participate, what are their incentives and their interests going to be?

"It would have asked questions about job creation. How do you begin putting people back to work and give them a sense of some ability to contribute in their lives and have controls in their lives and who's going to do that?

"It would have asked questions about decentralization of government and the relationship between the federal government and the provinces, where the powers should lie, how those responsibilities are to be divided, how to create incentives from the bottom up at a time when you also have some sense of the state, and it would have forced us to ask the question once we started to look at a strategy and plan like that and identified who was going to do it and with what resources, whether in the end our answers had anything to do with the goals that we set out with the operation to begin with and whether we can actually achieve it. So, it would have actually forced us to approach the whole process with a different degree of realism.

"In terms of capabilities of putting people on the ground, the difference that it could have made is that it would have had civilians embedded

at the combatant commands working directly with the combatant command as it was developing its military strategy to engage in a discussion on the stabilization and reconstruction strategy and understand how the two fit together and how they needed to be weaved together, woven together from the beginning.

"It would have given us the capacity to have teams that could have embedded at a division or brigade level with the military individuals who would have been able to advise their military counterparts on how to begin working with municipal governments, ethnic groups on what some of the issues are that they were going to face and how to begin to address social services.

"I just want to underscore in particular the importance of developing an understanding on the political process and how critical this was because I think we've come to see over time that you can have a security presence on the ground, you can maintain stability and order, but you can't do that indefinitely if you don't have a political process that in the end is going to be the bedrock of stability in a country, and we're at another point where this has become crucial right now again today.

"The constitutional review process, which is supposed to be starting soon, any time, in
Iraq is another one of those circumstances where you have essentially a non-viable constitution. This constitution provides no taxation authority for the central government. It has no overarching human rights definitions. So, in the provinces, you can write legislation that supersedes what any kind of national level definition of human rights would be. So, no protection of minority rights.

"It says that if there's a conflict between federal law and provincial law in the development of oil and who controls it, that the provincial law overrides, and it says that the Supreme Court should be established but it doesn't define what its responsibilities are and whether it can override decisions or legislation.

"So, these planning issues, they're absolutely critical up front."

Q: *I have grave concerns about the so-called "surge concept" that has been discussed here today and in other venues. Forgive me if I exaggerate, but I am hearing people suggest that, if we have boxes of diplomats, ten to a box, stuffed away in an office at the State Department, each with a parachute on his back, ready to drop in on a problem country, we can 'whack the problem.' First, I'm not sure this approach will work. Second, I wonder if a government can expect long-term support for this kind of scheme. Third, doesn't this kind of thinking make an error in understanding when the post-conflict period begins?*

A: Ambassador Pascual: "In fact what's being proposed is not to organize diplomats in a box who can simply jump out and be deployed because, in the end, that won't work. The intent is to start building up an institutional capability of skilled diplomats who have a cross-section of regional skills, political skills, economic skills, reconstruction skills, as well as an understanding of how to operate in a conflict environment. Inevitably you start with something which is relatively small, but the way that it's also been planned is such that you have individuals rotating through positions and…then move to a larger reserve, so that, in fact, it's not unrealistic that over a period of five or six years you can build up teams of several hundred people that you can draw from. You can then bring those people in, taking into account their regional skills, their practical skills and assemble them in a way that makes sense."

Q: *My question builds on actually a comment that the general made where he said it would be great if you could do your postwar planning in concert with your war planning, and I have a question about capacity.*

NSPD-44 sets the Secretary as first among equals for postwar planning, but based on the lack of support to the CRS over tim,e and based on the quality of the planning that was done in advance of the Iraq invasion by the early days of ORHA, my question is this: how can we do this without the National Security Council?

I'm struck by the fact that in the course of an entire day's discussion about a full spectrum engagement, we haven't mentioned National Security Council yet. So, I guess my question is what is the prognosis for multi-agency coordination in the absence of a first among equals with strength, and what is the prognosis for engaging actually beyond the two and a half years, the shelf life, of NSPD-44? How will it go beyond that?

A: Ambassador Pacual: "I think the NSC plays a critical role, and I did mention the NSC in one particular function on prevention, on identifying threats, but I think it's a broader one than that.

"The Secretary of State is given responsibility in NSPD-44 to play a leadership role in coordinating among the Interagency. The question then comes of what you do with that coordinated strategy and that becomes the discretion of the Secretary of State, but one of the things I think is going to be critical is how you use the National Security Council and the White House to be able to review and vet those plans and to ensure that you have an interagency consensus on them.

"I personally think that there has not been enough attention to these issues outside of the White House. If you look at how the NSC is staffed to deal with stabilization and reconstruction functions, the issue is embedded within the directorate that is responsible for development and for

multilateral affairs in the G8, and there has been up to now one individual who has responsibility at a director level, not a senior director level, for these kinds of functions and responsibilities, and then you bring in senior directors on individual country issues, but those senior directors have a whole lot of other things to do and they have in particular their own region-specific or country-specific policy concerns."

Q: Dr. Binnendijk*: "Ambassador Pascual, would you support the creation of a new position, perhaps a deputy NSC director for operations?"*

A: Ambassador Pascual: "From my personal experience (when I worked in the National Security Council for five years), I would get rid of all of the deputies that are currently there and have one deputy and have a much clearer structure within the NSC. I think what's happened right now is that you've got a whole range of different deputies, people trying to figure out if they should take certain issues to this or that individual…and, in the end, you need somebody who is responsible for the overall policy and strategy in a country. [This way] you might [avoid a case where you've got] somebody who's responsible for stabilization and reconstruction [who] may be moving in one direction, but if that's not completely coordinated with those who have mainstream policy responsibility, you're going to have huge gaps and it's going to fail.

"So, what I would suggest is that you elevate the stature of these issues at a senior director level, you empower those individuals. This way you have one very clear strong National Security Council deputy, an individual who has the capacity to take a leadership role on the whole range of cross-cutting issues that are critical to policy in a given country."

Q: *When I look at DoD Directive 3000, I don't see that there is an executive agency. I see a lot of hubs of responsibility for doing different things. So, who is driving this at the joint level or at the DoD level, and who really has vision of all the different things that are going on?*

I have two shorter questions that are closely related. Do you see a center of excellence, like the center of excellence for infantry operations (infantry schools)? Do we need a stability and reconstruction center of excellence within the Army?

A: Lt. Gen. Barno: "Well, to the last question, I think the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at Carlisle is probably the Army's answer to that, which is being evolved a bit from its earlier incarnations to include a broader focus on stability operations.

"As far as the first question goes, I think that ultimately the combatant commander—in the preparation and execution—is going to be the

predominant force. As far as training and doctrine development, I think it will depend on who owns it during execution."

DR. BINNENDIJK: "The person who is currently responsible for the implementation of Department of Defense Directive 3000 is Eric Galen. His shop, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is driving the implementation, but, as you indicated, as you go downstream, military commanders are going to have to do their bit."

Q: DR. BINNENDIJK*: "Let me ask everybody on the panel this final question: "Are we gearing up to fight the last war? I think that's a criticism that has been made of the focus that is now on stabilization and reconstruction operations, that many of these operations are essentially optional operations. We don't have to do them. Or so it has been said. Therefore, we are gearing up to fight the last war.*

We're losing capacity as we gain this other capacity. This is the argument that's being made today. The question is: 'are we gearing up to fight the last war or should we proceed?' Are there good reasons to proceed as you look out into the future?"

A: AMBASSADOR PASCAL: "The CIA did an analysis called the '2020 Study,' and it explored what the world will like in 2020. The report projected that, by 2020, the world's economy will have grown about eighty percent, and that most regions of the world will actually benefit. Your ability to benefit will depend on whether or not you can tap into global markets and develop technologies that allow you to be competitive. You must also have internal policies that allow you to reshape your economy in ways that are cognizant of a changing global environment.

"In the projections, the expectation is that everybody is going to move ahead except for two regions of the world: Africa and the Middle East. What we see in those parts of the world is the combination of poverty, increased urbanization, increased education, and, at the same time, increased communications where you have deprived people fully aware of what they're being deprived of, and able to communicate much more effectively with one another about their grievances. If you accept this interpretation, I think what the report telling us is that if we can't find a way to address these trends that we're projecting now, the situation is even going to be worse in 15 years. Under these circumstances, then, we're not fighting the last war. We're dealing with a situation that is coming—which is actually going to become more complex that what we see today, so we need to build up these capabilities. In effect, what we're trying to do right now is to build up a capacity for understanding how to help conflicted environments redirect themselves on a path of pursuing

democracy.

"So, I think we absolutely have to continue to build the capabilities."

LT. GEN BARNO: "I would say that we learn something from every war that we fight, so that we're better for the next one, but I have two thoughts. The first is that if you look at the lessons learned from the Gulf War in 1991, because of the nature of that war, if you think back to what occurred, there really was no post conflict phase. It was only in Kuwait. It was a very small effort. Kuwait was not an enemy country. It was a friendly country. So, we learned virtually no lessons on what we today call post conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations.

"We learned some different lessons in the Balkans in the 1990s, but what we ended up, I think, fighting OIF with were more refined kinetic options that probably were spin-offs of what we learned from our kinetic fight in the first Gulf War, which didn't include a stabilization phase.

"So, I think we're learning some, and perhaps relearning some lessons in this war. I think what we're picking up from this war are lessons related to stability operations and reconstruction, as well as closely related counterinsurgency lessons which may be even more important for us in the future as we come to understand our enemies and how they employ indirect ways of fighting us.

AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: "If it's true, as Lord Ashdown said this morning, that we've really made some changes—that the United States government has actually turned and learned some things from ongoing operations, then as General Barno just said, it's fine to look at what the last war was. If, as Carlos says, the next several wars in this next 15-20 years are in areas that we know about, then learning some lessons from current operations and making changes to our organizations and doctrine make sense.

"I would just give you a specific example. Think of the reserve corps concept that we've been discussing today—this 'box of experts.' When we went to Iraq and we suddenly had to pull together people who knew something about reconstructing electricity grids and putting in water mains—fairly technical kinds of things—it took us awhile. We sent some people over there, I think we will all agree, who didn't know how to do those things, but they were responsible for doing them at the outset and over time, we got better. We were able to recruit some more qualified people, but it took time.

"The idea that Carlos talked about of having these people available quickly may be a reaction to the last war, but if that's going to be something we see in the next war, then it's worth doing, it's worth making those plans."

GEN. VUONO: "I go back to the point I made earlier about having a balance among our capabilities, and I think that is going to be critical in the coming decades. As we look at the wars we have fought here in Afghanistan and Iraq, we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that, as a global power, we've got to strike a balance between and among our capabilities.

"I do think, though, there's one constant here that we can't forget. We've talked about the lack of interagency coordination. I would submit that whether it's a conventional war or a counter terrorism operation, I do think we do have a lot of work to do in terms of interagency coordination, regardless of where the next conflict is. To me, that's one of the key lessons we should learn and relearn here as we go forward."

Following Gen. Vuono's comments, Dr. Binnendijk concluded the panel discussion.

SECTION IV

The Iraq War and Lessons For Counterinsurgency

Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke, Chair in Strategy, acordesman@aol.com
With the Assistance of Eric M. Brewer and Sara Bjerg Moller
Working Draft, Revised: March 16, 2006

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE RISING INSURGENCY in Iraq has become a "war after the war" that threatens to divide Iraq and thrust it into full-scale civil war. It dominates the struggle to reshape Iraq as a modern state, has become a growing threat to the Gulf Region, and has become linked to the broader struggle between Sunni and Shi'ite Islamist extremism and moderation and reform throughout the Islamic world.

In military terms, the insurgency has evolved into a "long war," or war of attrition that has produced ten times as many Coalition casualties as the fight to topple the Regime and defeat Iraq's army. It is a conflict with no clear end and which can either gradually fade if the Iraqi political process and development of Iraqi forces succeeds; or suddenly divide the country in ways that no amount of Coalition effort may be able to avoid.

There is no clear or meaningful difference between insurgency and civil war, or between largely national terrorism and civil war for that matter. They are all forms of civil conflict. The insurgency in Iraq, however, has evolved over time in ways that increase the risk of intense or full-scale civil war. It is increasingly driven by sectarian and ethnic struggles, rather than national movements and causes.

The forces in insurgency include a number of of different elements. Shi'ite and Kurdish groups now dominate the government. Their militias and Shi'ite and Kurdish dominated elements of the Iraqi forces do, however, play a role in what is already a low-level civil conflict. They would play a far greater role if Iraq drifts into the kind of civil war that divides the country. There are Sunni insurgency movements, most with Ba'ath origin, that are more secular and nationalist in character, and concerned

with Sunni rights and preventing Shi'ite dominance. These groups probably have a large base of popular Sunni support, but have been increasingly overshadowed by the Islamist extremists.

The current violence is dominated, however, by Sunni Islamist extremists who oppose any negotiations or arrangement with the new Iraqi government and compromise with Coalition forces. These extremists now focus more on attacking Shi'ites, Kurds, and those Sunnis who support the new government or who might participate in the political process than on Coalition forces. Nonetheless, they still attack Coalition, diplomatic, NGO, and other non-Iraqi targets. They are seeking to force the US and its allies to withdraw from Iraq, and to defeat them through a war of attrition, but their primary goal is to prevent Iraq from emerging as unified national state dominated by a Shi'ite majority

This report provides an overview of both how the Iraqi insurgency has moved towards civil conflict from its inception in the spring of 2003 through the first months of 2006, and of the ways in which insurgent tactics and methods have changed over time. It is divided into five general sections.

The first section examines the immediate post-war aftermath and the development of a violent insurgency in the spring and summer of 2003. It shows the evolution of insurgent tactics, methods of attack and the political, psychological and informational warfare lessons from 2003-2006.

The second chronicles developments in the nature of the insurgency and examines Coalition operations to counter it.

The third section explores different methods to measure the insurgency including patterns of attack; the number of bombings, suicide bombings, IED attacks and act of sabotage; and the cost in blood for both U.S. soldiers and Iraqis.

The fourth section assesses the composition of the insurgency including Iraqi Sunni Arabs, foreign jihadists, and the uncertain status of the Shi'ites. It also addresses the degree to which these factions cooperate or conflict and the role of outsiders in the insurgency.

The fifth and final section considers Iraqi views of the threat.

Trends in the Fighting and the Risk of More Intense Civil War

The insurgency remains highly sectarian and highly regional. It not only is driven by a relatively small number of Sunni insurgents, it is concentrated in a limited portion of Iraq. Some 83% of the attacks from August 29, 2005 through January 20, 2006 occurred in only four of Iraq's 18 provinces, although these provinces do include Baghdad and Mosul and have some 43% of the population. Twelve provinces, with over 50% of Iraq's population, have been the scene of only 6% of the attacks.

At the same time, the insurgents have shown a consistent capability

attack at two major levels of operations: First, through a wide range of constant low-level methods that have a serious cumulative effect. Second, through large attacks designed to capture media attention, intimidate and kill the government's supporters, and prevent any form of normalization by provoking Shi'ite and Kurdish response and a more intense civil war. The attacks on Shi'ite targets have increasingly led to Shi'ite reprisals and broader Sunni anger and fear in response.

If one looks at the cycles in the evolving struggle, there are no clear signs that the struggle is being lost or won. For example, the number of attacks peaked to some 700 per week in October 2005, before the October 15th referendum on the constitution compared to 430 per week in mid-January. This was more a function of insurgent efforts to peak operations in sensitive periods than any outcome of the fighting. Similarly, the number of US killed has averaged some 65 per month since March 2003. The total of US killed was 96 in October 2005, 84 in November 68, in December, and 63 in January 2006.[1] This reflected shifts in the cycles of attacks and in their targets. US experts estimated that some 500 Iraqis were killed between the December 15, 2005 elections and mid-January 2006, an "average" period in US casualties.[2]

The key issue is not so much the intensity of the fighting, but rather whether the more extreme Sunni Islamists can paralyze or defeat the political process and intensity the level of civil conflict on all sides.

Changing Patterns in Attacks on Iraqi and Coalition Targets

The insurgency is not yet "winning," although there is a serious that it may be able to paralyze political progress and create a more intense civil war. The previous data show that insurgency has not been able to increase its success rate, establish sanctuaries, win larger-scale military clashes, or dominate the field. It is active largely in only four of Iraq's 18 governorates. (Some 59% of all US military deaths have occurred in only two governorates: Al Anbar and Baghdad.)[3] Much of its activity consists of bombings of soft civilian targets designed largely to provoke a more intense civil war or halt the development of an effective Iraqi government, rather than progress towards control at even the local level. So far, the insurgency has done little to show it can successfully attack combat-ready Iraqi units, as distinguished from attacks on vulnerable casernes, recruiting areas, trainees or other relatively easy targets.

The insurgents have, however, learned and adapted through experience. They have shown the ability to increase the number of attacks over time, and they have hit successfully at many important political and economic targets. Provoking civil war and undermining the Iraqi political process may not bring the insurgents victory, but it can deny it to the Iraqi government and the US. The Sunni insurgents continue to strike

successfully at politically, religiously, and ethnically important Shi'ite and Kurdis targets with suicide and other large bombings.

The insurgents have continued to carry out a large number of successful killings, assassinations, kidnappings, extortions, and expulsions. These have included a significant increase in the number of successful attacks on Iraqi officials, Iraqi forces, and their families. Well over 2,700 Iraqi officials and Iraqi forces were killed in 2005. The Department of Defense estimated that 2,603 members of the Iraqi forces had been killed in action by October 2005, far more than the 1,506 members of US forces that had been killed in action up to that date.[4] The insurgents continue to succeed in intimidating their fellow Sunnis. There is no way to count or fully assess the pattern of such low level attacks, or separate them from crime or Shi'ite reprisals, but no one doubts that they remain a major problem.

Suicide attacks have increased, and killed and wounded Iraqis in large numbers. The number of car bombs rose from 420 in 2004 to 873 in 2005, the number of suicide car bombs rose from 133 to 411, and the number of suicide vest attacks rose from 7 in 2004 to 67 in 2005.[5] In case after case, Shi'ite civilians and Sunnis cooperating with the government were successfully targeted in ways designed to create a serious civil war.

The use of roadside bombs (improvised explosive devices IEDs) remains a major problem for US and other Coalition forces. The total number of IED attacks nearly doubled from 5,607 in 2004 to 10,953 in 2005. While the success rate of IED attacks dropped significantly, from 2530% in 2004 to 10% in 2005, they still had a major impact. During 2005, there were 415 IED deaths out of a total of 674 combat deaths, or 61.6 % of all combat deaths. IEDs accounted for 4,256 wounded out of a total of 5,941, some 71.6% of the wounded. From July 2005 to January 2006, IEDs killed 234 US service members out of a total of 369 total combat deaths, or 63.4%. They accounted for 2,314 wounded out of 2,980 total combat wounded, or 77.7 %.

To put these numbers in perspective, IEDs caused 900 deaths out of a total of 1,748 combat deaths, or 51.5 % during the entire post-Saddam fall from March 2003 and January 2006. IEDs caused 9,327 wounded out of a total of 16,606 or 56.2%.[6] However, the numbers of personnel killed and wounded by IEDs are scarcely the only measure of insurgent success. Casualties may have dropped but the number of attacks has gone up. IED attacks tie down manpower and equipment, disrupt operations, disrupt economic and aid activity, and interact with attacks on Iraqi civilians and forces to limit political progress and help try to provoke civil war.

One other point is worth noting. There is no evidence as yet that Iraq is somehow a unique "magnet" for global terrorist activity. It certainly has a powerful political and ideological impact, and is a key source of

Arab and Islamic anger. The number of foreign volunteers remains so limited, however, that Iraq must be regarded as just one of several areas of Islamic extremist activity—others include Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Chechnya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, and Yemen.

The Economic Side of the Insurgency

The insurgents have also continued to be successful in attacking the Iraqi economy and the Coalition aid effort, as well as human targets. They have often paralyzed aid efforts, particularly in Sunni or mixed areas where such efforts might win over current or potential insurgents. They have forced a massive reprogramming of aid into short-term, security-oriented activity, and well over 20% of aid spending now goes simply to providing security for aid activity. The attacks have done much to discourage or reduce investment and development even in the more secure governorates, and have blocked or sharply limited efforts to renovate and improve Iraq's infrastructure. They have largely prevented efforts to expand Iraq's oil exports—its key source of government earnings.

Insurgents had carried out more than 300 attacks on Iraqi oil facilities between March 2003 and January 2006. An estimate by Robert Mullen indicates that there were close to 500 and perhaps as many as 600-700. His breakdown of the number of attacks was: pipelines, 398; refineries, 36; oil wells, 18; tanker trucks, 30; oil train, 1; storage tanks 4; and 1 tank farm. In addition, there were at least sixty-four incidents in which the victims were related to Iraq's petroleum sector, ranging from high ranking persons in the Oil Ministry to oil workers at refineries, pipelines, and elsewhere in the sector, to contract, military, police, and tribal security people. The number killed in these directed attacks reached at least 100.

The end result was that oil production dropped by 8% in 2005, and pipeline shipments through the Iraqi northern pipeline to Ceyan in Turkey dropped from 800,000 barrels per day before the war to an average of 40,000 barrels per day in 2005. In July 2005, Iraqi officials estimated that insurgent attacks had already cost Iraq some $11 billion. They had kept Iraqi oil production from approaching the 3 million barrel a day goal in 2005 goal that the Coalition had set after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and production had dropped from pre-war levels of around 2.5 million barrels a day to an average of 1.83 million barrels a day in 2005, and a level of only 1.57 million barrels a day in December 2005.[8] These successes have major impact in a country where 94% of the government's direct income now comes from oil exports.

The impact of such attacks has been compounded the ability of insurgents to steal oil and fuel. The *New York Times* has quoted Ali Allawi, Iraq's finance minister, as estimating that insurgents were taking some 40 percent to 50 percent of all oil-smuggling profits in the country, and

had infiltrated senior management positions at the major northern refinery in Baji: "It's gone beyond Nigeria levels now where it really threatens national security…The insurgents are involved at all levels." The *Times* also quoted an unidentified US official as saying that, "It's clear that corruption funds the insurgency, so there you have a very real threat to the new state…Corruption really has the potential of undercutting the growth potential here." The former oil minister, Ibrahim Bahr al-Ulum, had said earlier in 2005 "oil and fuel smuggling networks have grown into a dangerous mafia threatening the lives of those in charge of fighting corruption." [9]

The Changing Risk of Civil War

The mosty important change since the transfer of power from the CPA to interim government in June 2004, however, is the slow and steady evolution of the insurgency towards efforts by Sunni Islamist extremist groups to target Shi'ites, Kurds, and Sunnis in ways that provoke civil conflict.

It is important to recognize that here has been political progress in spite of the violence. The final results for the December 15, 2005 elections gave the Sunnis significant representation, in spite of complaints about fraud. The new Council of Representatives had 275 seats and the final results for the election, which were certified on February 9, 2006, gave the main parties the following number of seats: Iraq Alliance (Shi'ites), 128 seats; Kurdish coalition, 53; The Iraqi List (Secular "Allawi list"), 25; Iraqi Accordance Front (Sunnis), 44; Iraqi front for National Dialogue (Sunni), 11. The Shi'ite coalition won 47% of the 275 seats, the Kurdish coalition won 21%, the Sunni coalition won 21%, and Allawi's secular nationalists (with significant Sunni support) won 9%.[10] The final 1% of the seats went to other parties.[11] As no party won a governing majority of the seats in the parliament, a coalition government will have to be formed.

More than 12 million Iraqi's voted in the December 2005 election. Sunni turnout increased markedly from the January elections. In Nanawa and Salah ad Din, it grew from 17% and 19% respectively to 70% and 98%. In al-Anbar Province it grew from 2% in January to 86% in December. Nationally, voter turnout was 77%, an increase from 58% in January.[12] Of the 1,985 election complaints received by the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, only 3% were considered to have possibly affected the results. These complaints amounted to no more than 1% of the total vote, which was voided and excluded from the final count.[13]

If the December 2005 election does eventually produce an inclusive national political structure that gives Iraq's Sunnis incentives to join the government and political process, many current Iraqi Sunni insurgents are likely to end their participation in the insurgency and the more extreme elements will be defeated.

No one can deny, however, that there is a very serious risk that that the political process will fail. The insurgency has found new targets and now opportunities to drive the nation towards a more intense civil war. The formation of a government gives the insurgency a strong incentive to do everything it can to prevent any meaningful unity between Arab Sunni and Arab Shi'ite, and to provoke counter-violence and attacks by Shi'ites that will drive Iraqi Sunnis to support the insurgency. It can seek to exploit divisions and fault lines within the dominant Shi'ite coalition, and try to provoke the Kurds towards increased separatism.

So far, the constitutional referendum and the election of a new Council of Representatives in December 2005 have not brought added security or stability. They have instead exposed the depth of the sectarian and ethnic divisions in Iraq, and raised serious questions as to whether any form of unified or inclusive national government can be effective.

While some form of "national" or "inclusive" coalition government is still likely to be formed, forming a government will at best be a prelude to new problems and challenges. The new government will then have to preside over a political process that offers the insurgency a host of new issues to exploit. Once the new Presidency Council, Prime Minister, and full slate of ministers are finally in place, the new government must pass legislation to clarify and codify the new constitution. This will involve a political struggle over some 55 enabling or implementing laws that are necessary to make the constitution operative. Many are potentially divisive and give the insurgency opportunities to paralyze the Iraqi political process and provoke full-scale civil war.

The key issues involved include:

Whether the nation should be divided into federal components by province. If this happens, it would almost inevitably be along ethnic and sectarian lines although the "Kurdish" provinces have many non-Kurdish minority elements, the "Shi'ite" provinces often have large Sunni minorities, and the "Sunni" provinces lack oil and any economic viability. Soft ethnic cleansing has already begun in many parts of Iraq, including Baghdad. "Federalism" could lead to sweeping, violent struggles over given areas and population movements.

How the nation's oil resources and revenues should be divided and how new areas should be controlled and developed. The Kurds lack oil reserves in their present areas and clearly want Kirkuk and the northern fields. Shi'ites in the south already talk about controlling the bulk of the nation's proven reserves in central and southern Iraq. The Sunnis have potential reserves but no immediate assets, and the central government gets virtually all of its revenue from oil exports.

Related issues over how to tax and increase Iraq's revenue base, and

who should control its revenues. This includes major debates over the powers of the central government, any federal areas, the provinces, and local governments.

The future security structure of the country, who will really control the armed forces and security forces, and control over provincial and local police forces. This is complicated by a major gap between the intent of the present constitution and the reality of national and local militias. It is further complicated by the fact that the present forces are dominated by Shi'ite and Kurdish elements, and could divide along ethnic and sectarian lines if the nation moved towards full-scale civil war.

Debates over the role of Islamic law in the government and every aspect of civil law. These issues not only have the potential to divide religious and secular Iraqis but also could lead to struggles over whether Sunni or Shi'ite interpretations should dominate. Both Sunni and Shi'ite Islamist extremists could resort to violence if their views were not adopted.

Basic issues over governance including the resulting power of the central government and ministries versus provincial and local power.

Resolving the future of Baghdad, a deeply divided city exempt from being included in any federal area and where soft ethnic cleansing and the relocation of Shi'ites and Sunnis has already become a low-level civil conflict.

Deciding on how the coming and future budgets should be spent, and how economic aid and development resources should be allocated, in an era where the national budget already exceeds revenues, and massive outside foreign aid and pools of oil for food funds will have been expended.

Societal issues closely linked to religious differences, and basic differences over the respective role of secular human rights and law and religious law and custom.

Such issues are explosive at the best of times, but the new government and Council of Representatives must act almost immediately to form a Constitution Review Committee that must try to resolve all of these issues in the middle of an ongoing insurgency and the risk of civil war looming within a four-month period of its formation. It must then win the support of whatever government and mix of the Council of Representatives that exists when it makes its recommendations, and *if successful*, hold a referendum 60 days later. Every element of this process offers new opportunities to the insurgency if Iraq's political process divides and falters. Every milestone offers new incentives to attack, and every leader that moves towards progress and compromise will be a target.

A New Focus on Attacks on Religious Shrines

In fact, the insurgents have already intensified their attacks on Shi'ite

shrines and provoked a new level of Shi'ite response. They scored a major victory by attacking the Askariya shrine in Samarra, a Shi'ite holy landmark, on February 22, 2006. They destroyed its golden dome, although they caused no deaths.

Long before this attack, there was increasingly dangerous trend towards Shi'ite revenge killings, and violence between Shi'ite and Sunni Sunnis had already become a low-level civil war. There is no easy way to quantify the scale of such Shi'ite attacks and abuses with any precision, but no one doubts that increased significantly after the spring of 2005.

Even so, the destruction of the shrine, which housed the graves of two revered Shi'ite imams, caused an unprecedented wave of sectarian violence in Iraq. In the five days that followed, some estimated that over 1,000 Iraqis were killed, that some 300 Sunni and Shi'ite mosques came under attack, and the country seemed to be on the brink of a large-scale civil war.[14] The Iraqi government and MNF-I have put these totals at one-third to one-half these "worst case," but the fact is that no precise numbers exist, and sectarian attacks have continued in the weeks that followed.

Government leaders did call for calm, and peaceful demonstrations were held across the Shi'ite dominated south and in ethnically mixed cities such as Kirkuk.[15] At the same time, many statements by participants and average civilians indicate that Shi'ite patience may well be wearing thin. A Shi'ite employee of the Trade Ministry summed up such views as follows: "You have a TV, you follow the news…who is most often killed? Whose mosques are exploded? Whose society was destroyed?" Another Iraqi put it differently: "We didn't know how to behave. Chaos was everywhere." Even the more moderate Shi'ite newspaper, Al Bayyna al Jadidah, urged Shi'ites to assert themselves in the face of Sunni violence. Its editorial stated that it was "time to declare war against anyone who tries to conspire against us, who slaughters us every day. It is time to go to the streets and fight those outlaws."[16]

Shi'ite religious leaders also continued to call for calm, but their message was sometimes ambiguous both in terms of words and actions. For example, the Moqtada Al-Sadr ordered his Mahdi Militia to protect Shi'ite shrines across Iraq, and blamed the U.S. and Iraqi government for not failing to protect the Askariya shrine saying, "If the government had real sovereignty, then nothing like this would have happened." In a speech from Basra, al-Sadr also called for restraint and unity amongst Iraqi's: "I call on Muslims, Sunnis and Shi'ites, to be brothers…Faith is the strongest weapons, not arms." He also publicly ordered his listeners to not attack mosques in retaliation saying, "There is no Sunni mosques and Shi'ite mosques, mosques are for all Muslims…it is one Islam and one Iraq."[17]

Despite Sadr's rhetoric, however, it appeared that his militia was

responsible for at least some of the violence. Amid demonstrations and condemnations from both Sunni and Shi'ite political leaders, Shi'ite militias such as al-Sadr's Mahdi Army sought revenge against Sunni's and carried out numerous killings and attacks on Sunni mosques. Sunni groups reciprocated.

Sunni politicians have since made many charges that that Sunni mosques in Baghdad and some southern cities were attacked or actively occupied by the Mahdi Army in the days following the attacks.[18] The Association of Muslim Scholars, a hard-line Sunni clerical organization, alleged on Thursday that 168 Sunni mosques were attacked, 10 imams killed and 15 abducted.[19] The association also made direct appeals to al-Sadr to intervene and stop the violence, apparently suspecting he was a primary coordinator of the Shi'ite attacks. In early March however, U.S. government estimates put the number of mosque attacks at only 33, only nine of which were destroyed of sustained significant damage.[20] In some Sunni areas, residents, fearing attacks on their mosques, erected barricades and stood watch. In Al Moalimin district, armed men patrolled the roof of the Sunni mosque Malik bin Anas.[21]

There is no doubt that the attack and its aftermath threatened progress in forming an inclusive government. Iraqi political figures called on the country to recognize that the attack was an attempt to create a civil war and urged Iraqi's to be calm. President Jalal Talabani said the day of the attacks, "We are facing a major conspiracy that is targeting Iraq's unity…we should all stand hand in hand to prevent the danger of a civil war." President Bush echoed these sentiments saying, "The terrorists in Iraq have again proven that they are enemies of all faiths and of all humanity…the world must stand united against them, and steadfast behind the people of Iraq."[22]

The violence resulted in the announcement Thursday by the Sunni coalition party that it would suspend talks to form a coalition government and issued a list of demands. These demands, which were met shortly, and a telephone call from President Bush to the leaders of the seven major political factions urging them to reinstitute talks, brought Sunnis back to a meeting with their Shi'ite and Kurdish counterparts. Later that evening, Prime Minister al-Jaafari, accompanied by the leaders of the other major coalitions, announced at a press conference that that country would not allow itself to engage in civil war and that this was a moment of "terrific political symbolism."[23]

The reaction of Iraqi security, military and police units to the sectarian violence that followed the bombing of the Askariya shrine was considered by some in the U.S. and Iraq to be a test in how well these forces could provide security for their own country in a crises. Opinions differ greatly, however, over whether ISF forces passed this test. The MNF-I

has claimed the armed forces played a major role in limiting and halting sectarian violence. Others have claimed they often allowed Shi'ite groups to attack Sunni mosques, and that the security forces and police did little to calm the violence. The data that have emerge since the attack tend to support many of the MNF-I claims, but the risks of growing divisions in the Iraqi forces, and a tilt towards the Shi'ite and Kurdish side remain all too real.

Some claim that Iraq has already reached the precipice of civil war, seen the dire consequences, and soberly held itself back. These individuals read events in late February as a "turning point" for Iraq. For others, the recent sectarian violence is a more limited "tipping point" toward a deepening civil conflict. In balance, the risks have clearly increased, but it may well be too soon for pessimistic predictions. Iraqis may have drifted toward more intense civil conflict, but the levels of violence are still comparatively limited. Moreover, for all of the political risks, there are opportunities as well and many Iraqis in every sectarian and ethnic faction understand the risks of further escalation and dividing the country.

Insurgent Tactics and Goals

If one turns to the tactical level, many of the trends are clearer. The Sunni part of insurgency has become the equivalent of a distributed network: a group of affiliated and unaffiliated moves with well-organized cells. It is extremely difficult to attack and defeat because it does not have unitary or cohesive structure or a rigid hierarchy within the larger movements. The larger movements seem to have leadership, planning, financing, and arming cadres kept carefully separate from most operational cells in the field. Accordingly, defeating a given cell, regional operation, or even small organization does not defeat the insurgency although it can weaken it.

The insurgency has effectively found a form of low technology "swarm" tactics that is superior to what the high technology Coalition and Iraqi forces have been able to find as a counter. It can move slowly, in cycles, and episodically, concentrating on highly vulnerable targets at the time of its choosing. Media coverage, word of mouth, and penetration into Coalition and Iraqi government operations provides both intelligence and a good picture of what tactics work in military, political, and media terms. Movements can "swarm" slowly around targets of opportunity, and rely on open source reporting for much of their intelligence and knowledge of combat effectiveness. The Internet and infiltration from other nations gives them knowledge of what tactics work from other areas. The ability to "swarm" against vulnerable civil and military targets at the time of the insurgent's choosing, and focus on political and media effects sharply reduces the need to fight battles—particularly if the odds are against the

insurgents.

The insurgency operates both above and below the level of Coalition and Iraqi conventional superiority. It avoids battles when it can, and prefers ambushes and IED attacks that strike at Coalition and Iraqi targets with either great superiority at the local level or through remote attacks using IEDs. It attacks vulnerable

Iraqi and foreign civil targets using suicide bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and other tactics in ways that the Coalition and Iraqi forces cannot anticipate or fully defend against. It takes advantage of substantial popular support in Sunni areas to disperse and hide among the population, forcing the Coalition and Iraqi forces to use tactics and detainments that often alienate the people in the areas where they attack or attempt to detain insurgents, while still allowing the insurgents to disperse and escape. These tactics deprive the Coalition and Iraqi forces of much of their ability to exploit superior weapons, IS&R assets, and conventional war fighting expertise, and use a countervailing strategy focused on Coalition and Iraqi government weaknesses. Coalition and Iraqi forces are adapting but are still often forced to fight the insurgency on the insurgency's terms.

The insurgency attacks above the level of Coalition and Iraqi conventional superiority by exploiting a diverse mix of past loyalty to the Ba'ath Party, Sunni sectarianism and fears of the loss of power and resources, Iraqi nationalism against foreign occupiers and Iraq "puppets," and Islam against sectarianism. Its attacks are designed to wear down the Coalition forces through attrition and destroy their base of domestic political support. They are also designed paralyze the Iraqi government and force development effort, to prevent Iraqi Sunnis from joining the Iraqi forces and supporting the government, to provoke Shi'ite and Kurdish reactions that will further divide the country along ethnic and sectarian lines, and—in some cases—provoke a civil war that will both prevent Iraq emerging as a nation and divide in ways that will create a national and eventual regional struggle between neo-Salafi Islamic Puritanism and other Sunnis, Shi'ites, and secular voices. This political battle is more important to the success or failure of the insurgency than any aspect of the military battle.

The Shi'ite and Kurdish side of the insurgency assumes a far more indirect role, and is more an actor in the low-level civil war than a player in the insurgency, but presents a serious problem. Shi'ite elements of the local police and Ministry of the Interior are attacking Sunnis and committing serious abuses. The Kurds are exploiting their control of the three provinces that made up the Kurdish enclave under Saddam Hussein in ways that give them advantages over other ethnic groups in the region, and present the threat of soft ethnic cleansing in the area of Kirkuk. The inclusiveness of the national government is at risk, as is the effort to create truly nation Iraqi forces.

Probable Outcomes

The positive side is that that Shi'ite, Kurdish, and some key Sunni leaders still actively work for a united Iraq. More and more Iraqi forces are coming on-line, playing an active role, and taking over their own battlespace. They insurgency so far lacks major foreign support, although it does get limited amounts of money, weapons, and foreign supporters. It does not have the support of most Shi'ites and Kurds, who make up some 70-80% of the population.

If Iraqi forces become effective in large numbers, *if* the Iraqi government demonstrates that its success means the phase out of Coalition forces, and *if* the Iraqi government remains inclusive in dealing with Sunnis willing to come over to its side, the insurgency should be defeated over time—although some cadres could then operate as diehards at the terrorist level for a decade or more.

The negative side is that there is a serious risk of full-scale civil war. The efforts of the insurgents to divide Iraq along sectarian and ethnic lines are having some success and are leading to Shi'ite and Kurdish reprisals that are causing fear and anger among Sunnis. Shi'ite and Kurdish federalism, mixed with the rise of Shi'ite religious factions and militias, can divide the country. The Iraqi political process is unstable and uncertain, and parties and officials are now identified (and identifying themselves) largely by sect and ethnicity. Severe ethnic and sectarian divisions exist inside the government at the national, regional, and local levels. Popular support for the Coalition presence in Iraq is now a distinct minority in every Coalition country.

In short, the odds of insurgent success at best are even. Iraq could degenerate into full-scale civil conflict or remain divided and/or unstable for some years to come. There already is limited popular support in the US and Britain for a continued military role and major new aid programs, and continued political turmoil or serious civil war could make a continued Coalition presence untenable and force US and British forces out of Iraq. It seems likely that the US will have to slow its plans to reduce its military presence, adjust to new threats, and intensify its efforts to shape effective security and police forces if it is to deal with the growing risk of civil conflict during the period in which the new government must come to grips with all of the issues raised by the constitution—a period which now seems likely to last until at least September of 2006.

Much depends on the success of the Iraqi political process following the December 15th election, how Iraqis deal with the range of issues raised by the Constitutional referendum and need for action on its outcome once a new government takes office. Much also depends on how

well Iraqi forces succeed in becoming effective at both the military and political level, and in replacing Coalition forces. Finally, much depends on the ability of the new Iraqi government to take responsibility for what happens in Iraq, lead effectively, and establish effective police and government services in the field—all areas where previous Iraqi governments have been weak.

There is also a continuing possibility that the insurgency will drive Iraq's political and religious leaders and various elements of the Iraqi forces into warring Sunni, Shi'ite, and Kurdish factions. Even the most committed leaders may be forced to abandon the search for a national and inclusive political structure if sectarian and ethnic fighting escalates out of control. Those that do not ,may be replaced by far more extreme voices.

The new Iraqi forces can divide along ethnic and sectarian lines and much of the police and security forces already are divided in this way. There is also a risk that Iraq could bring in outside powers supporting given factions. Iran supporting Iraqi Shi'ites, the Arab Sunni states supporting Iraq Sunnis, with the Kurds left largely isolated and facing increasing problems with the Turks. Any precipitous Coalition withdrawal would greatly encourage this possibility.

The Lessons of Complexity, Uncertainty, and Risk

Whatever happens, the US and its allies need to consider the lessons of the "war after the war" in Iraq. One key lesson is the need for ruthless objectivity and to accept the political and military complexity of counterinsurgency. Far too often, policymakers, analysts, and intelligence experts approach the subject of counterinsurgency by trying to oversimplify the situation, underestimate the risks, and exaggerate the level of control they can achieve over the course and ultimate strategic outcome of the war.

They try to deny both complexity of most counterinsurgency campaigns, and the full range of issues that must be dealt with. In doing so, many try to borrow from past wars or historical examples, and they talk about "lessons," as if a few simple lessons from one conflict could be transferred easily to another. The end result is that—far too often—they end up rediscovering the same old failed slogans and over simplifications and trot out all the same old case histories without really examining how valid they are.

There is a great deal to be learned from past wars if the lessons are carefully chosen and adapted as potential insights into a new conflict rather than transferable paradigms. The Iraq War, however, is not the Afghan War, much less Mao, Malaysia, Vietnam, Northern Ireland, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There is nothing to be gained from efforts to

revive the same old tactical and technical solutions, without remembering past failures. "Oil spots," "hearts and minds," "Special Forces," walls and barriers, and sensor nets are just a few examples of such efforts that have been applied to the Iraq War.

The Need For Accurate Planning and Risk Assessment

Much has been made of the intelligence failures in assessing Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. These failures pale to insignificance, however, in comparison with the failure of US policy and military planners to accurately assess the overall situation in Iraq before engaging in war, and for the risk of insurgency if the US did not carry out an effective mix of nation building and stability operations. This failure cannot be made the responsibility of the intelligence community. It was the responsibility of the President, the Vice President, the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of State, the Sectary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

All had the responsibility to bring together policymakers, military planners, intelligence experts, and area experts to provide as accurate a picture of Iraq and the consequences of an invasion as possible. Each failed to exercise that responsibility. The nation's leading policymakers chose to act on a limited and highly ideological view of Iraq that planned for one extremely optimistic definition of success, but not for risk or failure.

There was no real planning for stability operations. Key policymakers did not want to engage in nation building and chose to believe that removing Saddam Hussein from power would leave the Iraqi government functioning and intact. Plans were made on the basis that significant elements of the Iraqi armed forces would turn to the Coalitions' side, remain passive, or put up only token resistance.

No real effort was made to ensure continuity of government or stability and security in Iraq's major cities and throughout the countryside. Decades of serious sectarian and ethnic tension were downplayed or ignored. Actions by Saddam Hussein's regime that had crippled Iraq's economic development since the early years of the Iran-Iraq War—at time when Iraq had only 17-18 million people were ignored. Iraq was assumed to be an oil wealthy country whose economy could quickly recover if the oil fields were not burned, and transform itself into a modern capitalist structure in the process.

The nation's most senior military commanders compounded these problems by planning for the conventional defeat of the enemy and an early exit from Iraq, by making a deliberate effort to avoid "Phase IV" and stability operations. The fact they did so to minimize the strain on the US force posture, and the "waste" of US troops on "low priority" missions

played a major role in creating the conditions under which insurgency could develop and flourish.

The intelligence community and civilian and military area experts may not have predicted the exact nature of the insurgency that followed. Analysis is not prophecy. They did, however, provide ample warning that this was a risk that Iraqi exiles were often failing to provide a balanced or accurate picture, and nation building would be both necessary and extremely difficult. The nation's top policymakers choose to both ignore and discourage such warnings as "negative" and "exaggerated," and to plan for success. They did so having seen the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the sectarian and ethnic problems of Afghanistan.

To succeed, the US must plan for failure as well as success. It must see the development or escalation of insurgency as a serious risk in any contingency were it is possible, and take preventive and ongoing steps to prevent or limit it. This is an essential aspect of war planning and no Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, service chief, or unified and specified commander can be excused for failing to plan and act in this area. Responsibility begins directly at the top, and failures at any other level pale to insignificance by comparison.

This is even truer because top-level policymakers failed to recognize or admit the scale of the problem as it developed. Their failures were as much failures of reaction as prediction or contingency planning, and failures to accurately assess and react to ongoing events are far less excusable. There were no mysteries involving the scale of the collapse of the Iraqi government and security forces within days of the fall of Saddam Hussein. The reaction was slow, inadequate, and shaped by denial of the seriousness of the problem.

This situation did not improve until more than a year after the fall Saddam's regimes, and at least six months after it became apparent that a serious insurgency was developing. Major resources did not flow into the creation of effective Iraqi forces until the fall of 2004. The US aid effort behaved for nearly a year and a half as if insurgency was truly a small group of diehards or "terrorists." Even in late 2005, top US civilian policymakers split hairs over semantics to try to even avoid the word insurgency, failed to perceive that many Sunni Arab Iraqis see such an insurgency has legitimate causes, and chose to largely publicly ignore the risks of civil conflict and the developing problems in Shi'ite forces and political structures.

The US denied risks and realities of the Vietnam War. European powers initially denied the realities that forced them to end their colonial role. Israel denied the risks and realities of striking deep into Lebanon and seeking to create a Christian-dominated allied state. Russia denied the risks and realities of Chechnya in spite of all the brutal lessons of having

denied the risk and realities of Afghanistan.

The failure to learn the need for accurate characterization of the nation and region where counterinsurgency may—or does—exist seems to be a constant lesson of why nations go to and stay at war. The failure to plan for risk and failure as well as success is equally significant. Ruthless objectivity is the cheapest solution to be preventing and limiting insurgency, and planning and deploying for the full range of stability operations and nation building is an essential precaution wherever the stakes are high and the risk is significant.

The Limits of "Oil Spots"

The "oil spot" theory, for example, is useful if it simply means securing key populated areas and allowing local governance to become effective and people to feel secure enough to see the insurgents as defeatable. Winning hearts and minds does not mean persuading people to accept constant daily threats and violence. The creation of safe areas is critical. Success in Iraq, and many other campaigns, will depend heavily on finding the right trade-offs between creating safe areas and aggressively pursuing the enemy to prevent the insurgents from creating safe areas of their own and attacking the safe area of the Iraqi government and Coalition.

At a different level, however, "oil spots" are simply one more slogan in a long list of such approaches to counterinsurgency. Iraq is not atypical of many insurgencies in the fact that the key areas where insurgencies are active are also centers of ethnic and sectarian tension, and that the insurgency within these areas is also a low-level civil war.

In cities like Baghdad and Mosul, the most important potential "oil spots," it simply is not practical to try to separate the constant risk of more intense civil conflict from defeating the insurgency. Sectarian and ethnic conflict has intensified in spite of local security efforts, and a concept that ultimately failed in Vietnam is in many ways simply not applicable to Iraq.

Neither option can really be chosen over the other. Worse, in a highly urbanized country—where many major urban areas and their surroundings have mixed populations and the insurgency can exploit serious ethic and sectarian tensions—creating coherent safe areas in major cities can be difficult to impossible. Rapid action tends to force the US to choose one sect or ethnic group over others. It also presents major tactical problems in the many mixed areas including Iraq's major cities. It is far from clear whether it is even possible to guard any area against well-planned covert IED and suicide bombing attacks, or make it feel secure unless enough political compromise has already taken place to do a far better job of depriving insurgent of popular support.

Creating secure "oil spots" in sectarian and ethnic based insurgencies like the Iraqi War also requires effective local governance and security forces. US and allied Coalition forces cannot create secure areas because they are seen as occupiers and lack the area expertise, language skills, HUMINT, and stable personal contacts to know if the insurgents are present or the area is really secure. Iraq is a good example of a case where an ally may be able to eventually make areas secure, but where the political dimension is critical, and Coalition forces cannot solve either the security or political problem without a local ally's aid.

The Limits of Technology and Western "Swarm" Techniques

An honest assessment of the insurgent Iraq War, and particularly of its political and ideological dimensions, also illustrates that technology is not a panacea even for the warfighting part of the conflict. This is particularly true when the insurgency is far more "human-centric" than net-centric and when insurgency is mixed with civil ethnic and sectarian conflict

For example, sensors, UAV, and IS&R can have great value in Iraq, just as they did in Vietnam and South Lebanon, but they are anything but "magic bullets." The unattended ground sensor program in Vietnam was once touted as such a magic bullet but took less than a year to defeat. Decades later, the Israelis tried using UAVs and unattended ground sensors in Southern Lebanon, and developed a remarkable amount of statistical evidence and technical data to indicate a more modern approach *would* work. In practices, the IDF's efforts led Hezbollah to develop more sophisticated tactics and IEDs at a fraction of the cost of the Israeli detection and defense effort, and Israel was eventually defeated. Both experiences are warnings about the limits of technology.

At a different level, the informal distributed networks and "swarming" of the Iraqi insurgents is a serious warning about the limits of technology-based efforts to rely on high technology formal networks and "swarming" of the kind Australia choose in its Complex Warfighting doctrine, and efforts to use small, semi-autonomous combat elements that can suddenly come together and "swarm" an enemy concentration with a mix of different joint force elements integrated by modern IS&R systems and battle management. This may work where the insurgency is small, and where the population is neutral, favorable to the outside force, and/or hostile to the insurgents. The Iraq War shows that it has very acute limits in a more modern state where political and military conditions are far less favorable.[24]

The same is true of the British Future Land Operating Concept (FLOC) and so-called C-DICT (Countering Disorder, Insurgency, Criminality and Terrorism) approach. It is certainly wise to adopt a "system centric"

approach that combines the human element, all elements of joint forces, and tailored IS&R and battle management. But, this is no solution to force density problems or the challenges raised by an insurgency that can still attack both below and above the level of operations that FLOC forces can use. It is a useful tool, but scarcely an answer to ideological and political warfare where the insurgent operates against different targets at a different pace, and large elements of the population support the insurgency and/or are hostile to the counterinsurgents. Under these conditions, a foreign force with a different culture and religion can use such an approach to aid a local ally but cannot win on their own.

The US Army and Marine Corps approach to "distributed operations," and approaches to "counterinsurgency," "small wars," "a modular army," and "pacification" come up against the same basic problem in a case like Iraq. Like the Australian and British approaches, they can have value under the right conditions. They become dangerous and self-defeating, however, the moment tactics and technology become ends in themselves, and the dominance of political and cultural factors are ignored. Mao's description of the people as a sea that insurgents can swim in, indistinguishable from all those around them, is no universal truth but it is a warning that in many cases, only allied forces and allied governance can prevent the outside force from losing to a vastly cheaper and smaller force simply because it is perceived as a crusader or occupier and the insurgency does not face an effective local government or mix of local forces.

The "Undrainable Swamp"

These political risks illustrate another lesson that Iraq teaches about both counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Many analysts have suggested that the key to victory is to remove the causes of terrorism or insurgency, to remove popular support for such movements and give terrorists and/or insurgents' incentives to join civil society. In short, to "drain the swamp."

The fundamental wisdom of such an approach is undeniable, but everything depends upon its feasibility. In Iraq's case, in Vietnam, and in many other cases, the problem is that the US cannot drain the swamp. It is dealing with a foreign country, different religions and ideologies, and different goals and values. It is perceived by a significant percentage of the people as an invader, occupier, neo-colonial power, "crusader," or simply as selfishly serving its own strategic interests. Language alone presents serious problems, and American public diplomacy is too ethnocentric to be effective.

The US can encourage political, economic, and social reform, but cannot implement it. Like Iraqis, people must find their own leaders, political

structures, and methods of governance. The US lacks basic competence in the economics of nation building in societies whose economic structures, ability to execute reforms and projects, and perceived values differ significantly from its own. Different cultures, human rights practices, legal methods, and religious practices can be influenced to evolve in ways the US sees as positive, but there are no universal values, and the US cannot shape a different nation, culture, or religion.

In many cases, the sheer scale of the problem is also a major factor. Demographic, ethnic, and sectarian problems can take a generation or more to fully solve. Decades of economic failure, neglect, and discrimination can also take a decade or more to fix. A lack of rule of law, working human rights, pragmatic and experienced leaders and political parties cannot be fixed by a few years of outside aid and education.

It should be stressed that this in no way means that the US cannot exert tremendous influence during a major counterinsurgency or counterterrorism campaign, or that the US should not seek reform and change. But, the swamp will almost always be undrainable unless a host government and power-set of local political movements drives the process. Religious, cultural, and ideological reform must come largely from within. The local populace must see the reason for economic reform, and believe in it enough to act. Governance and security must be largely local to be perceived as legitimate. Equally important, if the swamp can be drained, the process will generally take so long that a US counterinsurgency campaign will be lost or won long before the process is completed.

The US failed to act on these realities in Vietnam. It began the Iraq War by rejecting them, and greatly strengthened the insurgency in the process while wasting critical months before it made effective efforts to help the Iraqis help themselves. More than two years after the "end" of the war, it still has not shaped an aid process focused around the Iraqis, local methods, local needs, and local methods and execution. Part of an effective counterinsurgency strategy is to honestly assess all of the underlying causes that sustain an insurgency, know what the US can credibly hope to do to address them, understand that the US will only be effective if local leaders can help themselves, and face the fact that so much time will be needed to fully deal with such problems that the US can normally only hope to start the process of reform and removing underlying causes during the duration of most counterinsurgency campaigns.

The Limits of Cheerleading and Self-Delusion

There is no way to avoid the fog of war, but there is no reason to make it a self-inflicted wound. Counterinsurgency cannot be fought on the basis of political slogans, official doctrine, ideology, and efforts to spin the situation in the most favorable terms. Unless warfighters and

policymakers honestly address the complexity, unique characteristics, and risks and costs of a given conflict, they inevitably come up with solutions that, as the old joke states, are "simple, quick and wrong." History shows all too clearly that this "simple, quick and wrong" approach is how Americans have created far too many past problems in US foreign policy, and that it is a disastrous recipe for war. In retrospect, fewer US failures occurred because it lacked foresight, than because it could not resist praising itself for progress that did not really exist and choosing simplicity at the expense of reality.

To use another old joke, Iraq is another case where Americans have tended to treat counterinsurgency as if were a third marriage, "a triumph of hope over experience." The prior history of the insurgency shows that the US began by underestimating the scale of the problems it really had to face and just how many resources, how much time, and how expensive in dollars and blood the cost would be. Counterinsurgency campaigns cannot be based on hope and best cases if the US wants to win. American policy and military planners have to examine all of the variables, prioritize, and be very careful about the real-world importance of any risks and issues they dismiss. They must be ready for the near certainty of major problems and gross failure in unanticipated areas.

The reality is that counterinsurgency warfare is almost always a "worst case" or nations like the US would not become involved in it in the first place. The US and other Western states become involved in counterinsurgency because an ally has failed, because a friendly nation has failed or because diplomacy and foreign policy have failed. Almost by definition, counterinsurgency means things have already gone seriously wrong.

The New Fog of War and the "Law of Unattended Consequences"

Iraq is one more illustration of the reality that the "fog of war" evolves at the same rate as technology and tactics. Regardless of success in battle, no country can afford to ignore the fact that the course and outcome of counterinsurgency wars is inevitably affected by the "law of unintended consequences." Risk analysis is remarkably difficult, because risk analysis is based on what we think we know going in, and that set of perceptions almost invariably proves to be seriously wrong over time. Both allies and enemies evolve in unpredictable ways. Political, social and economic conditions change inside the zone of conflict in ways the US and its allies cannot anticipate.

Wars broaden in terms of the political impact on regions and our global posture. Conflict termination proves to be difficult to impossible, or the real-world outcome over time becomes very different from the outcome negotiators thought would happen at the time. The reality proves

far more dynamic and uncertain than is predicted going in; the fight requires far more time and resources necessary to accomplish anything than operators plan for.

All planning for counterinsurgency warfare must be based on the understanding that there is no way to eliminate all such uncertainties, and mistakes will inevitably be made that go far beyond the ones that are the result of political bias or ideology. There are some who would believe that if only planners and analysts could work without political bias or interference, this would solve most of counterinsurgency problems. In reality, even the best planners and analysts will face major problems regardless of their political and military leadership. The scale of ignorance and uncertainty will inevitably be too great when we enter most counterinsurgency contingencies. The US and its allies must accept this as part of the price of going to war.

It is frightening to look back at the almost endless reams of analyses, plans, and solutions that people advanced in war colleges, think tanks and universities during the Vietnam War, El Salvador and Lebanon. Vietnam may have represented the nadir of American analysis, planning, and objectivity. However, Somalia, the Dayton accords, and Iraq also represented a failure to analyze the situation properly. Even when the US analyzed well, it failed to translate this analysis into effective counterinsurgency plans and operational capabilities within the interagency process.

Moreover, time and again, the US drifted into trying to win in tactical terms rather than focusing on how it could achieve the desired national, regional, and grand strategy outcome. It forgot that it is only the endgame that counts, and not the means. It also forgets that slogans and rhetoric, ideology, and a failure to fully survey and assess ultimately all become a source of self-inflicted wounds or friendly fire.

The Lesson of Strategic Indifference; Of Knowing When to Play—and When Not to Play, the Counterinsurgency Game

The seriousness of the insurgency in Iraq, and the costs and risks imposed by such a comparatively small insurgent force with so many tactical limitations, also raise a lesson the US seem to repeatedly learn at the end of counterinsurgency campaigns and then perpetually forget in entering into the next conflict. Not every game is worth playing, and sometimes the best way to win is not to play at all—even if this does mean years of instability and accepting the uncertainties of civil conflict

It is far easier to blunder into a war like the Iraq War than blunder out. It is easy to dismiss the risks of becoming bogged down in local political strife, ignore the risks of counterinsurgency, and civil conflict, downplay economic and security risks, and mischaracterize the situation by seeing the military side of intervention as too easy and the political

need for action as too great. It is far too easy to exaggerate the threat. It is equally easy to both exaggerate the ability of a counterinsurgency campaign to achieve a desired strategic outcome and ignore the fact that history is often perfectly capable of solving a problem if the US does not intervene.

Personal anecdotes can lead to dangerous overgeneralizations, but they can also have value. A few years ago, I toured Vietnam, and saw from the Vietnamese side their vision of what had happened in the war. There were many tactical and political lessons I drew from that experience, one of which was how thoroughly we ignored what was happening to Buddhist perceptions and support at the political level while we concentrated on the tactical situation and the politics of Saigon.

The lesson I found most striking, however, was seeing the grand strategic outcome of the war as measured by even the most trivial metrics. I bought a bottle of mineral water in Hanoi airport and discovering that on the front label it said "USA Water," while its back label stated that it had been processed through a 14-step process developed by NASA. When I looked at the toy counter, I saw that the bulk of toys consisted of US fighters or fighters with US marking. When I walked over to the news counter, I saw the "Investor's Journal" in Vietnamese and English. This was after being told repeatedly how glad the Vietnamese were that we stayed in Asia as a deterrent to China. We were right in many ways about the domino theory, we just forgot that dominoes could fall in two directions.

Is Counterinsurgency the Right Means to the End?

This raises another lesson the US needs to carefully evaluate in dealing with future security problems and crises. Even if the game is worth playing, counterinsurgency may not be the way to play it, particularly if the nation is divided along sectarian, ethnic, or tribal lines in ways where there is no clear "good side" or positive force for change. Robert Osgood made the point a long time ago that when a nation engages in limited war, it does it for limited purposes. If a nation cannot keep the war and the purposes limited, it should not engage. History shows that it is amazingly easy to forget this. There are times when a counterinsurgency campaign is necessary or will be forced on the US from the outside, but there are many times when the US has a choice of the means it can use to achieve a given end, and can choose options other than counterinsurgency.

Containment is one such option. Every reader will have to decide for him or herself if they had known when the Coalition went into Iraq what they know today, whether they would still have rejected containment as the option? If one considers military involvement in Iran or Syria, the same issues arise as to whether containment and diplomacy are quite that bad a choice versus expanding a limited war or regime change—at least

by force?

If containment is not a substitute for counterinsurgency, the US must ask whether it should take advantage of military options where it retains advantages insurgents cannot counter: the ability to carry out selective strikes with limited cost. Placing US forces on the ground where they must conduct a major counterinsurgency or counterterrorism campaign is far more costly and risk-oriented than using limited amounts of force in precision strikes or other carefully limited forms. Sanctions and sustained political pressure often have severe limits, but they too can sometimes achieve the desired result in ways that are less costly than counterinsurgency.

Even when a counterinsurgency or counterterrorism campaign is necessary, using US forces may often be the wrong answer. It is true that the US will normally only consider engaging in counterinsurgency because the nation it is going to fight is weak or divided. Far too often, however, we seem to commit our forces to combat. In many cases, it will still be better to rely on the local ally and build up their forces, even if this means a higher risk of losing in what is, after all, a limited war.

No nation is every likely to stay a "failed nation." This does not mean, however, that the US can "fix" any given country in the face of massive political and social divisions, economic weakness or collapse, and/or ideological and religious turmoil. The world's worst problems are its most tragic problems, but this does not mean that the US can decisively change them with affordable amounts of force, aid, and efforts at political reform. If anything, Iraq is a warning that the US does not know how to measure and characterize the risks of intervention, is not structured to combine nation building and counterinsurgency on a massive scale, and cannot impose its system and values on another people unless they actually want them. In retrospect, the US could almost certainly have done far more good spreading the same resources among the nations and peoples where they would have had real benefits, and by concentrating on the wars it actually had to fight.

At the same time, these are questions that events in Iraq may still answer in ways that give both the Coalition and the Iraqi people enough of a victory to defeat the insurgency. The right answer in future crises may never be clear, easy to choose, or be the same for different crises and problems. It is also important to emphasize, that that the lessons of Iraq are scarcely that the US should not use and improve its counterinsurgency techniques. It is rather a warning that the US and other powers should only engage directly in counterinsurgency after it assesses the costs, risks, ability to achieve the desired end objective, *and alternative means* honestly and in depth.

Counterinsurgency Does Not Always Mean Winning

There is a grimmer lesson from the evolution of the insurgency in Iraq. It is a lesson that goes firmly against the American grain, but it is a natural corollary of limited war. If the course of the political and military struggle shows the US that it cannot achieve the desired grand strategic outcome, it needs to accept the fact that the US must find ways to terminate a counterinsurgency war. Defeat, withdrawal, and acceptance of an outcome less than victory are never desirable in limited war, but they are always acceptable. For all the arguments about prestige, trust, and deterrence, there is no point in pursuing a limited conflict when it becomes more costly than the objective is worth or when the probability of achieving that objective becomes too low.

This is a lesson that goes against American culture. The whole idea that the US can be defeated is no more desirable for Americans than for anyone else, in fact, almost certainly less so. But when the US lost in Vietnam it not only lived with the reality, it ultimately did not suffer from it. When the US failed in Lebanon and Haiti, it failed at almost no perceptible cost. Exiting Somalia was not without consequences, but they were scarcely critical.

This does not mean that the US should not stay in Iraq as long as it has a good chance of achieving acceptable objectives at an acceptable cost. But, it does mean that the US can afford to lose in Iraq, particularly for reasons that are frankly beyond its control and which the world will recognize as such. There is no point in "staying the course" through a major Iraqi civil war, a catastrophic breakdown of the political process, or a government coming to power that simply asks us to leave. In all three cases, it isn't a matter of winning or losing, but instead, facing a situation where conditions no longer exist for staying.

Telling the Truth About Risks and the Value of Strategic Objectives

In the future, the US will need to pay far more attention to the option of declaring that it is fighting a limited war for limited objectives if it really is a limited war. It may well need to fully explain what the limits to its goals and level of engagement are and develop a strategy for implementing, communicating and exploiting these limits. One mistake is to tell the host government, or the people you are fighting with, that your commitment is open-ended and that you can never leave; the incentive for responsibility vanishes with it.

Similarly, if you tell the American people and the world that a marginal strategic interest is vital, the world will sooner or later believe it, which is very dangerous if you have to leave or lose. You are better off saying you may lose, setting limits, and then winning, than claiming that you can't lose, having no limits, and then losing. This should not be a

massive, innovative lesson, but it is one we simply do not seem prepared to learn.

If the US Must Fight a Counterinsurgency Campaign, It Must Focus Firmly on the Strategic, Political, and Allied Dimension of the Fighting

The evolution of the insurgency in Iraq is yet another lesson in the fact that focusing on the military dimension of war is an almost certain path to grand strategic defeat in any serious conflict, and particularly in counterinsurgency in a weak and divided nation. If the US must engage in counterinsurgency warfare, and sometimes it must, then it needs to plan for both the complexity and cost of successful conflict termination and ensuring a favorable grand strategic outcome. It must prepare for the risk of long-term engagement and escalation, civil war and ethnic and sectarian conflict, and risks that will require more forces and resources. If such "long wars" are too costly relative to the value of the objective, the US must set very clear limits to what it will do based on the limited grand strategic value of the outcome and act upon them -regardless of short-term humanitarian costs.

The US needs to prepare for, and execute, a full spectrum of conflict. That means doing much more than seeking to win a war militarily. It needs to have the ability to make a valid and sustainable national commitment in ideological and political terms. It must find ways of winning broad local and regional support; stability operations and nation building are the price of any meaningful counterinsurgency campaign.

The US Normally Cannot Win Serious Counterinsurgency Wars Unless It Creates an Ally and Partner Who Can Govern and Secure the Place Where the US is Fighting.

Iraq, like so many other serious Post-WWII insurgencies, shows that successful counterinsurgency means having or creating a local partner that can take over from US forces and that can govern. Both Vietnam and Iraq show the US cannot win an important counterinsurgency campaign alone. The US will always be dependent on the people in the host country, and usually on local and regional allies. To some extent, it will be dependent on the quality of its operations in the UN, in dealing with traditional allies and in diplomacy. If the US can't figure out a way to have or create such an ally, and fight under these conditions, a counterinsurgency conflict may well not be worth fighting.

This means the US must do far more than creating effective allied forces. In most cases, it will have to find a way to reshape the process of politics and governments to create some structure in the country that can actually act in areas it "liberates." Pacification is the classic example. If

the US or its allies can't deploy allied police forces and government presence, the result is far often to end up with a place on the map where no one in his right mind would go at night.

Economics and Counterinsurgency: Dollars Must Be Used as Effectively as Bullets

The US must be prepared to use aid and civic action dollars as well as bullets, and the US military has done far better in this area in Iraq than it has in the past. Unfortunately, the history of the insurgency shows that the same cannot be said for USAID in Washington, or for any aspect of the economic planning effort under the CPA. The US ignored the economic and related political and cultural realities of nation building going into Iraq and ignores the economic realities now.

Every independent assessment of the US aid effort warns just how bad the US performance has been in these areas—even in critical areas like the oil industry. The US has now spent or committed its way through nearly $20 billion, and has virtually no self-sustained structural economic change to show for it. Most aid projects spend more money on overhead, contractors, and security than gets to Iraqis in the field. It can't protect most of its aid projects; for too much of post-March 2003 Iraqi economic "growth" has been illusory and comes from US waste and wartime profiteering.

Self-congratulatory measures of achievement are mindless. Who cares how much money the US spends or how many buildings it creates, unless this effort goes to the right place and has a lasting impact. The number of school buildings completed is irrelevant unless there are books, teachers, furniture, students and security, and the buildings go to troubled areas as well as secure ones. Bad or empty buildings leave a legacy of hostility, not success. Empty or low capacity clinics don't win hearts and minds. Increasing peak power capacity is meaningless unless the right people actually get it.

Long Wars Mean Long Plans and Long Expenditures

The US announced on February 4th that its new Quadrennial Defense Review was based on a strategy of long wars, and an enduring conflict with terrorists and Islamist extremists. As the Iraq War and so many similar conflicts have shown, "long wars" can also take the form of long nation buildings, long stability operations, and long counter insurgencies. This means they can only be fought with patience, over a period of years, and with sustained investment in terms of US presence, military expenditures, and aid money.

In the case of Iraq, virtually every senior officer and official came to realize by 2005 that a short campaign plan had failed to prepare the

US and Coalition for a meaningful effort, helped create a serious insurgency, and led to a situation that cost thousands of additional killed and wounded and meant tens of billions of addition dollars were needed to have any chance of success. Talk of major reductions in US forces moved to end-2006, and many experts talked about 2007. Most senior serving officers privately talked about a major advisory and combat support effort through 2010. A "three month" departure had turned into what threatened to be a decade-long presence *if* the US and its allies were to succeed. Estimates of total costs in the hundreds of billions of dollars that senior officials in the Bush Administration had dismissed in going to war had already become a reality, and the US was well on its way to a war that would cost at least 3,000 dead and 20,000 wounded.

The message is clear. Any plan for counterinsurgency and stability operations must include years of effort, not months. Spending plans for military operations and all forms of aid must be shaped accordingly. The American tendency to begin operations with the same plan for immediate success—"simple, quick, and wrong"—needs to be replaced with an honest assessment of the fact that history takes time. The tendency to oversell the ease of operations, demand quick and decisive success, is a natural one for both policymakers and senior military officers. It is also a path to failure and defeat. At best, it is likely to be paid for in unnecessary body bags and billions of dollars.

Honestly Winning the Support of the American People

The sharp gap between the evolution of the insurgency described in the preceding analysis, and the almost endless US efforts to use the media and politics to "spin" a long and uncertain counterinsurgency campaign into turning points and instant victory, has done America, the Bush Administration, and the American military great harm. Spin and shallow propaganda loose wars rather than win them. They ultimately discredit a war, and the officials and officers who fight it.

Iraq shows that it is critical that an Administration honestly prepares the American people, the Congress and it allies for the real nature of the war to be fought. To do so, it must prepare them to sustain the expense and sacrifice through truth, not spin. But there is only so much shallow spin that the American people or Congress will take. It isn't a matter of a cynical media or a people who oppose the war; rubbish is rubbish. If the US "spins" each day with overoptimistic statements and half-truths, it embarks on a process that will sooner or later deprive itself of credibility—both domestically and internationally.

Iraq is also yet another warning that serious counterinsurgency campaigns often take five to fifteen years. They don't end conveniently with an assistant secretary or a President's term in office. Again and again we

deny the sheer length of serious counterinsurgencies. Planners, executers, and anyone who explains and justifies such wars needs to be far more honest about the timescales involved, just how long we may have to stay, and that even when an insurgency is largely over, there may be years of aid and advisory efforts.

Lessons for Warfighting

Finally, this analysis of the insurgency raises lessons about warfighting, that go beyond the details of military strategy and tactics, and provide broader lessons that have been surprisingly consistent over the more than 40 years from Vietnam to Iraq.

First, warfighters must focus relentlessly on the desired outcome of the war and not simply the battle or overall military situation. In strategic and grand strategic terms, it doesn't matter how well the war went last month; it doesn't matter how the US is doing tactically. The real question warfighters must ask is whether the US is actually moving toward a strategic outcome that serves the ultimate interests of the US? If warfighters don't know, they should not spend the lives of American men and women in the first place.

The US, and any military force engaging in counterinsurgency warfare, should teach at every level that stability operations and conflict termination are the responsibility of every field-grade officer. (And, for that matter, every civilian.) Warfighters need to act on the principle that every tactical operation must have a political context and set of goals. The US needs to tie its overall campaign plan to a detailed plan for the use of economic aid at every level, from simple bribery to actually seeking major changes in the economy of a given country.

Second, warfighters need to understand, as Gen. Rupert Smith has pointed out, and as Iraq has shown, that enemies will make every effort to try to win counterinsurgency conflicts by finding ways to operate below or above the threshold of conventional military superiority. It is stupid, as some in the US military have done, to call Iraqi insurgents cowards or terrorists because they will not fight on our terms. The same remarkably stupid attitudes appeared in 19th century colonial wars and often cost those foolish enough to have them the battle. The Mahdi's victories in the Sudan are a good case example.

> The US has to be able to fight in ways that defeat insurgents and terrorists regardless of how they fight. Insurgents are not cowards for fighting us in any way that does so at the highest cost to us and the least cost to them. If they can fight below the US threshold of conventional superiority, then technology is at best a limited supplement to US human skills, military professionalism, and above

all, our ability to find ways to strengthen local allies.

It is far more important, for example to have effective local forces than more technology. Net-centric is not a substitute for human-centric, and for that matter, human-centric isn't a substitute for competent people down at the battalion level. Systems don't win. Technology doesn't win.

Third, warfighters and their political leaders need to acknowledge that enemies can fight above the threshold of US conventional ability, not just beneath it. The character of America's political system, culture, and values are not the answer to winning the political and ideological dimension of many counterinsurgency campaigns. There is no reason Americans should think *they* can win an ideological struggle over the future of Islam and/or the Arab world. Our Muslim and Arab allies, in contrast, may well be able to win this struggle, particular if the US works with them and not against them.

US public diplomacy and political actions can have a major impact in aiding counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. But, Iraq shows that the local, cultural, ethnic, religious, and political issues have to be fought out in such wars largely by our ally on the ground and other Islamic states. The US can help, but cannot win, or dominate, the battle for hearts and minds. Moreover, only regional allies with the right religion, culture, and legitimacy can cope with the growing ability of ideologically driven opponents to find the fault lines that can divide us from local allies by creating increased ethnic and sectarian tensions.

Fourth, although the US does need to improve its counterinsurgency technology, it cannot win with "toys." Technology is a tool and not a solution. Israeli technology failed in Lebanon as US technology did in Vietnam, and some of the same IED systems that helped defeat Israel have now emerged in Iraq: twin IR sensors, shaped charges, radio-controlled devices, and foam painted to look like rocks. Like Israel, the US can use technical means to defeat many IEDs, but not enough. Moreover, it is possible that the total cost of every insurgent IED to date is still lower than that cost of one AH-1S that went down over Iraq.

Fifth, the force must have the right balance of numbers and expertise. Many have argued since the beginning of the Iraq War that the Coalition needed far more manpower for stability operations. This is a solution to some problems, where a simple security presence will deter terrorism and the growth of an insurgency. It is, also, however, a dangerous illusion in other cases. Large numbers of forces that will never have the right language and area skills with any serious proficiency, which lack the necessary specialist training, and have a different culture and religion will simply compound local resentments and the feeling the US or US-led force

is at best an occupier and at worst an enemy. "Stabilizers" can easily become targets, and deployed large numbers of forces means more incidents with the local population, more problems in getting the host country to take responsibility, the growth of more rear-area military bureaucracy, and dealing with large number of no or little-purpose troops that need to be protected.

At the same time, too few ordinary troops can be equally dangerous, particularly in establishing initial security and presence. Small elites cannot do large or routine jobs. There must be enough military and civilians in country to establish basic security. There is no point in wasting Special Forces, translators, military police, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism experts, civil-military experts and other scarce elite forces in "presence" and "support" missions.

Finding the right balance will be difficult and case specific, and must deal with contingency risks and not simply the outcome policymakers and military planners want. The key to success is to fit the force to the case, and not to the desire or the doctrine.

Sixth, the best "force multiplier" will be effective allies, and interoperability with a true partner. If it is true that the US can win most counterinsurgency campaigns if it creates strong allies, the US must act decisively on this principle. US victories will often only be a means to this end. The real victories come when the US has allied troops that can operate against insurgents in the field, and a friendly government to carry out nation building and civil action activities at the same time. The US really begins to win when it can find ways to match the military, political, economic, and governance dimension.

Creating a real partnership with allies also means respect; it doesn't mean creating proxies or tools. It means recognizing that creating the conditions for effective governance and police are as important as the military. So is the creation of effective ministries. Iraq shows all too clearly that this kind of warfare, if you focus on the ministry of defense and ignore the ministry of the interior or the ministry of finance, just doesn't work.

In most places, the actual counterinsurgency battle is local and as dependent on police and effective governance as effective military forces. In hyper-urbanized areas, which represent many of the places where we fight, the city is the key, at least as much as the national government. Incidentally, Iraq has already shown time after time that it is difficult to sustain any victory without a lasting presence by local police and government offices

Seventh, political legitimacy in counterinsurgency is measured in local terms and not in terms of American ideology. Effective warfighting means the US must recognize something about regional allies that goes

against its present emphasis on "democracy." In most of the world, "legitimacy" has little to do with governments being elected, and a great deal to do with governments being popular.

By all means, hold elections when they do more good than harm. But bringing the people security, the rule of law, human rights, and effective governance is far more important. In many cases, elections may be disruptive or bring people to power that are more of a problem than a solution. This is particularly true if elections come without the preconditions of mature political parties, economic stability, a firm rule of law, and checks and balances. In most cases, the US and its allies will still need to worry about the people who don't win—people, ethnicities, and sects who will not have human rights protection. (If anyone thinks there is a correlation between democracy and human rights, congratulations, they got through college without ever reading Thucydides. The Melian dialogue is the historical rule, not the exception.)

Eighth, the US needs to have a functional interagency process and partner our military with effective civilian counterparts. Iraq has shown that political leaders and senior military cannot afford to bypass the system, or to lack support from the civilian agencies that must do their part from the outset. The US needs to begin by deciding on the team it needs to go to war, and then make that team work. It is one of the oddities historically that Robert McNamara got his largest increase in US troops deployed to Vietnam by bypassing the interagency process. The Bush Administration began by going through an interagency process before the war, but largely chose to ignore it after January of 2003.

This is the wrong approach. Counterinsurgency wars are as much political and economic as military. They require political action, aid in governance, economic development and attention to the ideological and political dimension. The US can only succeed here if the interagency process can work.

At another level, the US needs civilian risk-takers. It needs a counterpart to the military in the field. There is no point in supporting the staffing of more interagency coordination bodies in Washington unless their primary function is to put serious resources into the field. The US is not going to win anything by having better interagency coordination and more meetings, unless the end result is to put the right mix of people and resources out in the countryside where the fighting takes place.

The US needs to put a firm end to the kind of mentality that overstaff the State Department and intelligence community in Washington, and doesn't require career civilians to take risks in the field. Foreign Service officers should not be promoted, in fact should be selected out, unless they are willing to take risks. The US can get all of the risk takers we want. There already is a flood of applications from qualified people. It can

also ensure continuity and expertise by drawing on the brave group of people already in Iraq and Afghanistan—a remarkable number of whom are already contract employees—and giving them career status.

In the process, the US also needs to "civilianize" some aspects of its military. It needs to improve both their area and language skills, create the added specialized forces it needs for stability and nation building operations, and rethink tour length for military who work in critical positions and with allied forces. Personal relationships are absolutely critical in the countries where the US is most likely to fight counterinsurgency wars. So is area expertise and continuity in intelligence.

Counterinsurgency needs a core of military and civilians who will accept 18 month to 24-month tours in key slots. The problem today is often that the selection system does not focus on the best person but rather on external personnel and career planning considerations. Moreover, it fails to recognize that those who take such additional risks should be paid for it in full, and be given different leave policies and promotion incentives. Today, a solider that is only a battalion commander is *only* a battalion commander. The key officers are those with area and counterinsurgency skills that go beyond the combat unit level. Those officers need to have more diverse skills, and deal adequately with the broader dimension of war, and stay long enough to be fully effective.

Finally, human-centric warfare does not mean "super-soldiers" or super-intelligence officers. Military forces—and the civilian support needed for stability operations, nation building, and counterinsurgency—do need better training in the nature of such operations, local languages, and local cultures. *But*, military forces and civilians that are outstanding is a dangerous illusion. Effective operations require both adequate force quality and adequate force quantity, and the understanding that most people are, by definition, "average." Elites are an essential part of military operations, but only a part.

This demand for elites and super-intelligence officers is a particular problem for warfighting intelligence, given the limits of today's technical systems and means. It is also a problem because Iraq shows that developing effective US-led and organized HUMINT may often be impossible.

It is true that better intelligence analysis and HUMINT are critical. But, there will be many times in the future where we will also have to go into counterinsurgency campaigns without being able to put qualified Americans in the field quickly enough to recruit effective agents and develop effective HUMINT on our own.

Does that mean HUMINT isn't important? Of course it doesn't; it is a useful tool. But to create effective HUMINT abilities to deal with security issues, the US will need an effective local partner in most serious cases of both counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Having allied countries,

allied forces, or allied elements, develop effective HUMINT will be a critical answer to US shortcomings.

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PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES

Right Honorable Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon GCMG KBE PC

Paddy Ashdown was born in New Delhi on 27 February 1941, the eldest of 7 children. When he was 4 years old, his family returned to Britain to buy a farm in Ulster. Between 1959 and 1972 he served as a Royal Marines Officer and saw active service as a Commando Officer in Borneo and the Persian Gulf. After Special Forces Training in England in 1965, he commanded a Special Boat Section in the Far East. He went to Hong Kong in 1967 to undertake a full-time course in Chinese, returning to England in 1970. He was then given command of a Commando Company in Belfast.

In 1972, he left the Royal Marines and joined the Foreign Office. He was posted to the British Mission to the United Nations in Geneva where he was responsible for Britain's relations with a number of United Nations organizations and took part in the negotiation of several international treaties and agreements between 1974 and 1976. He was also involved in some aspects of the European Security Conference (the Helsinki Conference).

After leaving the Foreign Office Paddy worked in local industry in the Yeovil area in South-West England between 1976 and 1981. He stood as the Liberal Parliamentary candidate for the Yeovil constituency in 1979 and raised the Liberal vote there to its highest ever level. Shortly after entering Parliament in the 1983 General Elections, Paddy was appointed as the Liberal spokesman on Trade and Industry Affairs within the Liberal/SDP Alliance team at the House of Commons. He became Education spokesman in January 1987. He was elected Leader of the Liberal Democrats in July 1988 and was appointed as a Privy Councillor on 1 January 1989. In the 1997 General Election he further increased his majority in his Yeovil constituency to over 11,000. Paddy stood down as the leader of the Liberal Democrats in 1999 and retired from the Commons in 2001. He was made a Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire in 2000 and a peer in 2001. Lord Ashdown was awarded the GCMG in the 2006 New Year's Honours List, for his work in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

During the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Paddy was one of the leading advocates for decisive action by the international community. He argued strongly that this would help bring the conflict to an early close, and that this was in the interests of all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina whatever their ethnic background. He visited the country

many times during the conflict and subsequently. Lord Ashdown was the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the 27th May 2002 until the 31st January 2006.

Lieutenant General David W. Barno, US Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, US Army

Lieutenant General David W. Barno is a native of Endicott, New York, and was commissioned as an Infantry Officer from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1976 with a Bachelor of Science degree. He also holds a Master of Arts Degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College.

General Barno served in a variety of command and staff positions in the continental United States and around the world, and he has participated in unit deployments to Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Germany, Grenada, Panama, New Zealand, Honduras, and Hungary. He served in combat as a Ranger company commander in Grenada during Operation Urgent Fury (1983) and as a Ranger battalion operations officer in Panama during Operation Just Cause (1989). General Barno commanded a parachute Infantry Battalion in the 82nd Airborne Division and later commanded the 2nd Ranger Battalion, completing his third tour with the 75th Ranger Regiment. Following brigade command at Fort Polk, Louisiana, he directed the Joint Task Force training program at what is now United States Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia.

Following selection to Brigadier General, he was assigned in June 1999 as the Assistant Division Commander (Operations) of the 25th Infantry Division (Light) at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and in June 2000, as the Deputy Director of Operations, United States Pacific Command. Following selection to major general in 2001, he served as Commanding General, United States Army Training Center and Fort Jackson. During this tour, he deployed to Hungary in 2003 as the Commanding General of Task Force Warrior with the mission to train the free Iraqi forces in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

General Barno deployed in October 2003 to Afghanistan, Commanding over 20,000 U.S. and Coalition Forces in Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. For 19 months in this position, he was responsible to U.S. Central Command for regional efforts in Afghanistan, most of Pakistan, and the southern parts of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. His duties involved close coordination with the

United States State Department, the government of Afghanistan, the United Nations, NATO International Security Assistance Force and the senior military leaders of many surrounding nations.

General Barno assumed duties as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management on 15 June 2005.

Dr. Hans Binnendijk, Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security Policy and Director of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Dr. Hans Binnendijk, the Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security Policy and Director of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. He previously served on the National Security Council as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control (1999-2001). From 1994 to 1999, Dr. Binnendijk was Director. Dr. Hans Binnendijk is currently the Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Prior to that he was Principal Deputy Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff (1993-1994). He also served as Deputy Staff Director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1980-1985). He has received numerous awards for his government services, including two Distinguished Public Service Awards.

In academia, Dr. Binnendijk was Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, where he was also the Marshall B. Coyne Research Professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (1991-1993). He was Deputy Director and Director of Studies at London's International Institute for Strategic Studies and Editor of *Survival* from 1988-1991. He is author or co-author of about 100 articles and reports, and is a frequent contributor to *The International Herald Tribune, The Washington Quarterly, Strategic Forum* and *Defense Horizons*

Dr. Binnendijk serves on the Board of Overseers of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and the Studies Committee of the Council on Foreign Relations. He has previously served on the U.S. Committee of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and on the International Advisory Committee of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Dr. Binnendijk is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and received his Ph.D. in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Ambassador Clifford G. Bond, Department of National Security Studies, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University

Ambassador Bond is a career Foreign Service officer with the rank of Minister-Counselor. He has worked at the U.S. Mission to the then European Communities and U.S. Embassies in Belgrade, Stockholm, Prague and Moscow holding a number of political, economic, and commercial assignments. In Washington he has worked on coordinating assistance to Eastern Europe and on relations with the states of the former Soviet Union. Prior to his appointment as Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina, he served as the Director of the Office of Caucasus and Central Asian Affairs. Ambassador Bond received his undergraduate degree from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and a graduate degree from the London School of Economics. He also attended the National War College and Osgoode Hall Law School in Ontario. He is currently serving on the faculty of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, in Washington DC.

LTG Paul G. Cerjan, USA (Ret.), Vice Chairman, National Defense University Foundation

Lieutenant General Paul G. Cerjan, U.S. Army (Ret.) is currently the Vice Chairman of the National Defense University Foundation at Fort McNair in Washington, D. C.

General Cerjan served as the President of the National Defense University from August 1992 to July 1994. He spent the majority of his military career in command and senior staff positions in seven different divisions in the United States Army. His other assignments included serving as the Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Army-Europe and Seventh Army; Commander, 21st Theater Army Area Command in Kaiserslautern, Germany; and Commandant of the Army War College.

After military retirement he became the Director of Land Operations for Loral Corporation and subsequently the Director of Intelligent Transportation Systems for Lockheed-Martin Corporation. He served as President of Regent University from August 1997 to September 2000.

From July 2004 to August 2005, he served as Vice President/Program Manager, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP III), Mid-East and Central Asia for Kellog, Brown, and Root, Inc. In this capacity, he supported all U.S. and Coalition forces in 9 countries, principally Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait.

He holds a Master of Science degree in Construction Management

from Oklahoma State University and a Bachelor of Science in Engineering from the United States Military Academy at West Point. He attended the U. S. Army War College and the U.S. Command and General Staff College, as well as the Senior Government Leaders Course at Harvard University.

Dr. B. F. Cooling, Associate Dean of Academic Programs, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University

Dr. Cooling is the currently Associate Dean of Academic Programs at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Formerly the chair of the Department of Grand Strategy and Mobilization, he has been on the faculty since 1995. He teaches courses in core strategy curriculum, as well as an elective entitled Business and the American Way of War. A graduate of Rutgers University with advanced degrees from the University of Pennsylvania, he is a veteran of the U.S. Army Reserve of the Cold War. Before joining ICAF, he served with Interior, Army, Air Force and Energy departmental history programs, as well as teaching at the University of Pennsylvania, Weidner University, Army War College and George Washington University.

He has written or edited numerous books and articles in military, naval and air history. Among his publications that have a connection to the subject of the symposium, he is the author of *Gray Steel and Bluewater Navy* (1979), and the editor of *War, Business and American Society* (1977) and *War, Business, and World Military Industrial Complexes* (1981).

Anthony Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Anthony Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He is also a national security analyst for ABC News. His analysis has been featured prominently during the Gulf War, Desert Fox, the conflict in Kosovo, the fighting in Afghanistan, and the Iraq War. During his time at CSIS, he has been director of the Gulf Net Assessment Project, the Gulf in Transition Study, and principle investigator of the CSIS Homeland Defense Project. He has led studies on national missile defense, asymmetric warfare and weapons of mass destruction, and critical infrastructure protection.

He directed the CSIS Middle East Net Assessment Project and acted as co-director of the CSIS Strategic Energy Initiative. He is the author of a

wide range of studies on U.S. security policy, energy policy, and Middle East policy these are available from the CSIS Web site (www.csis.org).

Professor Cordesman has formerly served as national security assistant to Senator John McCain of the Senate Armed Services Committee, as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. He directed the analysis of the lessons of the October War for the secretary of defense in 1974, coordinating U.S. military, intelligence, and civilian analysis of the conflict, and he has served in numerous other government positions, including in the State Department and on NATO International Staff. He also served as director of policy and planning for resource applications in the Department of Energy, and he has had a number of foreign assignments, including posts in Lebanon, Egypt, and Iran, and worked extensively in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Professor Cordesman is the author of more than 20 books, including a four-volume series on the lessons of modern war. He has been awarded the Department of Defense Distinguished Service medal, is a former adjunct professor of national security studies at Georgetown University, and has twice been a Wilson fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars.

Ambassador James F. Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, The RAND Corporation

Ambassador Dobbins directs RAND's International Security and Defense Policy Center. He has held State Department and White House posts including Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, Special Assistant to the President for the Western Hemisphere, Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State for the Balkans, and Ambassador to the European Community. He has handled a variety of crisis management assignments as the Clinton Administration's special envoy for Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and the Bush Administration's first special envoy for Afghanistan. He is principal author of the two volume *RAND History of Nation Building*.

In the wake of Sept. 11, 2001, Ambassador Dobbins was designated as the Bush Administration's representative to the Afghan opposition. Dobbins helped organize and then represented the United States at the Bonn Conference where a new Afghan government was formed. On Dec. 16, 2001, he raised the flag over the newly reopened U.S. Embassy.

Earlier in his State Department career Dobbins served twice as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, as Deputy Chief of Mission in Germany, and as Acting Assistant Secretary for Europe.

Dobbins graduated from the Georgetown School of Foreign Service and served 3 years in the U.S. Navy.

Dr. Alan Gropman, Department of National Security Studies, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University

Dr. Alan Gropman is the Distinguished Professor of National Security Policy at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He served 27 years in the United States Air Force, including two tours in Vietnam where he accumulated more than 670 combat missions. He also served as a war planner in Europe and the Pentagon, retiring as a Colonel. He earned the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Air Medal with five oak leaf clusters, and the Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm among other awards and decorations. He has a Ph.D. from Tufts University, earned a diploma from the National War College, and is a distinguished graduate of the Air War College. He is also an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University. He has published three books and edited one, and authored more than 250 book reviews, essays, op-ed pieces, articles, and book chapters.

Ambassador Carlos Pascual, Vice President and Director of the Foreign Policy Studies Program, The Brookings Institution

Carlos Pascual is the vice president and director of the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. Mr. Pascual's career included stints at the United States Department of State, the National Security Council (NSC), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Before joining the Brookings Institution, Mr. Pascual served as coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the United States Department of State, where he led and coordinated U.S. Government planning to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife. The primary focus of his work was Sudan, Haiti, and several conflict prevention activities in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Prior to serving as coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Mr. Pascual was coordinator for U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia (2003) where he guided the development of regional and country assistance strategies to promote market-orientated and democratic states and to ensure U.S. assistance reinforces American interest.

From October 2000-August 2003, Mr. Pascual served as U.S.

Ambassador to Ukraine. He oversaw U.S. policy focused on promoting Ukrainian reforms critical to its integration with the Euro-Atlantic Community. Mr. Pascual served as special assistant to the President and was NSC senior director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia from July 1998 to January 2000. He advised the President on U.S. policy to advance security interest with Russia.

Prior to working at the NSC, Mr. Pascual held several important positions at the U.S. Agency for International Development. Mr. Pascual received his M.P.P from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 1982 and his B.A. from Stanford University in 1980.

Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., Senior Advisor, Office of the Coordinator, Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State

Bill Taylor is currently a senior advisor to the Coordinator, Reconstruction and Stabilization in the U.S. Department of State. Until February 2006, he was the U.S. government's representative to the Quartet's effort to facilitate Israeli disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank, led by Special Envoy James Wolfensohn in Jerusalem.

Prior to this assignment, Ambassador Taylor served in Baghdad as Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (2004-2005), in Kabul as coordinator of U.S. Government and international assistance to Afghanistan (2002-2003), and as coordinator of U.S. Government assistance to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (1992-2002).

He previously served in Brussels as deputy defense advisor at the U.S. Mission to NATO, in Washington on the staff of Senator Bill Bradley, and at the National Defense University and in the U.S. Department of Energy.

As an infantry officer in the U.S. Army, he served in Vietnam and Germany.

He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government.

General Carl E. Vuono, USA (Ret.), President MPRI Inc.

General Carl E. Vuono is one of the most distinguished and accomplished American soldiers of the 20th Century, having served the American people in peace and war for 34 years while in the uniform of the nation and then continuing to apply his expertise and leadership in meeting national security challenges after his retirement from active service.

Appointed to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, he graduated in 1957 and was commissioned a lieutenant in the Field Artillery. As a junior officer, he learned his trade and honed his leadership skills in a variety of assignments within the United States and overseas. These early assignments in his career prepared him for the rigors of combat command in Vietnam where he served two battlefield tours of duty. During his second tour, he commanded two field artillery battalions, leading his soldiers with skill, valor and distinction.

In 1987, General Vuono was selected to be the thirty-first Chief of Staff of the United States Army. Immediately upon assuming his duties, he recognized that significant challenges were on the horizon, and he set in motion a range of historic initiatives that would prepare the Army for revolutionary changes in the international environment that were to come. As guiding principles for preparing the Army for a new world order, General Vuono established six imperatives (training, doctrine, personnel, structure, leaders and equipment) that served as a roadmap in meeting the unforeseen challenges that the Army would confront during General Vuono's service as Chief of Staff.

In February, 1991, the Army demonstrated the results of General Vuono's uncompromising adherence to the six imperatives. In 100 hours, two full heavy U.S. corps, operating as part of an international coalition, destroyed the fourth largest army in the world, liberated Kuwait and anchored peace and stability in the Gulf. The victory, unprecedented in both scope and intensity, underscored General Vuono's leadership—for this was the Army that he had shaped, and this was the Army that he led.

Desert Storm was the exclamation point to a 34-year military career—but it by no means ended General Vuono's contributions to the Army or to the nation. Following his retirement in 1991, General Vuono assumed the leadership of MPRI—a company consisting almost entirely of retired military leaders who brought their experience and expertise to bear in support of U.S. national security objectives around the world

A leader of vision, pragmatism and uncompromising values, General Carl E. Vuono shaped the Army into the finest fighting force in our nation's history, and he continues to apply his professional capabilities and personal honor to the challenges of the world of today.

Symposium Proceedings Editor

Dr. Shannon A. Brown holds a Ph.D. from the University of California at Santa Cruz, where his studies focused on the history of technology and modern world history. Now serving as an associate professor in the department of National Security Studies at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Dr. Brown worked in and around Washington, D.C., as a contract historian and analyst for a number of years. His clients have included the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and a variety of private organizations and companies, among them the National Electrical Manufacturers Association and the Tokyo Electric Power Company. He is the editor of *Providing the Means of War: Historical Perspectives on Defense Acquisition, 1945-2000* (U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005) and several articles on technology and military subjects. Dr. Brown teaches graduate-level history courses on military technology and urban infrastructure as a visiting professor of Science and Technology Studies at Virginia Polytechnic and State University's NoVa Graduate Center in Alexandria, Virginia.

ANNEX: SYMPOSIUM PROGRAM

23 March 2006

Eisenhower National Security Series Symposium
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)
National Defense University
Resourcing Stability Operations and Reconstruction: Past, Present, and Future

0745 - 0830 Registration and Continental Breakfast (Eisenhower Hall, Room 107)

0830 - 0845 Administrative Remarks
Opening Remarks - **Major General Frances Wilson, USMC**, Commandant, ICAF
Opening Remarks - **Lieutenant General James J. Lovelace, USA**, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7

0845 - 0945 *Resourcing Stability Operations & Reconstruction, a Historical Perspective*
Dr. B.F. Cooling & Dr. Alan Gropman, Department of National Security Studies, ICAF

0945 - 1000 Break

1000 - 1200 Panel 1:
Issues and Challenges in Stability Operations and Reconstruction

Moderator: **Ambassador Cliff Bond**, former US ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Department of National Security Studies, ICAF

Overview Speaker: **Right Honorable Lord Paddy Ashdown** of Norton-sub-Hamdon GCMG KBE PC, former UN High Representative Boznia and Herzegovina

Panel Remarks and Discussion & Question and Answer Period
- **Right Honorbale Lord Paddy Ashdown**
- **Ambassador James Dobbins**, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation

- **Paul G. Cerjan, LTG, USA (Ret)**, former Vice President and Program Manager, LOGCAP III, Kellogg, Brown, and Root
- **Anthony Cordesman**, Arleigh A, Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies

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1200 - 1400 Lunch Break

1300 - 1345 (Optional) Tour of Historic Fort McNair
Departs from main lobby of Marshall Hall, bdlg 62

1215 - 1345 Luncheon (by invitation): *Resourcing Stability Operations & Reconstruction: A Perspective from Capitol Hill*
Speaker: **Senator Richard G. Lugar**
Location: Ft. McNair's Officer's Club

1400 - 1600 Panel 2: *Resourcing Stability Operations & Reconstruction: Recommendations for the Future*

Moderator: **Dr. Hans Binnendijk**, Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security Policy and Director, Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Overview Speaker: **Ambassador Carlos Pascual**, Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy Studies Program, Brookings Institution, and former Coordinator, Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, US Department of State

Panel Remarks and Discussion & Question and Answer Period
- **Ambassador Carlos Pascual**
- **Gen Carl E. Vuono, USA (Ret)**, former Chief Of Staff US Army, President, L-3 MPRI
- **Ambassador William "Bill" Taylor**, former Coordinator for Assistance to Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and former Director Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
- **LTG David W. Barno**, USA, Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, US Army, and former Commander, Military Operations-Afghanistan, later redesignated Combind Forces Command-Afghanistan, United States Central Command, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan

1600 Concluding Remarks